NORTHEAST UTILITIES

THE CONNECTICUT LIGHT AND POWER COMPANY
WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS ELECTRIC COMPANY
HOLYOKE WATER POWER COMPANY
NORTHEAST UTILITIES SERVICE COMPANY
NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY

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August 5, 1992

Docket No. 50-336
B14014

Re: 10CFR50.9^

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attention: Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Gentlemen:

Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 2
Proposed Change to Technical Specifications
Containment Isolation Valves

Pursuant to 10CFR50.90, Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (NNECO) hereby proposes to amend its Operating License No. DPR-65 by incorporating the changes identified in Attachment 1 into the Technical Specifications of Millstone Unit No. 2.

Discussion

The Millstone Unit No. 2 auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system is being modified to include the addition of bypass lines and associated Containment Isolation Valves 2-MS-458 and 2-MS-459. The bypass lines and valves are located upstream of the AFW pump Steam Supply Isolation Valves (SSIV) 2-MS-201 and 2-MS-202. The bypass lines will provide a drainage path for condensate which collects in the lines during plant start-up and normal plant operation when an SSIV is shut.

During normal plant operation, the bypass lines will be isolated by locking closed the associated isolation valve. Operation of the bypass lines will require operator action under controlled or monitored conditions; i.e., in-service testing or intermittent draining of condensate. In addition, the operating procedures will require that an operator be present at the applicable bypass line isolation valve for the entire drainage period. The piping upstream of 2-MS-458 and 2-MS-459, including these valves, has been designed and seismically supported in accordance with ASME Section III. The piping downstream of Isolation Valves 2-MS-458 and 2-MS-459 will be designed, installed, and supported in accordance with ANSI B31.1. All modifications will be completed during the current outage.

The bypass lines and isolation valves are being added to improve the reliability of the main steam and AFW system by reducing the potential for water hammer damage in the main steam piping and the AFW pump turbine during the intermittent operation of the SSIVs. The bypass lines will be isolated during normal plant operation and will experience intermittent service only under controlled conditions.

Description of Proposed Change

The proposed technical specification change involves the addition of these two containment isolation valves, 2-MS-458 and 2-MS-459, to Table 3.6-2.

Significant Hazards Consideration

NNECO has reviewed the changes in accordance with 10CFR50.92 and concluded that the changes do not involve a significant hazards consideration. The basis for this conclusion is that the three criteria of 10CFR50.92(c) are not compromised. The proposed changes do not involve a significant hazards consideration because the changes would not:

1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously analyzed. The addition of Valves 2-MS-458 and 2-MS-459 to the containment isolation valve list does not impact any safety system. The bypass lines and isolation valves will increase the reliability of the AFW pump turbine by reducing the potential for water hammer damage to the turbine and main steam piping during intermittent operation of the SSIVs.

2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously analyzed. This modification and the potential failure modes do not modify the plant response to the point where it can be considered a new accident. The modification was designed so that it will be isolated during normal plant operation. Operation of the bypass line isolation valves would require operator action under controlled or monitored conditions. The valves and the upstream piping have been designed and seismically supported in accordance with ASME III, which is consistent with the original design criteria of the plant.

3. Involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety. The addition of bypass lines and two manual containment isolation valves to the AFW system will provide a drainage path for condensate which collects in the line when an SSIV is shut. The bypass line isolation valves will be operated under specific operating conditions with an operator present at the bypass isolation valve for the entire drainage period. This modification does not affect or have any potential impact on the consequences of any design basis accident. Therefore, the modification does not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

Moreover, the Commission has provided guidance concerning the application of standards in 10CFR50.92 by providing certain examples (March 6, 1986, 51FR7751) of amendments that are considered not likely to involve a significant hazards consideration. Although the proposed change is not enveloped by a specific example, the change would not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously analyzed.

The Millstone Unit No. 2 Nuclear Review Board has reviewed and approved the attached revision and has concurred with the above determinations.

Based upon the information contained in this submittal and the environmental assessment for Millstone Unit No. 2, there are no significant radiological or nonradiological impacts associated with the proposed action, and the proposed license amendment will not have a significant effect on the quality of the human environment.

Regarding our schedule for this amendment, we request issuance at your earliest convenience with the amendment effective within 30 days of issuance.

In accordance with 10CFR50.91(b), we are providing the State of Connecticut with a copy of the proposed amendment application.

If you have any questions, please contact my staff.

Very truly yours,

NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY

FOR: J. F. Opeka
Executive Vice President

BY: W. D. Romberg
Vice President

cc: T. T. Martin, Region I Administrator
G. S. Vissing, NRC Project Manager, Millstone Unit No. 2
P. D. Swetland, Senior Resident Inspector, Millstone Unit Nos. 1, 2, and 3

Mr. Kevin McCarthy, Director
Radiation Control Unit
Department of Environmental Protection
Hartford, CT 06106

STATE OF CONNECTICUT)
) ss. Berlin, August 5, 1992
COUNTY OF HARTFORD)

Then personally appeared before me, W. D. Romberg, who being duly sworn, did state that he is Vice President of Northeast Nuclear Energy Company, a Licensee herein, that he is authorized to execute and file the foregoing information in the name and on behalf of the Licensee herein, and that the statements contained in said information are true and correct to the best of his knowledge and belief.

Notary Public
My commission expires 3/31/95