

### LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) <b>DIABLO CANYON, UNIT 1</b>	DOCKET NUMBER (2) <b>0 5 0 0 0 0</b>	PAGE (3) <b>1 OF 0 2</b>
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TITLE (4)  
**GASEOUS RADWASTE OXYGEN CONCENTRATION EXCEEDS LCO**

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)
1	0	2	6	8	4	8	4	-	<b>0 2 7 - 0 0</b>		<b>0 5 0 0 0 3 2 3</b>
1	0	2	6	8	4	8	4	-	<b>0 2 7 - 0 0</b>		<b>0 5 0 0 0 3 2 3</b>

OPERATING MODE (9) <b>5</b>	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)				
POWER LEVEL (10) <b>0 0 0</b>	20.402(b)	20.405(e)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)	
	20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(e)	
	20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form JDBA)
	20.405(a)(1)(iii)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)		
	20.405(a)(1)(iv)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)		
	20.405(a)(1)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(ix)		

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)		TELEPHONE NUMBER
NAME <b>DAVID P. SISK, REGULATORY COMPLIANCE ENGINEER</b>	AREA CODE <b>8 0 5</b>	<b>5 9 5 - 7 3 5 1</b>

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

While in Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown), the concentration of oxygen in the Gaseous Radwaste System exceeded 4 percent by volume for 1 hour and 55 minutes. This exceeded the 1 hour limiting condition for operation of Technical Specification 3.11.2.5 action item b.

This event was the result of a failure by Unit 2 operational personnel to coordinate the operation of a common system with Unit 1 operational personnel as required by Operating Orders. During Unit 2 hot functional tests, the Low Pressure Nitrogen System (LPNS) was inadvertently depressurized and a slight vacuum was drawn on the system. The LPNS is a system shared by Units 1 and 2. With the LPNS under a slight vacuum, air was drawn into the system. Since the LPNS supplies cover gas to certain tanks which vent to the Gaseous Radwaste System, air was introduced into the Gaseous Radwaste System causing the oxygen concentration to increase.

Immediate corrective action was taken by repressurizing the LPNS with nitrogen, hence, diluting the oxygen in the Gaseous Radwaste System to a level below two percent.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)  DIABLO CANYON UNIT 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2)		LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER					
	0 5 0 0 0 2 7 5	8 4	- 0 2 7	- 0 0	0 2	OF	0 2	

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

On October 26, 1984, at 0111 PDT, the 1 hour action statement of Technical Specification 3.11.2.5, action b was exceeded. Action b requires that if the oxygen concentration in the Gaseous Radwaste System (WE) is found to be greater than 4 percent by volume, immediately suspend all additions of waste gases to the system and reduce the concentration to less than or equal to 4 percent within 1 hour and 2 percent within 48 hours after initially exceeding 2 percent. Though no measurable gaseous radwaste was present in the system at the time of the incident, action was taken suspending further additions to the system. Monitor ANI 76, which samples the waste gas compressor discharge header, indicated an oxygen concentration greater than 4 percent for 1 hour and 55 minutes and greater than 2 percent for 2 hours and 5 minutes.

This event was caused by Unit 2 nonlicensed operational personnel failing to coordinate an operation of a common system with Unit 1 operational personnel as required by Operating Orders. During Unit 2 hot functional tests, the Low Pressure Nitrogen System (LK) was inadvertently depressurized and a slight vacuum was drawn on the system. With the LPNS under a slight vacuum, air was drawn into the system. Since the LPNS supplies cover gas to certain tanks which vent to the Gaseous Radwaste System, the air was introduced into the Gaseous Radwaste System causing the oxygen concentration to increase.

The immediate corrective action was to repressurize the LPNS with nitrogen and dilute the oxygen in the Gaseous Radwaste System to a level below two percent.

A contributing factor was that due to the higher than normal use of nitrogen during startup and functional testing of Unit 2, the normal LPNS supply is bypassed, and bulk storage liquid nitrogen is used in its place. This temporary configuration bypasses the normal low pressure alarm that warns operators of low nitrogen supply in this common system. This configuration will be normalized prior to Unit 2 heatup following fuel loading.

To prevent recurrence, all Unit 1 and Unit 2 operations personnel have reviewed the causes of the event. This review reemphasized the importance of Unit 1 and Unit 2 personnel interfacing with each other during the operation of common systems.

This event had no safety consequences and in no way affected the health and safety of the public since the Gaseous Radwaste System contained no measurable radioactivity at the time of the incident. Had this event occurred at full power, the health and safety of the public would not be adversely affected. This is a previously analyzed accident (see FSAR Section 15.5.24).

# PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

PG&E



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JAMES D. SHIFFER  
VICE PRESIDENT  
NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION

November 26, 1984

PGandE Letter No.: DCL-84-356

Document Control Desk  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Re: Docket No. 50-275, OL-DPR-80  
Diablo Canyon Unit 1  
Licensee Event Report 84-027-00  
Gaseous Radwaste Oxygen Concentration

Gentlemen:

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i), PGandE is submitting the enclosed Licensee Event Report concerning an event where the Gaseous Radwaste System oxygen concentration was not within the allowable limits of the Technical Specifications.

This event has in no way affected the public's health and safety.

Sincerely,

Enclosure

cc: J. B. Martin  
Service List

IE22  
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