Omaha Public Power District
P.O. Box 399 Hwy. 75 - North of Ft. Calhoun Fort Calhoun, NE 68023-0399
402/636-2000

August 21, 1992
LIC-92-257L

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attn: Document Control Desk
Mail Station P1-137
Washington, DC 20555

Reference: Docket No. 50-285

Gentlemen:

Subject: Licensee Event Report 92-025 for the Fort Calhoun Station

Please find attached Licensee Event Report 92-025 dated August 21, 1992. This report is being submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv). If you should have any questions, please contact me.

Sincerely,

W. G. Gates

W. G. Gates
Division Manager
Nuclear Operations

WGG/lah

Attachment

c: J. L. Milhoan, NRC Regional Administrator, Region IV
S. D. Bloom, Acting NRC Project Manager
R. P. Mullikin, NRC Senior Resident Inspector
INPO Records Center

250092

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NRC FORM 366 (6-89) | U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 4/30/92

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
Fort Calhoun Station Unit No. 1	0 5 0 0 0 2 8 5	1 OF 0 3

TITLE (4)
Inadvertent Manual Start of Emergency Diesel Generator at the Local Control Panel

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
0 7	2 3	9 2	9 2	0 2 5	0 0	0 8	2 1	9 2	N	0 5 0 0 0
										0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9)	1	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)			
POWER LEVEL (10)	0 2 9	20.402(b)	20.405(c)	X 50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
		20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
		20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
William J. Blessie, Shift Technical Advisor	AREA CODE 4 0 2 5 3 3 - 6 8 9 6

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

On July 23, 1992 at 1400, Emergency Diesel Generator DG-2 was started (to idle speed) when an operator performing a Surveillance Test inadvertently pushed the normal start button instead of the alarm acknowledge button.

The significance of this event is minimal based on the fact that Diesel Generator DG-1 was operable and in emergency standby mode, ready to supply power had the need arisen. Additionally, DG-2 could have been manually brought up to rated speed and voltage, and loaded to supply power.

The primary cause of this incident was determined to be lack of self-checking to ensure an intended action was correct.

Corrective actions will include reemphasizing the importance of self-checking with operations personnel and an evaluation of the human factors considerations for the DG-1 and DG-2 local control panels.

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's)(17)

The Fort Calhoun Station (FCS) Emergency Diesel Generators (DG-1 and DG-2) are designed to furnish a reliable source of 4160V AC power for safe plant shutdown and operation of Engineered Safeguards when the normal sources of off-site power are lost. The diesel generators are normally aligned in a standby mode, ready to automatically start, come up to rated speed and voltage and energize their respective Engineered Safeguards bus when required.

On July 23, 1992, FCS was in Mode 1 (Power Operation), operating at 29% power and holding for a boric acid soak of the steam generators and to ensure primary and secondary chemistry were within specification prior to increasing power. At approximately 1300, a job briefing was held between the two operators who were to perform Surveillance Test Procedure OP-ST-ESF-0010, "Channel 'B' Safety Injection, Containment Spray and Recirculation Actuation Signal Test." During the initial line-up for performing the test, DG-2 is taken from emergency standby mode to local control mode with Engine/Generator Selector Switch 143/SS, at the DG-2 local control panel, to prevent an auto-start of DG-2. Both operators had successfully performed the test in the past, however, the operator sent to isolate DG-2 had not performed the test in over a year.

At 1400 Switch 143/SS for DG-2 was taken from emergency standby mode to local control mode which results in an expected alarm. The operator performing the task, intending to push the alarm acknowledge button, inadvertently pushed the normal start button at the local panel instead. This resulted in an inadvertent start of DG-2 to idle speed (500 rpm). The operator immediately notified the Control Room of his action, the start was verified to be inadvertent, and DG-2 was shutdown from the local panel at 1405.

A four-hour non-emergency notification was made to the NRC on July 23, 1992 at 1429, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(ii). This report is being submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv).

The significance of this event is minimal based on the fact that DG-1 was operable and in emergency standby mode, ready to supply power had the need arisen. FCS is capable of achieving and maintaining a safe shutdown condition with one Emergency Diesel Generator. Additionally, DG-2 could have been manually brought up to rated speed (900 rpm) and voltage, and loaded to supply power.

The primary cause of this incident was determined to be lack of self-checking to ensure an intended action was correct. When the operator turned the Switch 143/SS key from emergency standby mode to local control mode, he was at eye level with the annunciator horn. Although the operator expected the annunciator and horn, he was startled by the horn and inadvertently pushed the normal start button instead of the alarm acknowledge button.

A lack of human factors consideration in the design layout of the local diesel generator control panel may have contributed to this event. Switch 143/SS is located between the normal start and emergency start buttons. The alarm acknowledge button is about eleven inches from Switch 143/SS.

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's)(17)

The following corrective actions will be completed:

1) The Operations Supervisor has discussed the importance of self-checking with the operator. Self-checking will be reemphasized with other operations personnel during the next operator training cycle, to be completed by November 15, 1992.

2) An evaluation of the human factors considerations for the local control panels for DG-1 and DG-2 will be performed by November 1, 1992.

Licensee Event Reports 88-007, 88-014, 88-024, 88-026, 90-006, 90-010, 90-012, 90-019, 91-012 and 91-013 discuss previous events involving inadvertent diesel generator starts.