

March 4, 1985

Docket No. 50-285

Mr. R. L. Andrews
Division Manager, Nuclear Production
Omaha Public Power District
1623 Harney Street
Omaha, Nebraska 68102

Dear Mr. Andrews:

In conducting our review of your January 9, 1985 submittal relating to your Appendix R exemption request for Fire Area 34B at the Fort Calhoun Station, Unit No. 1, we have determined that we will need the additional information identified in the enclosure to continue our review.

In order for us to maintain our review schedule, your response is requested within 30 days of your receipt of this letter.

We note that, in your discussion of alternative shutdown capability for Fire Area 34B, you reference technical specifications 2.2 (CVCS), 2.5 (steam and feed water systems including auxiliary feedwater) and 3.9 (auxiliary feedwater). In your response to this letter, we also request that you (1) describe the testing performed on these systems, (2) specify which ones are tested on a monthly basis, and (3) provide the basis for not performing monthly testing for the ones not tested on a monthly basis.

The reporting and/or recordkeeping requirements contained in this letter affect fewer than 10 respondents; therefore, OMB clearance is not required under P.L. 96-511.

Please contact us if you have any questions concerning this letter.

Sincerely,

Original signed by:

James R. Miller, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #3
Division of Licensing

Enclosure: Request for
Additional Information

cc w/enclosure
See next page

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PKreutzer
3/1/85

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REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
APPENDIX R - REQUEST FOR EXEMPTION FA-34B
FORT CALHOUN STATION

1. The response to Question 1.b is not clear. Six valves are listed as being required to be closed. Five valves appear to be powered from Fire Area 34B-West and one from Fire Area 34B-East. It is not clear that the power can be removed from these valves if the fire is in 34B-West and does not trip the appropriate breakers and similarly the single valve in fire area 34B-East. Provide a description of the method to remove power from these valves assuming their respective fires. Provide a discussion of the effects of the loss of coolant as the result of these valves being open until they can be closed from outside of the control room (this assumes spurious operation due to damage of the control cable due to the fire).
2. The response to Question 1.f is concerned with the manpower to perform a safe shutdown and for the fire brigade. It appears that the minimum number of people required to perform a safe shutdown in the event of a fire is seven and the minimum fire brigade size is five for a minimum number of people onsite of 12. The list of personnel provided in the response only lists 10 people. Provide a revised response which clearly specifies the minimum personnel requirements for a safe shutdown in the event of a fire and in the fire brigade and list each person, by title, for both groups.
3. Table 1 indicates that isolation of some of the alternate shutdown equipment is by means of fuses. Verify that no fuses will be pulled in order to isolate the equipment.