

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)
Davis-Besse Unit 1

DOCKET NUMBER (2)
0 5 0 0 0 3 1 4 6

PAGE (3)
1 OF 0 1 4

TITLE (4)
Leakage of Containment Isolation Valves found by Local Leak Rate Testing

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)
0 9	2 1	8 4	8 4	0 1 4	0 0	1 0	1 9	8 4			0 5 0 0 0
<p>THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § (Check one or more of the following) (11)</p>											

OPERATING MODE (9)	POWER LEVEL (10)	20.402(b)	20.406(a)(1)(i)	20.406(a)(1)(ii)	20.406(a)(1)(iii)	20.406(a)(1)(iv)	20.406(a)(1)(v)	20.406(a)(1)(vi)	30.406(e)	50.36(a)(1)	50.36(a)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(vi)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)(B)	50.73(a)(2)(ix)	73.71(b)	73.71(a)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 365A)	
6	0 1 0 1 0																							

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
Donald E. Missig, Asst. Engr., Davis-Besse Operations	4 1 9 2 5 9 1 - 5 0 1 0

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)										
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPROS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPROS	
X	J M	I S V	P 3 4 0	Y	X	J M	I S V	F 1 3 0	Y	
X	J M	I S V	I 2 0 8	Y	X	J M	I S V	V 0 8 5	Y	

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)		1 2	3 1 1	8 4

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

During the performance of the Containment Vessel Local Leak Rate Test (LLRT), ST 5061.02, four containment isolation valves, SA2010, CV5005, CC1411B and CF1541 were found with leakage in excess of T.S. 3.6.1.2b and c. There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or station personnel. Leakage through the backup (or second) isolation valve has been well within safe limits for the valves that have been tested. Additional testing on the other backup isolation valve will be completed once the failed valves are repaired. If these backup isolation valves failed, there still would be no danger to the health and safety of the public or station personnel. The action statement of T.S. 3.6.1.2 requires restoration of leakage rates to within limits prior to increasing the RCS temperature above 200 degrees Fahrenheit. The station is currently in a refueling outage, Mode 5 or 6, and will not enter Mode 4 until the above mentioned valves have acceptable leakage.

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

Description of Occurrence: During the performance of Containment Vessel Local Leak Rate Test (LLRT), ST 5061.02, four containment isolation valves, Station Air to Containment Isolation, SA2010, (ISV); Containment Purge Supply Isolation Valve, CV5005, (ISV); Component Cooling Supply Header Containment Outer Isolation Motor Actuated Butterfly Valve, CC1411B, (ISV) and Core Flood Tank 1-2 Fill and Pressurization, CF1541 (ISV) were found with leakage rates in excess of Technical Specification 3.6.1.2.b and c (see attachment 1.)

Technical Specification 3.6.1.2.b limits combined leakage from type B and C test to less than 0.6 L^a, approximately 600,000 standard cubic centimeters of air per minute (sccm), and Technical Specification 3.6.1.2.c limits combined secondary containment "bypass leakage" to less than 0.015 L^a, approximately 15,000 sccm. Only SA2010 falls under the jurisdiction of Technical Specification 3.6.1.2.c. The action statement of Technical Specification 3.6.1.2 requires restoration of leakage rates to within limits prior to increasing the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) temperature above 200 degrees Fahrenheit. The station is currently in a refueling outage, Mode 5 or 6 and will not enter Mode 4 until the above mentioned valves meet Technical Specification leakage rate requirements.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: At the present time, the station is in an extended refueling outage. The Maintenance Work Orders (MWO's) to investigate the cause as well as the corrective action have been scheduled, but no work has been performed as of yet.

Analysis of Occurrence: There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or station personnel. In each of these penetrations, two containment isolation valves are always provided in series. The backup isolation valves for SA2010 and CF1541 had leakage rate of 89 sccm and 775 sccm respectively, well within Technical Specification limits. Leakage through the backup isolation valve for CV 5005 and CC1411B have not been tested due to the piping configuration and test method employed. The backup isolation valves for CV5005 and CC1411B will be tested once the actuators for these valves are repaired. If the backup isolation valve for CV5005 fails this line would vent to the emergency ventilation system through valve CV 127 preventing a release. If the backup isolation valve for CC1411B fails, there is a functional manual and two automatic isolation valves upstream of CC1411B which could serve to isolate leakage. In addition, normal component cooling water pressure is in excess of 75 psig which would preclude outward leakage from containment even during the worst credible accident (38 psig containment pressure.)

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

Corrective Action: The MWO's to investigate the cause as well as the corrective action have been scheduled into the outage work schedule, but no work has been performed as of yet. (See Attachment 1 for MWO numbers.) Local leak rate testing of containment penetrations is in progress, and any additional failures, and all subsequent corrective actions will be documented as a revision to this report.

Failure Data: Similar occurrences were reported in Licensee Event Reports NP-33-80-52 (80-042), NP-33-82-31 (82-027) and NP 33-83-56 (83-044.)

Report No: NP-33-84-15

DVR No(s): 84-149 and 84-150



November 13, 1984

Docket No. 50-346
License No. NPF-3

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

LER No. 84-014
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Unit 1
Date of Occurrence: September 21, 1984

Enclosed are three (3) copies of Licensee Event Report 84-014 which are being submitted to correct a sequential numbering error. The submittal by letter dated October 19, 1984 as LER 84-015 (NP 33-84-015) should be replaced with this submittal, LER 84-014 (NP 33-84-015.)

Yours truly,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Stephen M. Quennoz".

Stephen M. Quennoz
Plant Manager
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station

SMQ/bec

Enclosure

cc: Mr. James G. Keppler,
Regional Administrator
USNRC Region III

Mr. Walt Rogers
DB-1 NRC Resident Inspector

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