			COMPLETE	ONE LINE FOR	EACH COMPONENT	FAILURE	DESCRIBE	D IN THIS REPORT	(13)	014121-	1312	141
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SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)							EXPECTED	MONTH	DAY	YEA		
YES III yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE!							SUBMISSION DATE (15)		1			
ABSTRA	CT /Limit t	2 1400 spaces / a ap	proximately fifteen	single-space type	written lines) (16)							

During a purge of the Unit 2 Containment (1/30/85), one train of the Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS) became inoperable. Unit 2 Technical Specifications require both trains of SGTS to be operable prior to commencing a purge, and while the purge system is in use.

The purge was initiated using SGTS Train A by one shift at approximately 0640 on 1/30/85. Sometime during the next shift the SGTS B Heater failure alarm annunciated in the Control Room and caused the "B" Train of SGTS to be inoperable. The shift did not recognize that purging should have been suspended.

The ability of Operations personnel to analyze the situation was impacted due to a difference in Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specifications and the fact that maintenance was in progress on a damper in the "B" Train.

The event will be reviewed with all licensed operators and alarm response for SGTS will be reviewed and revised as necessary to identify the Technical Specification requirements regarding purging. In addition, change to Unit 1 Technical Specifications was submitted to the NRC on 5/18/84, and is expected to be issued soon.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION						U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 8/31/85					
FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)		LER NUMBER (6)				PAGE (3)				
Susquehanna Steam Electric Sta	tion	YEAR		SEQUENTIAL NUMBER		REVISION		T			
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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

At approximately 0640 on 1/30/85 a purge of the Unit 2 Containment was initiated using the "A" Train of the Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS). The Unit 2 Technical Specifications require both trains of SGTS to be operable prior to commencing a purge and while the purge system is in use. The unit's system operating procedure properly reflects the Technical Specification requirement and both SGTS trains were operable when the purge was initiated.

During this time a work package was released to perform maintenance on the inlet damper to the "B" Filter Train on SGTS. This work necessitated that the damper be blocked open. This configuration was reviewed and determined acceptable for system operability.

During the next shift the SGTS "B" Heater failure alarm annunciated in the Control Room. Operations personnel on duty at the time were aware of the work package on the "B" Train Damper and initially attributed the alarm to the personnel protection blocking applied to perform the maintenance. The "B" Train of SGTS was then declared inoperable. At this point shift personnel did not recognize that purging the containment, which had been in progress for several hours, should have been suspended.

The purging operation was secured at approximately 308 on 1/30/85, and a subsequent review identified the Unit 2 Technical specification requirements. The situation was reported via the internal plant reporting program.

During investigation of heater failure alarm, Operations reinserted the fuse (removed as part of the protective blocking), which was the suspected cause of the heater alarm, no change in alarm status was noted, and assistance was requested of Technical Section personnel.

A review of conditions that existed revealed that the heater failure was due to system configuration at the time. With the "A" Train in service to purge the containment and the inlet damper to "B" Train was blocked open for maintenance, sufficient flow was established to make-up the flow switch in the "B" logic. Since the heaters were not in service (heaters come on when fan is running), proper delta-temperature was not established and "B" SGTS was locked out.

The ability of Operations personnel to analyze the situation was impacted due to different requirements regarding SGTS operability in Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specifications, and the fact that maintenance was in progress on the "B" Train of SGTS.

The event will be reviewed with all licensed operators, and alarm response procedures for SGTS will be reviewed and revised as necessary to ensure Technical Specification compliance regarding purging, and SGTS operability. Additionally, a change to Unit 1 Technical Specifications was submitted to the NRC on 5/18/84.

Pennsylvania Power & Light Company

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March 5, 1985

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 85-007-00 ER 100450 FILE 841-23 PLAS- 050

Docket No. 50-388 License No. NPF-22

Attached is Licensee Event Report 85-007-00. This event was determined reportable per 10CFR50-73(a)(2)(i), in that one train of the Standby Gas Treatment System became inoperable during a containment purge.

W. Keiser

Superintendent of Plant-Susquehanna

APP/pjg

cc: Dr. Thomas E. Murley
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