

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401

400 Chestnut Street, Tower II

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January 21, 1985

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
Attn: Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator
101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30323

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - NRC-OIE REGION II INSPECTION REPORT
50-327/84-35 AND 50-328/84-35 - RESPONSE TO VIOLATION

The subject OIE inspection report dated December 28, 1984 from
D. M. Verrelli to H. G. Parris cited TVA with one Severity Level V
Violation. Enclosed is the response to the item of violation in the
subject inspection report.

If you have any questions, please get in touch with R. H. Shell at
FTS 858-2688.

To the best of my knowledge, I declare the statements contained herein are
complete and true.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

R. H. Shell

R. H. Shell
Nuclear Engineer

Enclosure

cc (Enclosure):

Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Records Center
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ENCLOSURE

RESPONSE - NRC-OIE INSPECTION REPORT
NOS. 50-327/84-35 AND 50-328/84-35
D. M. VERRELLI'S LETTER TO H. G. PARRIS
DATED DECEMBER 28, 1984

Items 50-327/84-35 and 50-328/84-35

Technical Specification 6.8.1 requires that written procedures be established, covering activities referenced in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, February 1978. Paragraph 3 of Appendix A requires specific procedures for the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS). System Operating Instruction (SOI)-63.1 was established to satisfy this requirement.

Contrary to the above, adequate procedures were not established in that Valve Checklists 63.1A-3 and 63.1A-4, Revision 26, of SOI-63.1, Emergency Core Cooling System, Revision 30, each failed to list a level transmitter root valve for the cold leg accumulators.

This is a Severity Level V violation (Supplement I).

1. Admission or Denial of the Alleged Violation

TVA admits the violation occurred as stated.

2. Reason for the Violation if Admitted

During original compilation or subsequent revision of the valve checklist, root valve 63.362A for level transmitter LT-63-81 and root valve 63-366A for level transmitter LT-63-60 were inadvertently left out.

3. Corrective Steps Which Have Been Taken and Results Achieved

A temporary change was made to the procedures involved on November 29, 1984, to include the missing root valves. On December 12, 1984, the temporary procedure change became a permanent revision.

4. Corrective Steps Which Will Be Taken To Avoid Further Violations

Personnel periodically review procedures which involve the operation of the plant. Procedures will continue to be verified for accuracy, and to reflect the current status of the plant on a continuing basis. We believe this inadvertent deletion of the two root valves to be an isolated occurrence, and no other corrective actions are required.

5. Date When Full Compliance Will Be Achieved

Full compliance was achieved on December 12, 1984.