NRC Form 366
(9-83)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 8/31/85

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

Supplemental Report: Date of previous report 1/30/85

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
Dresden Nuclear Power Station	0 5 0 0 0 2 3 7	1 OF 0 2

TITLE (4)

Bus 23-1 to Bus 23 Breaker Protective Relaying

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
									N/A	0 5 0 0 0
0 1	0 4	8 5	8 5	— 0 0 1	— 0 1	0 2	2 1	8 5	N/A	0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)			
N		20.402(b)	20.405(c)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
POWER LEVEL (10)		20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
0 0 0		20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)	X 50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
		20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
	AREA CODE
Ronald Jackson (X-549)	8 1 5 9 4 2 1 - 2 9 2 0

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	
A				Y							

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

During unit refueling outage, the 4 KV breaker 2329 (Bus 23-1 main feed breaker) failed to trip open while the Operational Analysis Department (OAD) was conducting breaker differential relay testing. Safety significance was minimal since there was redundant tripping logic that would have operated the breakers in an identical manner for a differential fault and the unit was in a refueling outage.

The cause of the breaker failure was disconnected wires in the tripping logic. In reviewing the breaker's work history since the last successful test (3/8/83), it was found that no work was performed during this period. Thus, the reason for the disconnected wires is unknown. A work request was written to correct the problem and the wires were subsequently reconnected. After successful testing, the breaker was returned to service.

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FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

During unit refueling outage, the 4 KV breaker 2329 (Bus 23-1 main feed breaker) failed to trip open while the Operational Analysis Department (OAD) was conducting breaker differential relay testing. The OAD Test Engineer inspected the breaker's trip logic and found four (4) disconnected wires. These wires were connected to breaker 2302 lockout relay contact in the tripping logic of breaker 2329. A survey of differential current relays on bus 24-1, 34-1 and 33-1 was made and all were intact. In addition, OAD has tested other similar breakers and found no problems. They plan to test the remaining seven 4 KV breakers prior to unit startup. The Unit Three 4 KV breakers were tested since the last cycle and no problems of this type were identified. Therefore, as a result of the survey, and since the wires were disconnected in a manner indicative of normal removal, Dresden believes that this incident was not one of malicious intent but was simply a personnel error.

The OAD staff indicated that the breaker had been successfully tested when the identical surveillance was performed during the previous refueling outage (3/8/83). A review of the breaker's work history revealed no work conducted since that time. Thus, the reason for the disconnected wires is unknown. The wires were reconnected and the breaker tripped successfully when tested.

Despite the disconnected wires in the tripping logic of breaker 2329, the breaker would have still tripped on a differential fault. This would have occurred from the energizing of the lock-out relay which trips breaker 2302, consequently tripping breaker 2329 through the B auxiliary contact of breaker 2302. Because of this redundancy, the safety significance was minimal. First occurrence of this type at Dresden.

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT TO DIR/LER

DVR NO. STA	UNIT	YEAR	NO.
D- 12	- 2	- 85	- 2

PART 1 TITLE OF EVENT

Bus 23-1 to Bus 23 Breaker Protective Relaying

OCCURRED: 1/4/85 (DATE) 1700 (TIME)

REASON FOR SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT

This supplemental report is being submitted because of the request by the resident NRC Inspector.

PART 2

ACCEPTANCE BY STATION REVIEW: J. Burnett, T.M. Adams

DATE: 2/26/85 2/27/85

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT APPROVED AND AUTHORIZED FOR DISTRIBUTION: Douglas Root, STATION SUPERINTENDENT — 3/4/85 (DATE)

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Commonwealth Edison
Dresden Nuclear Power Station
R.R. #1
Morris, Illinois 60450
Telephone 815/942-2920

February 25, 1985

DJS Ltr #85-210

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Supplement to Licensee Event Report #85-001-1, Docket #050237 is being submitted as required by Technical Specification 6.6, NUREG 1022 and 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(ii). This supplement is being submitted to supply additional information.

D.J. Scott
Station Superintendent
Dresden Nuclear Power Station

DJS/kjl

Enclosure

cc: J.G. Keppler, Regional Administrator, Region III
File/NRC
File/Numerical