U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED OME NO. 3180-0104 EXPIRES 8/31/86 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) PACILITY NAME (1) 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 4 | 4 OF 013 Robert E. Ginna, Unit 1 Failure to Exercise Control Roos in Bank D OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8) REPORT DATE (7) LER HUMBER (6) EVENT DATE (6) FACILITY NAMES YEAR DAY BEQUENTIAL YEAR YEAR MONTH DAY 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 4 1 1 1 4 0 1 3 010 8 4 1 0 1 5 THIS REPORT IS EUGMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CPR &: (Check one or more of the following) (11) 73,71(0) 80 73(a)(2)(iv) 20.463(4) 73,71(e) 60.73(a)(2)(v) 90.36(a)(1) 20 408(a)(1)(l) OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 386A) 60 73(a)(2)(vii) 80.38(a)(2) 20.406(a)(1)(3) 90 73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 80 73(a) (2)(i) 20.406(a)(1)(M) 90,73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 90.73(a)(2)(W) 20.405(a)(1)(lv) 60,73(a)(2)(x) 90 73(a)(2)(W) 20 405(a)(1)(v) LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12) TELEPHONE NUMBER NAME AREA CODE 5 12 141-14 1414 16 Thomas A. Meyer, Technical Manager COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13) TO NPROS MANUFAC-CAUSE SYSTEM MANUFAC COMPONENT CAUSE SYSTEM A A - R O D W 1 3 5 1 YEAR MONTH EXPECTED SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

YES IIT YES, COMPLETE EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE!

On the afternoon of October 15, 1984, a review of an October 11, 1984, surveillance test revealed that the controlling bank of rods (Bank D) was not tested in accordance with Technic Specifications. Procedure changes incorporating Technical Specification amendment No. 40 failed to eliminate an initial condition which allowed testing of the controlling bank to be omitted. Since April 17, 1981, control bank D testing has been required but has not been performed. On the afternoon of October 16, 1984, Control Bank D was satisfactorily tested. The cause of this event has been attributed to a procedure deficiency and a failure to properly implement an amendment to Technical Specifications. Corrective actions that have already been taken include procedure changes which will preclude similar events from occurring in the Tuture.

B411270033 841114 PDR ADDCK 05000244 PDR

1E22

NRC Ferm 386A (9-63)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 8/31/85

PACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (8) PAGE (3)	PAGE (3)							
		YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER								
Robert E. Ginna, Unit 1	0 5 0 0 0 2 4	14 8 4 -0 1113 - 010 012 OF 0	13							

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form INSA's) (17)

On the afternoon of October 15, 1984, a review of an October 11, 1984, surveillance test revealed that one control rod (CO5) in the shutdown bank failed to demonstrate movement of at least ten steps in any one direction as indicated by recorded data. In addition, during a review of Technical Specifications for reportability of the individual rod, it was discovered that the controlling bank of rods (Bank D) was not tested. The condition of not exercising control bank D has existed since April 17, 1981, when amendment No. 40 to the Technical Specifications was issued. This amendment required monthly movement of at least ten steps in any one direction for any rod not fully inserted. Prior to 1981 Technical Specifications only required that partial movement of all rods be demonstrated and since the controlling bank frequently changes position there was no specific requirement to test it. In December of 1982 procedure changes were approved which incorporated Technical Specification amendment No. 40. These changes included adding the ten step requirement for individual rods but failed to eliminate an initial condition which allowed testing of the controlling bank to be omitted. Since April 17, 1981, when it became a requirement, the controlling bank was only tested at hot shutdown conditions prior to plant startups. Surveillance testing of the controlling bank was omitted at all other times. Even though control bank D was not tested, all rods in the bank could be considered operable since:

- 1.) They appropriately achieved their rod drop time of less than or equal to 1.8 seconds.
- They were properly aligned within plus or minus twelve steps of their group step counter demand position.
- 3) They were not known to be immovable due to excessive friction or mechanical interference.
- 4) They were not known to be untripable.

Upon discovery of this event control room personnel were notified and immediately performed a retest to verify operability of control rod CO5 in the shutdown bank. This retest satisfactorily demonstrated that rod CO5 moved at least ten steps in one direction. It was later discovered after a review of a computer printout that rod CO5 did successfully move at least ten steps during the test on October 11, 1984. The apparent inconsistency in the data has been attributed to a transposing error.

LICENSEE EVENT	LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION					APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 8/31/85				
PACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	T	LE	R NUMBER (6)		PAGE (3)				
		YEAR		SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER					
Robert F. Gippa- Unit 1	0 15 10 10 10 12 1 414	814	_	0 1113	- 010	013	OF	0	13	

TEXT IN more space is required, use additional NAC Form 388A's) (17)

On the night of October 15, 1984, it was presumed that a power reduction of up to four percent may have resulted when testing the control rods in bank D. It was decided not to test the controlling bank pending further investigation by the plant staff. Calculations were performed the morning of October 16, 1984, which indicated that testing the controlling bank would have virtually the same effect as testing the shutdown bank. On the afternoon of October 16, 1984, control bank D was successfully tested and no ensuing plant transient resulted nor was a power reduction required.

In addition to the testing of selected control rod banks, other short term actions included the changing of the surveillance procedure to eliminate the initial condition allowing the testing of the controlling bank to be omitted.

Long term corrective actions will be to change the surveillance procedure to adequately define acceptance criteria limits directly on the data sheets in addition to the Test Requirements section. Also, a letter will be directed to all qualified level II test personnel in the Operations section emphasizing the importance of adequately performing, analyzing and reviewing Technical Specification surveillance activities. These corrective actions will be completed by December 15, 1984. Additionally, Administrative procedures were changed in December of 1983 which require the Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) to review all approved changes to the Technical Specifications and require the PORC chairman to be responsible to delegate the appropriate section manager(s) the required work necessary to implement the new Technical Specification amendment.





ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION . 89 EAST AVENUE, ROCHESTER, N.Y. 14649-0001

ROGER W. KOBER VICE PRESIDENT ELECTRIC & STEAM PRODUCTION

TELEPHONE AREA CODE 716 546-2700

November 14, 1984

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject: LER 84-013, Failure to Exercise Control Rods in Bank D during Monthly Surveillance Test.

R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, Unit No. 1 Docket No. 50-244

Gentlemen:

In accordance with 10CFR50.73 "Licensee Event Report System" item (a)(2)(i)(B), which requests a report of "Any operation or condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications" the attached Licensee Event Report LER 84-013 is hereby submitted.

Very truly yours,

Roger W. Kober

xc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Region I

631 Park Avenue

King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

1E22