

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION 1

Report No. 50-286/92-21
Docket No. 50-286
License No. D9R-64
Licensee: Power Authority of the State of New York
P.O. Box 215
Buchanan, New York 10511
Facility Name: Indian Point 3 Nuclear Power Plant
Inspection At: Buchanan, New York
Inspection Conducted: July 27-30, 1992

Inspector: Edward B. King 8/5/92
E. B. King, Physical Security Inspector date

Approved by: R. R. Keimig 8-5-92
R. R. Keimig, Chief, Safeguards Section date
Division of Radiation Safety
and Safeguards

Areas Inspected: Licensee Action on Previously Identified Security Violation; Management Support and Security Program Plans; Protected and Vital Area Physical Barriers, Detection and Assessment Aids; Protected and Vital Area Access Control of Personnel, Packages and Vehicles; Alarm Station and Communications; Testing and Maintenance; and Security Training and Qualification.

Results: The program is directed toward public health and safety. The license was found to be in compliance with the NRC requirements in the areas inspected. One previously identified violation was closed. Security program upgrades and enhancements continue to be made and management attention to the program was evident.

DETAILS

1.0 Key Persons Contacted

1.1 Licensee

- *J. Vignola, General Manager, Maintenance
- *J. Fitzsimmons, Security Manager
- *E. Sackman, Deputy Director of Security
- *B. Ray, Manager-Licensing/Operational Experience Review Group (OERG)
- *M. Albright, Instrumentation & Control (I&C) Manager
- *J. Dube, Safety and Fire Protection Manager
- *M. Leonard, Security Supervisor
- *T. Weber, Security Support Coordinator
- *J. Gullick, Site Engineering Manager
- *R. Tansky, Training Manager
- *M. Kyer, Supervisor, Training Support
- *H. Bain, Security Training Specialist
- *J. Cooper, Security Coordinator

1.2 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

- *K. Ihnen, Acting, Senior Resident Inspector
- *A. Lopez-Goldberg, Acting Resident Inspector

*Denotes those present at the exit interview

The inspector also interviewed other licensee security and medical personnel during this inspection.

2.0 Followup of Previously Identified Security Violation

(Closed) VIO 50-286/92-18-01: Failure of several security force members (SFMs) to carry an extra pair of glasses as required.

During previous inspection (50-286/92-18) the inspector determined that several SFMs failed to carry an extra pair of glasses as required by the NRC-approved Indian Point 3, Guard Training and Qualification Plan. Based on a review of the corrective actions which included counseling the errant SFMs, the revision of the shift sergeant's inspection form and a revision to the applicable security training lesson plan, the inspector determined the corrective actions to be adequate.

3.0 Management Support and Plans

3.1 Management Support

Management support for the licensee's physical security program was determined to be consistent with program needs. This determination was based upon the inspector's review of the various aspects of the licensee's program during this inspection as documented in this report.

Security program enhancements made since the last routine physical security inspection (50-286/92-18) were as follows:

- the installation of new state-of-the-art computerized graphic display equipment to enhance assessment response by the alarm station operators; and
- the installation of roof lights and equipment boxes on all security vehicles.

The inspector also noted the cooperative efforts between security and operations personnel to identify and develop enhanced protection strategies for vital plant equipment.

3.2 Plans

The inspector performed a cursory review of changes to the licensee's Guard Training and Qualification (T&Q) plan, as implemented, did not decrease the effectiveness of the respective plan. This revision was in the process of being submitted to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(p).

4.0 Protected and Vital Area Physical Barrier, Detection and Assessment Aids

4.1 Protected Area Barrier

The inspector conducted a physical inspection of the protected area (PA) barrier on July 27, 1992. The inspector determined by observation that the barrier was installed and maintained as described in the NRC-approved Physical Security Plan (the Plan).

4.2 Protected Area Detection Aids

The inspector observed the perimeter detection aids on July 27 and 29, 1992, and determined that they were installed, maintained and operated as committed to in the Plan.

During a previous inspection (50-286/92-18), the inspector noted that testing personnel lacked an in-depth understanding of the operating principles of the detection aids. The licensee was in the process of developing a new testing procedure which would identify the areas in detection zones which have the greatest potential for vulnerabilities and failures so that they can be more rigorously and consistently tested.

4.3 Protected Area and Isolation Zone Lighting

The inspector conducted a PA and isolation zone lighting survey on July 28, 1992, from approximately 9:00 to 10:15 P.M., accompanied by a licensee security supervisor. The inspector determined by observation and use of a calibrated light meter that the station's lighting system was very effective and that the isolation zones were adequately maintained to permit observation of activities on both sides of the PA barrier.

4.4 Assessment Aids

The inspector observed the PA perimeter assessment aids during day and night periods and determined that they were installed, maintained and operated as committed to in the Plan.

However, the inspector noted several areas where the assessment aids continue to be marginally effective. The licensee's assessment system upgrade was progressing on schedule and was expected to be completed in March 1993. The licensee continued to maintain appropriate compensatory measures. This matter will be reviewed during subsequent inspections.

4.5 Vital Area Barriers

The inspector conducted a physical inspection of selected vital area (VA) barriers on July 29, 1992. The inspector determined by observation that the VA barriers were installed and maintained and described as the Plan.

4.6 Vital Area Detection Aids

The inspector observed testing of selected VA detection aids on July 29, 1992, and determined that they were installed, maintained and operated as committed to in the Plan.

In summary, the licensee's program in the areas of PA and VA physical barrier, detection and assessment aids satisfies the NRC requirements and progress is being made to enhance the program.

5.0 Protected and Vital Areas Access Control of Personnel, Packages and Vehicles

5.1 Personnel Access Control

The inspector determined that the licensee was exercising positive control over personnel access to the PA and VAs. This determination was based on the following:

- 5.1.1 The inspector verified that personnel were properly identified and authorization was checked prior to issuance of badges and key cards.
- 5.1.2 The inspector verified that the licensee was implementing a search program for firearms, explosives, incendiary devices and other unauthorized materials as committed to in the plan. The inspector observed both plant and visitor personnel access processing during peak and off-peak traffic periods on July 28 and 30, 1992. The inspector also interviewed members of the security force and licensee security staff about personnel access procedures.
- 5.1.3 The inspector determined, by observation, that individuals in the PA and VAs displayed their badges as required.
- 5.1.4 The inspector verified that the licensee had escort procedures for visitors into the PA and VAs.
- 5.1.5 The inspector verified the licensee had a mechanism for expediting access to the vital equipment during emergencies and that mechanism was adequate for its purpose.

5.2 Package and Material Access Control

The inspector determined that the licensee was exercising positive control over packages and materials that were brought into the PA through the main access portal. The inspector reviewed the package and material control procedures and found that they were consistent with commitments in the Plan. The inspector also observed package and material processing and interviewed members of the security force and the licensee's security staff about package and material control procedures.

5.3 Vehicle Access Control

The inspector determined that the licensee properly controlled vehicle access to and within the PA. The inspector verified that vehicles were properly authorized prior to being allowed to enter the PA. Identification was verified

by a SFM at the main access portal. The procedure was consistent with the commitments in the Plan. The inspector also reviewed the vehicle search procedures and determined that they were consistent with commitments in the Plan. The inspector determined that at least two SFMs control vehicle access at the main vehicle access portal. On July 28 and 30, 1992, the inspector observed vehicle searches and interviewed members of the security force and the licensee's security staff about vehicle search procedures.

In summary, the licensee had effective programs which meet the NRC requirements in the areas of PA and VA access control of personnel, packages, and vehicles.

6.0 Alarm Stations and Communications

The inspector observed the operations in the Central Alarm Station (CAS) and Secondary Alarm Station (SAS) and determined they were operated as committed to in the Plan. CAS and SAS operators were interviewed by the inspector and found to be knowledgeable of their duties and responsibilities. The inspector verified that the CAS and SAS did not require any operational activities that would interfere with the assessment and response functions. The inspector verified that the licensee has communications with local law enforcement agencies as committed to in the Plan. No deficiencies were noted.

7.0 Testing, Maintenance and Compensatory Measures

The inspector determined that the licensee was conducting tests and maintaining security systems and equipment as committed to in the Plan. This determination was based upon a review of the test records for the equipment.

However, while reviewing the testing procedures for the perimeter intrusion detection system, the inspector determined that the procedure used for the required weekly tests was the same procedure used when equipment was returned to service after maintenance or repairs. The inspector discussed with the licensee the importance of thorough performance testing after equipment maintenance or repairs versus operability testing done on a routine weekly basis. The licensee agreed that enhanced testing should be conducted on equipment being returned to service and stated that separate test procedures for this activity would be developed. This matter will be reviewed during a subsequent inspection.

The station provides I&C technicians to conduct preventive and corrective maintenance on security equipment. A review of corrective maintenance records indicated repairs were being accomplished in a timely manner.

In discussions with the licensee personnel, the inspector was informed that the

licensee was in the process of obtaining training for the technicians that are assigned to work on security equipment. This initiative would enhance the effectiveness of the preventive and corrective maintenance program.

8.0 Security Training and Qualification

The inspector randomly selected and reviewed training and qualification records for 8 SFMs. The physical qualification and firearms requalification records were inspected for armed SFMs and security supervisors. The inspector determined that the training had been conducted in accordance with the T&Q plan and that it was properly documented.

The inspector observed a tactical response drill on July 28, 1992, and determined that the licensee was working towards improving the security force's response capabilities. This was evident by the manner in which the drills were developed, controlled and critiqued.

Several SFMs were interviewed to determine if they possessed the requisite knowledge and ability to carry out their assigned duties. The interview results indicated that they were professional and knowledgeable of the job requirements. No deficiencies were noted.

9.0 Exit Interview

The inspector met with the licensee's representatives indicated in Paragraph 1.0 at the conclusion of the inspection of July 30, 1992. At that time, the purpose and scope of the inspection were reviewed, and the findings were presented.