



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
REGION I  
831 PARK AVENUE  
KING OF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19406

U.S. NRC

October 3, 1983

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OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS  
FIELD OFFICE, REGION I

MEMORANDUM FOR: William J. Dircks, Executive Director for Operations  
FROM: Thomas E. Murley, Regional Administrator, Region I  
SUBJECT: NRC INVESTIGATION ON TWO HARTMAN ALLEGATIONS

To assist in the response by the Office of Investigation to the Commission's inquiry on the status of the NRC investigation into two allegations by Mr. Hartman (i.e., that feedwater pump test criteria were altered and that the estimated control rod position for attainment of criticality was recalculated in order to meet procedural requirements) I am enclosing a June 3, 1983, status report prepared by Thomas T. Martin, Director, Division of Engineering and Technical Programs, at the request of Chairman Palladino.

This summary represents the views of the team members involved in the initial investigation in the spring of 1980. As you are aware, this investigative effort was halted when the matter was referred to the Department of Justice, and the staff therefore did not reach a position on these matters. We are confident that, from a technical perspective, there are no health and safety issues posed by the two allegations. Since OI has been given the task of resuming and completing this investigation with regard to the issue of falsification of records, I assume it will cover the two referenced allegations.

Thomas E. Murley  
Regional Administrator

Enclosure:  
As Stated

cc: w/Encl.  
B. Hayes

w/o Encl.  
V. Stello, DEDROGR  
H. Denton, NRR  
R. DeYoung, I&E

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1 Foreman would go down with him and try to get the reference values and  
2 they couldn't meet the acceptance criteria or the flow would be wrong,  
3 so he'd bring it back up and set it on the desk and says hey look you  
4 know this is what we got, I don't know what we could, you guy's try and  
5 run it and then the day shift would take it and they would see what  
6 they could do with it and after a few days it would disappear and then  
7 apparently you'd just assume that it was done and then it would surface  
8 up somewhere in the completed surveillance files as being completed and  
9 within, the next procedure would always have a little TCN stating the  
10 new reference values.

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12 MARTIN: Hal for clarification the TCN is a Temporary Change Notice  
13 for procedure which would actually change the reference values?

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15 HARTMAN: Yes.

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17 MARTIN: Alright Hal lets continue, what was your opinion why this  
18 test wouldn't come out the same twice since we'd indicated or you  
19 indicated in earlier interviews?

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21 HARTMAN: I don't know really I was baffled, I just didn't know, you  
22 can only speculate on stuff like that, I'd hate to even make a speculation  
23 except the fact that maybe one time the tank would be half full and  
24 they could meet this one particular thing but then it would throw some  
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1 other parameter off or I don't know just the way perhaps a guy would  
2 throb a valve to get it to come in, little tricks of the trade so to  
3 speak but not everybody has the adeptness to come up with.  
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5 MARTIN: Again your indicating though that you don't know for a fact  
6 that this is the reason.  
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8 HARTMAN: I don't know, I don't really know why that, I don't really  
9 know why it didn't pass.  
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11 CHRISTOPHER: Did you Hal discuss this problem with any other operators  
12 on your shift in an effort to find the solution and if so what was,  
13 were there any common grounds that you found for this happening or any  
14 common way that you as operators for that shift determine that you  
15 would use a method that you would use to come with appropriate figures?  
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17 HARTMAN: No not really we did some discussions with it but you know  
18 generally we'd just come up with a dead end, we just couldn't do it, we  
19 just settled with data that we had collected and you know someone else  
20 would try it and apparently they would get some good data or get it so  
21 that the engineers had to look at it and reevaluate it.  
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23 MARTIN: Who changed the referenced values and what explanation were  
24 you provided for those changes?  
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HARTMAN: I think it was the ISI group, I think Diane Shamus was one of  
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them, I don't really know for sure and there was another guy but they  
would look over this stuff and reevaluate it, come up with another set  
of numbers and then they would just say, I don't even remember what the  
reasons were but we would always end up with some new reference values  
and I didn't know why really.

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CHRISTOPHER: Do you have any reason to believe that they were mani-  
pulating the figures just to get accurate reference values or do you  
have any bases to believe that they were doing anything wrong, that  
they were, so called fudging the statistics?

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HARTMAN: No I don't have any bases for that.

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CHRISTOPHER: Okay. Hal do you personally feel or do you know any of  
the operators who felt that you were either professionally or through  
pressure from management being forced to fudge calculations in order to  
get correct records, do you feel that there was upward management  
pressure in order to obtain these?

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HARTMAN: I'm not sure I understand. What level was upper management?

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CHRISTOPHER: Well to me management would be from my Shift Supervisor  
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