



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION  
RELAXATION OF REGULATORY GUIDE 1.97  
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION REQUIREMENTS FOR ACCUMULATOR  
PRESSURE AND LEVEL INSTRUMENTATION AT PRESSURIZED WATER REACTORS  
DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY  
OHIO EDISON COMPANY  
THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING COMPANY  
THE TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY  
BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 2  
DOCKET NO. 50-412

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Section 6.2 of Generic Letter 82-33 requested licensees to provide a report on their implementation of Regulatory Guide (R.G.) 1.97 (Rev. 2), and their methods for complying with the Commission's regulations including a supporting technical justification of any proposed alternatives or deviations. A review of the licensees' submittals was performed by the staff and a safety evaluation (SE) was issued for each plant. These SEs concluded that the licensees either conformed to the guidance of the Regulatory Guide for each post-accident monitoring (PAM) variable or adequately justified any deviations, except for the variables identified in the SE.

Exceptions were identified for the accumulator level and pressure monitoring instrumentation. A large number of the exception requests were for relaxing the equipment qualification (EQ) requirement from Category 2 to Category 3. Category 3 qualification allows the use of commercial grade instruments for certain applications. However, none of the submittals requesting the exceptions provided sufficient justification for granting the exception. These requests were denied to the licensees and applicants whose R.G. 1.97 compliance SEs were issued by the staff before 1987. Since 1987, exceptions for the accumulator instrumentation were considered by the staff as an open item pending a generic resolution. Thirty-two plants requested relaxation of EQ requirements from Category 2 to Category 3 for the accumulator level and pressure instrumentation.

2.0 EVALUATION

The Code of Federal Regulations 10 CFR 50.49 requires licensees to establish a program for qualifying certain post-accident monitoring equipment. Specific guidance concerning the types of variables to be monitored is provided in R.G.

1.97 (Rev. 2). This guide identifies the accumulator instrumentation as type D variable that provides information to indicate the operation of individual safety systems and other systems important to safety to help the operator in selecting appropriate mitigating actions. The guide lists Category 2 qualification for this instrumentation. The Category 2 qualification criteria require the instrumentation to be qualified in accordance with R.G. 1.89 and the methodology described in NUREG-0588. Additionally, the instrumentation with Category 2 qualification should be energized from a high-reliability power source, not necessarily standby power. In contrast to this, the Category 3 qualification criteria require only an off-site power source and the instrumentation to be only of high-quality commercial grade to withstand the specified service environment (mild environment as defined in 10 CFR 50.49, paragraph c).

Qualification criteria for instrumentation are established based on the safety function of the system whose variables are being monitored. The selection criteria for R.G. 1.97 variables qualification category are based upon whether monitoring of system parameters is needed during and following an accident and whether subsequent operator actions in the operating procedures are dependent on the information provided by this instrumentation.

The accumulators are pressure vessels filled with borated water and pressurized with nitrogen gas. Being a passive system, it provides fast-acting cold leg injection during the injection phase of ECCS operation. Both volume and pressure are monitored to assure the accumulators function in accordance with the FSAR safety analysis.

During normal operation, each accumulator is isolated from the reactor coolant system (RCS) by two check valves in series, and each accumulator's motor operated isolation valve (MOV) is open with its power removed to prevent inadvertent closure. The status of the MOV is assured by the Technical Specification surveillance requirements. Should the RCS pressure decrease below accumulator pressure (as during a loss-of-coolant accident), the check valves open and the nitrogen gas pressure will force the borated water into the RCS. Thus, mechanical operation of each swing-check valve is the only action required to open the injection path from the accumulator to the reactor core. No external power source or initiating signal is needed for the accumulator to perform its safety function. Additionally, when the RCS is at operating pressure, interlocks prevent deliberate closing of the motor operated valves used to isolate the accumulator from the RCS. Isolation from the RCS is not a safety function of the accumulator. Additionally, the accumulator is not designed to perform any post-accident safety function.

The accumulator instrumentation does not perform a safety function during or in a post-accident environment and operator actions to mitigate the effects of an accident do not depend on the information provided by the accumulator instrumentation. Additionally, successful performance of core cooling systems can be inferred from environmentally qualified instrumentation.

### 3.0 CONCLUSION

Based on our review, we conclude that the post-accident monitoring of the accumulator volume and pressure does not perform a safety function and no operator action is based on the information that will require Category 2 qualification of the instrumentation. In lieu of Category 2 qualification, Category 3 qualification of this instrumentation is acceptable.

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