

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401  
400 Chestnut Street Tower II

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BLRD-50-438/84-42  
BLRD-50-439/84-38

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Region II  
Attn: Dr. J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator  
101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900  
Atlanta, Georgia 30323

Dear Dr. Grace:


BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - CONTROL ROOM PRESSURIZATION BOUNDARY  
LOSS THROUGH DRAIN AND VENT LINES - BLRD-50-438/84-42, BLRD-50-439/84-38 -  
SECOND INTERIM REPORT

The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-OIE Inspector  
P. E. Fredrickson on June 25, 1984 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) as  
NCR BLN BLP 8407. Our first interim report was submitted July 25, 1984.  
Enclosed is our second interim report. We expect to submit our next report on  
or about March 5, 1986.

If you have any questions, please get in touch with R. H. Shell at  
FTS 858-2688.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY



J. W. Hufham, Manager  
Licensing and Regulations

Enclosure

cc: Mr. James Taylor, Director (Enclosure)  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Records Center (Enclosure)  
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations  
1100 Circle 75 Parkway, Suite 1500  
Atlanta, Georgia 30339

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ENCLOSURE

BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2  
CONTROL ROOM PRESSURIZATION BOUNDARY LOSS THROUGH DRAIN AND VENT LINES  
BLRD-50-438/84-42, BLRD-50-439/84-38  
NCR BLN BLP 8407  
10 CFR 50.55(e)  
SECOND INTERIM REPORT

Description of Deficiency

During a design review initiated to investigate the generic concerns of Watts Bar nonconformance report (NCR) WBN WBP 8335 (WBRD-50-390/83-70, 50-391/83-65), TVA determined that a similar condition exists at Bellefonte (BLN). Floor, equipment and sanitary facility vent and drain lines which penetrate the floor and roof slabs of the main control room (MCR) and technical support center (TSC) are not adequately designed to prevent air leakage into the MCR habitability system pressurization boundary. There is no assurance that traps will maintain enough water to seal off leak paths into the habitability zone nor, in most cases, are pipes sufficiently supported to maintain their pressure boundary in the case of a seismic event.

Interim Progress

TVA is in the process of changing plant design so that drain, vent, and potable water piping for the sanitary facilities that penetrate the pressurization boundary shall be manually isolated if a failure occurs during a seismic event. A segment of piping at each penetration shall be seismically supported and provided with a manual isolation valve. Floor drainage piping that penetrates the pressurization boundary shall be seismically supported to maintain the pressure boundary and shall be provided with loop seals.