

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Point Beach Unit 2 DOCKET NUMBER (2) 05000301 PAGE (3) 1 OF 02

TITLE (4) Inadvertent Actuation of an Engineered Safety Feature

| EVENT DATE (5) | | | LER NUMBER (6) | | REPORT DATE (7) | | | OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8) | | | | | | | | | |
|----------------|-----|------|----------------|-------------------|-----------------|-------|-----|-------------------------------|----------------|---|---|------|---|---|---|---|---|
| MONTH | DAY | YEAR | YEAR | SEQUENTIAL NUMBER | REVISION NUMBER | MONTH | DAY | YEAR | FACILITY NAMES | | | | | | | | |
| 1 | 0 | 2 | 8 | 4 | 8 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | None | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| | | | | | | | | | None | | | None | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)

| | | | | | |
|----------------------|-------------------|------------------|-------------------------------------|----------------------|--|
| OPERATING MODE (9) N | 20.402(b) | 20.406(e) | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | 50.73(a)(2)(iv) | 73.71(b) |
| POWER LEVEL (10) 000 | 20.406(a)(1)(i) | 50.38(e)(1) | <input type="checkbox"/> | 50.73(a)(2)(v) | 73.71(e) |
| | 20.406(a)(1)(ii) | 50.38(e)(2) | <input type="checkbox"/> | 50.73(a)(2)(vii) | OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 365A) |
| | 20.406(a)(1)(iii) | 50.73(a)(2)(i) | <input type="checkbox"/> | 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) | |
| | 20.406(a)(1)(iv) | 50.73(a)(2)(ii) | <input type="checkbox"/> | 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | |
| | 20.406(a)(1)(v) | 50.73(a)(2)(iii) | <input type="checkbox"/> | 50.73(a)(2)(ix) | |

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)
NAME: C. W. Fay, Vice President-Nuclear Power
TELEPHONE NUMBER: 414 277-2811
AREA CODE: 414

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

| CAUSE | SYSTEM | COMPONENT | MANUFACTURER | REPORTABLE TO NPRDS | CAUSE | SYSTEM | COMPONENT | MANUFACTURER | REPORTABLE TO NPRDS |
|-------|--------|-----------|--------------|---------------------|-------|--------|-----------|--------------|---------------------|
| | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | |

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)
 YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) NO
EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15) MONTH: DAY: YEAR:

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)
During a refueling shutdown on 10/22/84, while restoring the site's 13.8 KV power system to its normal lineup, the 13.8 KV bus tie breaker was opened prior to shutting Unit 2 345 KV/13.8 KV station auxiliary transformer output breaker. This resulted in a loss of offsite power to Unit 2 and the actuation of emergency Diesel generator (EDG) G02 on loss of voltage. EDG G01 did not start due to maintenance being performed on its loss of voltage relays. The plant was shut down with the core unloaded at the time of the loss of power and EDG actuation.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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|---|--|----------------|-------------------|-----------------|----------|--------|
| FACILITY NAME (1) Point Beach Unit 2 | DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 0 1 | LER NUMBER (6) | | | PAGE (3) | |
| | | YEAR | SEQUENTIAL NUMBER | REVISION NUMBER | | |
| | | 8 4 | - 0 0 5 | - 0 0 | 0 2 | OF 0 2 |

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

At the time of the event, the plant was in a refueling shutdown with the core unloaded. The Unit 2 high voltage station auxiliary transformer, 2X03, was secured to accommodate switchyard testing.

When returning 2X03 to service, the Control Operator opened a 13,800 V bus tie breaker prior to shutting the 2X03 output breaker. This resulted in a loss of offsite power to Unit 2. An approved procedure for this evolution is not considered to be necessary.

The loss of power to the 4160 V distribution system resulted in a loss of voltage start of emergency Diesel generator (EDG) G02 and closing of its feeder breaker to bus 2A06. The loss of voltage relays for bus 2A05 were being replaced per an approved procedure and therefore EDG G01 did not start when power was lost. The undervoltage relays did function properly to isolate bus 2A05. The 2X03 output breaker was shut to restore offsite power to Unit 2. All systems and components operated as designed.

This event will be discussed with all operators and trainees to prevent future occurrences. No further corrective actions are considered to be required.

DMB



Wisconsin Electric POWER COMPANY
231 W. MICHIGAN, P.O. BOX 2046, MILWAUKEE, WI 53201

November 14, 1984

Mr. J. G. Keppler, Regional Administrator
Office of Inspection and Enforcement,
Region III
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

Dear Mr. Keppler:

DOCKET NO. 50-301
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 84-005-00
INADVERTENT ACTUATION OF AN ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE
POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 2

Enclosed is Licensee Event Report No. 84-005-00 which provides a description of an inadvertent actuation of an emergency diesel generator while in a shut-down condition reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), "Any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any engineered safety feature, including the reactor protection system."

Very truly yours,

Vice President-Nuclear Power

C. W. Fay

Enclosure

Copy to NRC Resident Inspector

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