



**Florida
Power**
CORPORATION

November 21, 1984
3F1184-04

Mr. J. P. O'Reilly
Regional Administrator, Region II
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
101 Marietta Street N.W., Suite 2900
Atlanta, GA 30323

Subject: Crystal River Unit 3
Docket No. 50-302
Operating License No. DPR-72
IE Inspection Report No. 78-16
Supplemental Response

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

Florida Power Corporation (FPC) provides the attached as our supplemental response to Infraction 78-16-03. FPC's original response was submitted on July 28, 1978. In that response, FPC committed, in part, to post signs in the Reactor Building and Spent Fuel Area . . . "directing crane operators to make no lifts over pools or the reactor vessel while they contain fuel, except with a PRC approved procedure." As a result of FPC's effort to meet the guidance of NUREG-0612, FPC initiated, in September 1981, an intensive training program for crane operation. The training program includes an annual classroom requalification. Part of this training emphasizes the use of OP-421 and associated procedures, all of which are PRC approved. No one is allowed to operate a crane without having had this training. The objective is to provide safe crane operation around safety related equipment, including the Reactor Building and Spent Fuel Area. Through this training program, FPC meets the intent of the commitment to post signs in the Reactor Building and Spent Fuel Area. Therefore, the commitment to post signs is no longer necessary, and FPC is revising its original response to delete this commitment.

Sincerely,

E. C. Simpson
Director, Nuclear Operations
Engineering and Licensing

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Attachment

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FLORIDA POWER CORPORATION
RESPONSE

Inspection Report 78-16

Infraction 78-16-03

Criterion VIII to 10 CFR 50 Appendix B (Identification and Control of Material, Parts, and Components) requires the establishment of measures to prevent the use of incorrect or defective material in safety-related activities. Criterion XIV to 10 CFR 50 Appendix B (Inspection, Test, and Operating Status) requires the establishment of measures, such as tagging or marking to indicate the status of inspection or tests on components, to preclude their inadvertent use. These criteria are implemented, in part, by Section 1.7.6.7 (Operation QA Program) of the FSAR, and by the licensee's Quality Program Policies 8.1 (Identification and Traceability of Items Used During the Operational Phase) and 14.1 (Inspection, Test, and Operating Status).

Contrary to the above, the hook used to lift a 2050 lb. test weight in the spent fuel pool (adjacent to nuclear fuel assemblies) was locally manufactured from non-certified material, was not load tested or qualified prior to use, and was not tagged or marked as to the limitations on its use. The failure of this hook on June 9, 1978 while in use contributed to the damage to fuel assembly A-48.

Response

Surveillance Procedure SP-601 (Procedure for Load Testing of Slings) covers the load testing of slings and chokers, but did not specifically address the load testing of shackles and hooks.

SP-601 has been revised to specify that, in addition to load testing, all shackles and hooks will be tagged as to the load rating, and all special purpose lifting equipment will be tagged to identify the purpose for which it was designed.

To ensure that all concerned plant personnel are aware of the additional requirements for identifying, controlling and selecting equipment used in rigging, each first-line supervisor has been directed to formally discuss (and confirm that he had discussed) the new requirements with each of his personnel.

Full compliance has been achieved as of July 28, 1978.