

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Dresden Nuclear Power Station	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 3 7	PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 2
--	--------------------------------------	----------------------

TITLE (4)
Unit 2 Reactor Scrams

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)
0 2	0 6	8 5	8 5	0 0 4		0 0	0 3	0 5 8 5	N/A		0 5 0 0 0
									N/A		0 5 0 0 0

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)

OPERATING MODE (8) N	POWER LEVEL (10) 0 0 0	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.402(b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.406(a)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 80.73(a)(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(b)
		<input type="checkbox"/> 20.406(a)(1)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 80.39(a)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 80.73(a)(2)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(a)
		<input type="checkbox"/> 20.406(a)(1)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 80.39(a)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/> 80.73(a)(2)(vi)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
		<input type="checkbox"/> 20.406(a)(1)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 80.73(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 80.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
		<input type="checkbox"/> 20.406(a)(1)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 80.73(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 80.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
		<input type="checkbox"/> 20.406(a)(1)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 80.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 80.73(a)(2)(ix)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME Mark Leahy (X-422)	TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE: 8 1 5 9 4 2 - 2 9 2 0
----------------------------	--

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPROS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPROS
A				N					

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
---	--	-------------------------------	-------	-----	------

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

While clearing the outage on the 2A-2 RPS shunt breaker for testing following repair, with the unit shut down for refueling, the RPS power supply was switched from reserve (125 volt bus) to normal (RPS MG set). This caused RPS Channel B to become momentarily de-energized, and a full scram occurred. When the Shift Foreman reached the scene, he observed that RPS was on normal power, and thus was powered by an untested breaker. Not knowing of the first scram, he had the power returned to reserve, and a second scram occurred (seven minutes after the first). The Shift Foreman had left a note to the A Operator informing him not to transfer the power from reserve to normal, but the A Operator did not receive the note. To prevent this type of problem from recurring, a procedure will be created to ensure that all prerequisites to RPS power supply transfer have been completed.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1) Dresden Nuclear Power Station	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 3 7	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		
		8 5	- 0 0 4	- 0 0	0 2	OF 0 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

While clearing the outage on the 2A-2 RPS shunt breaker for testing following maintenance, with the unit shut down for refueling, the RPS power supply was switched from reserve (125 volt bus) to normal (RPS MG set). Because of this, RPS Channel B was momentarily de-energized, and a full scram occurred because reactor pressure was less than 600 psig and no condenser vacuum was present. Shortly thereafter, the RPS power supply was returned to reserve, causing a second scram. Safety significance was minimal, as all safety systems operated as designed, and the unit was already in cold shutdown. The last occurrence of this type was reported on RO #84-004, on Docket #050249.

The root cause of the event is personnel error based on insufficient communications. Following repair to the 2A-2 RPS shunt breaker, the Electrical Foreman requested that it be placed back in service for testing. When the Shift Foreman gave the outage checklist to the Unit Operator, he attached a note informing the A Operator not to return the RPS power to normal, but the A Operator did not receive the note. As a result, the A Operator switched over the power supply, as the Electrical Foreman closed the 2A-2 breaker. Because the scram signals from low condenser vacuum and low reactor pressure were not defeated, a scram resulted when the dead-bus RPS power supply transfer was made.

While this was occurring, the Shift Foreman was on his way to meet with the A Operator and the Electrical Foreman. When he arrived, he observed that the RPS power supply was in the normal position. Since the 2A-2 breaker had not been tested following its repair, and not knowing of the first scram, the Shift Foreman had the A Operator return the power supply to reserve. For the same reasons as before, a second scram occurred.

In order to prevent future occurrences of this type, a procedure will be written to ensure that all of the prerequisites to transfer RPS power have been met.



Commonwealth Edison
Dresden Nuclear Power Station
R.R. #1
Morris, Illinois 60450
Telephone 815/942-2920

March 5, 1985

DJS Ltr #85-243

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Licensee Event Report #85-004-0, Docket #050237 is being submitted as required by Technical Specification 6.6, NUREG 1022 and 10 CFR 50.72 (a)(2)(iv).

P.J. Scott
Station Superintendent
Dresden Nuclear Power Station

DJS/kjl

Enclosure

cc: J.G. Keppler, Regional Administrator, Region III
File/NRC
File/Numerical

IE22
1/1