

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401

400 Chestnut Street Tower II

3 410 26
March 21, 1984

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
ATTN: James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator
101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30303


Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

In my August 4, 1982 letter to you on IE Inspection Report Nos. 50-259/82-11, -260/82-11, and -296/82-11, we committed to provide you with the results of our evaluation regarding instrument, vent, and drain line supports by January 17, 1984. We notified R. Butcher of your staff of our failure to meet this commitment in a February 27, 1984 conference call. Follow-up conference calls on this subject were held on March 2 and March 5, 1984. Enclosed is our supplemental response as outlined in our conference calls with your staff. If you have any questions, please call Jim Domer at FTS 858-2725.

To the best of my knowledge, I declare the statements contained herein are complete and true.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY



L. M. Mills, Manager
Nuclear Licensing

Enclosure

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PDR ADOCK 05000259
Q PDR

ENCLOSURE
SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSE - NRC INSPECTION REPORT NOS.
50-259/82-11, 50-260/82-11, AND 50-296/82-11
R. C. LEWIS'S LETTER TO H. G. PARRIS
DATED JUNE 16, 1982

This supplemental response provides the details of the inspection of suspect safety-related piping in units 1 and 2 for possible inadequately supported test, vent, or drain connections.

The inspection of safety-related piping in units 1 and 2 for possible inadequately supported test, vent, or drain connections was completed on unit 1 by July 13, 1983, and on unit 2 by November 15, 1982. Inspection of unit 3 was not required since unit 3 has a issued standard drawing depicting vent drain and test connection tiedowns.

On unit 1, 36 supports were evaluated. Twenty-two supports required additional support to comply with Civil Engineering Branch (CEB) guidelines. Two supports on the reactor water cleanup system were modified to comply with CEB guidelines during the cycle 5 refueling outage. The remaining 20 supports are scheduled to be modified during the cycle 6 refueling outage.

On unit 2, 43 supports were evaluated. Fourteen of the configurations required additional support to comply with CEB guidelines. Six supports which were in the primary containment were modified to comply with CEB guidelines during cycle 4 refueling outage. The remaining eight supports are scheduled to be completed during the cycle 5 refueling outage.

A safety evaluation has been made and none of those test, vent, or drain connections not repaired will require additional supports before the end of their current operating cycle.

With respect to TVA's Sequoyah, Watts Bar, and Bellefonte plants, the following has been determined through discussions with EN DES CEB personnel. CEB Report 75-18 covers the particular design criteria to be utilized for Sequoyah and Watts Bar. CEB Report 81-56 addresses the same design criteria for Bellefonte. Therefore, TVA does not believe that such a problem exists at Sequoyah, Watts Bar, and Bellefonte.