

MAY 4 1983

*for
Lin
Harris*

MEMORANDUM FOR: Samuel J. Chilk
Secretary of the Commission

FROM: William J. Dircks
Executive Director for Operations

SUBJECT: HARTMAN REPORT BY GPU

The Commission requested information in regard to staff knowledge of the existence of the GPU report.

During the time period March - April 1980, Region I was aware that GPU had initiated an investigation into the Hartman allegations. However, when the Department of Justice (DOJ) assumed investigative jurisdiction in the Spring of 1980, staff ceased all further action regarding the case and neither received nor requested further information. As a consequence, EDO staff, OI and OIA have been unable to discover any organizational knowledge concerning the GPU investigation from the time DOJ became involved until GPU advised NRC of the existence of the report in March 1982. One week later, Region I was provided a copy by DOJ.

(Signed) T. A. Rehm

William J. Dircks
Executive Director
for Operations

83 ? *[Handwritten signature]*
6/9

Distribution:

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UIR

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PDR ADDCK 05000289
P PDR

*Initial concerned record
from PI/OIA POI on 5/4/83
THR*

OFFICER	: CEDU	: EDO			
NAME	: TARehm/kj	: WJDircks			
DATE	: 5/4/83	: 5/4/83			

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

April 26, 1983

Hullis
Smith
File
Bill
80-33

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman Palladino
FROM: William J. Dircks
Executive Director for Operations
SUBJECT: PROGRAM TO REVALIDATE NRC STAFF POSITION SUPPORTING
TMI-1 RESTART IN LIGHT OF MANAGEMENT INTEGRITY

On April 18, 1983, the staff filed its comments on the analysis of the GPU V. B&W transcript as it affects the TMI-1 Restart hearing. In that filing, we stated that the staff is initiating actions to revalidate the staff position, supporting TMI-1 restart, on the management integrity issue. Your memorandum of April 22, 1983, requested an explanation of revalidation and details of this effort.


In the staff's comments on the immediate effectiveness of the Licensing Board's partial initial decisions (PIDs) on management and cheating issues, the staff stated its position that those PIDs removed the management concerns which formed part of the basis for the Commission's immediately effective shutdown order for TMI-1. The open issue of the Hartman allegations concerning the falsification of leak rate data could possibly affect the staff's position on management integrity. Because the Department of Justice (DOJ) investigation into this matter is not yet complete, and, by agreement with DOJ, further NRC investigation is not appropriate at this time, the staff is taking interim actions to ensure that this one open issue does not affect the validity of the staff's position on management integrity. Thus, by stating that the staff is taking actions to "revalidate" the NRC staff position on management integrity, the staff means that the actions it is taking are designed to ensure that, should TMI-1 be permitted to restart before completion of the DOJ investigation into the Hartman allegations, the above-stated staff position on management integrity would remain valid.


This revalidation effort consists of an inspection and review program, jointly developed by NRR and Region I, as outlined in the enclosure. This inspection and review effort is now underway and we anticipate completion by May 6, 1983. We do not plan to conduct any interviews with TMI-1 personnel unless we have obtained clearance for such interviews from the Department of Justice.

CONTACT:
L. P. Crocker, NRR 492-4891
T. T. Martin, Region I 488-1280

~~8304280073~~

This activity may have an effect on other NRR review efforts. In particular, it may have an impact on the Salem Task Force review and on the Human Factors Program Plan expedited schedules. In addition, staff personnel involved in this revalidation program will also be providing input for the staff's answer to the recent motion by the Aamodts to reopen the TMI-1 restart proceeding.

(Signed) 
~~William J. Dircks~~

 William J. Dircks
Executive Director for Operations

Enclosure: as stated

- cc: Commissioner Gilinsky
- Commissioner Ahearne
- Commissioner Roberts
- Commissioner Asselstine
- SECY
- OPE
- OGC

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SEE ORIGINAL CONCURRENCE PAGE

:OELD	:OELD	:NRR	:EDO	:	:	:
:J. Geidberg	:m1EChristenbury	:E Case	:W.J. Dircks	:	:	:
:4/26/83	:4/26/83	:4/16/83	:4/26/83	:	:	:

ENCLOSURE

INSPECTION AND REVIEW PROGRAM OUTLINE
TMI RESTART MANAGEMENT INTEGRITY ISSUE

1. NRR and Region I will conduct a combined review to evaluate the effectiveness of GPU actions to ensure adherence to procedures - since issuance of the staff's evaluation (NUREG-0680, Supplement 1, November 1980). This review will include the following:
 - a. Review the TMI-1 Conduct of Operations Manual for clarity of its intended purpose in establishing rules for adherence to procedures. (Region I)
 - b. Review the training program for new employees and the re-qualification program for existing employees, both licensed and non-licensed, for emphasis on adherence to procedures in both safety and non-safety areas. (Region I)
 - c. Review the Operational Quality Assurance program for emphasis on procedure adherence. (Region I)
 - d. Review the TMI-1 audit program as it relates to verification of compliance with procedures. (Region I)
 - e. Review the disciplinary measures taken by the licensee to enforce its policy of adhering to procedures. (Region I)
2. Review of existing personnel at TMI-1 and in the GPU corporate management and support structure vis a vis their positions prior to the TMI-2 accident. (NRR)
3. Evaluate the effectiveness of actions taken at TMI-1 to enhance safe plant operation in accordance with the lessons learned as a result of the TMI-2 accident, including:
 - a. Evaluate the role/responsibility and effectiveness of the Shift Technical Advisor for review of procedures and operator adherence to procedures. (NRR)
 - b. Evaluate the role/responsibility and effectiveness of the Independent Safety Engineering Group (for TMI-1, the Independent On-Site Safety Review Group, IOSRG) for review of procedures and personnel adherence to procedures. (NRR)
 - c. Evaluate the role/responsibility and effectiveness of the individuals/groups assigned responsibility for independent review of plant procedures and facility adherence to procedures. (NRR)
4. Review past inspection reports, Licensee Event Reports, SALP reports and IIRPO evaluations for insight regarding procedure adherence and management issues since above cited staff's safety evaluation, November 1980.

DRAFT
TARhm
5/2/83

TO: S. J. Chilk
FROM: W. J. Dircks
SUBJECT: HARTMAN REPORT BY GPU

The Commission requested information in regard to staff knowledge of the existence of the GPU report. ^P During the time period March - April 1980, Region I was aware that GPU ^{had initiated} ~~was conducting~~ an investigation into the Hartman allegations. ^{However,} When the Department of Justice assumed investigative jurisdiction in the Spring of 1980, staff ceased all further action regarding the case and neither received nor requested further information. As a consequence, neither EDO staff, OI or OIA have been able to discover any organizational knowledge concerning the GPU investigation from the time DOJ became involved until ~~the GPU~~ ^{GPU informed NRC of the existence of the report} Region I was provided a copy by DOJ in March 1982

subsequently

~~one~~ ^{one} week later.

W. J. Dircks
Executive Director for Operations

FAX TO: TIM MARTIN, Region I
Fr: EDO

Tim -

Please discuss w/ Christopher &
let me know by phone if OK.

T. Rehm
5/2

Stella met
one week earlier



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR
AND AUDITOR

From -
Jim Cummings
4/26/83

Pls send to the ...

1 documents the company showed, would be helpful to the U.S.
2 attorney and to the parties in being able to understand what
3 are the intricacies, what are the vulnerabilities of making
4 those measurements.

5 And I think I'd also identify that some of the
6 people who are subject to grand jury investigation desired
7 to have the report as well for whatever purpose it might
8 serve them, and it seemed to us at that point that everybody's
9 best interest was served by providing it.

10 MR. STELLO: Thank you. I think we're ready to go
11 to the topics that are discussed in the report on the --

12 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Excuse me, just one comment.
13 I don't want to dwell on the total population of documents,
14 but it would be helpful if you could check to see if the 1767
15 did include the full --

16 MR. STELLO: Okay. I will get back with Mr.
17 Arnold. My understanding is that 1767 plus the 81 -- and
18 those are documents which are over and above those that were
19 entered into the record, but recognizing that some of these
20 documents, parts of which were, in fact, used. So to that
21 extent it's true. I would think that the deposition --

22 CHAIRMAN PALLADINO: Well, there still seems to be
23 a little lack of clarity on that.

24 MR. STELLO: I will get back to the Commission
25 as soon as we can get it straightened out with Mr. Arnold.