


RESAR-SP/90 INSTRUMENTATION & CONTROLS AND ELECTRIC POWER

WESTINGHOUSE
ADVANCED PRESSURIZED
WATER REACTOR



STANDARD PLANT DESIGN

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PDR ADOCK 05000601
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Category II

Those sections which are complete insofar as providing material relevant to this system module but for which additional information will be provided in support of subsequent modules.

Category III

Those sections for which information on interfacing systems will be provided at a later date.

NA

Those sections for which categorization is not applicable. Only the section titles are included for clarity.

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