Docket No. 50-219

GPU Nuclear Corporation
ATTN: Mr. P. B. Fiedler
Vice President and Director
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station
P. O. Box 388
Forked River, NJ 08731

Gentlemen:

Subject: Inspection No. 50-219/84-21

This refers to your letter dated December 11, 1984, in response to our letter dated November 16, 1984.

Thank you for informing us of the corrective and preventive actions documented in your letter. These actions will be examined during a future inspection of your licensed program. At the same time we will also review the documentation involved for the Fire Protection Modifications required by Amendment 18, thus resolving Item 50-219/80-07-02. With regards to Unresolved Item 50-219/84-21-01 your time table for implementing a program to functionally test the fire dampers is acceptable.

Your cooperation with us is appreciated.

Sincerely,

Original Signed By: Los H. Bettenhausen

Thomas T. Martin, Director
Division of Engineering and
Technical Programs

cc:

M. Laggart, BWR Licensing Manager Licensing Manager, Oyster Creek Public Document Room (PDR) Local Public Document Room (LPDR) Nuclear Safety Information Center (NSIC) NRC Resident Inspector State of New Jersey

bec:

Region I Docket Room (with concurrences)
Section Chief, DPRP

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

RL50-219/84-21 - 0001.0.0 02/11/85

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RI:DETP Krasopoulos/sm 1/17/85 RI:DETP Anderson 1/17/85 RI:DETP Ebneter 2/21/85

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

RL50-219/84-21 - 0002.0.0 02/11/85 **Nuclear**

GPU Nuclear Corporation

Post Office Box 388
Route 9 South
Forked River, New Jersey 08731-0388
609 971-4000
Writer's Direct Dial Number:

December 11, 1984

Mr. Thomas T. Martin, Director
Division of Engineering and Technical Programs
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region I
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, PA 19406

Dear Mr. Martin:

Subject: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station

Docket No. 50-219

Response to IE Inspection No. 50-219/84-21

This letter is in response to your letter of November 6, 1984 which forwarded the above referenced inspection conducted by Mr. A. Krasopoulos of your staff on July 23-27, 1984. This inspection documented a Notice of Deviation and requested additional information.


As a result of the inspection conducted on July 23-27, 1984, the following deviation from an Oyster Creek commitment to the NRC was identified:

Fire Protection Report - Comparision to Standard Review Plan 9.5.1, Appendix A, states that because the stairwells serve as escape routes and access routes for fire fighting, the stairwells have been designed to minimize smoke infiltration by their enclosures.

Contrary to the above, the enclosure of the Reactor Building Southwest Stairwell contained a hitherto unsealed penetration that would allow smoke infiltration in the stairwell in the event of fire.

On July 25, 1984, GPUN issued work request No. 19976 to seal the duct penetration noted in the deviation. This penetration was sealed on July 29, 1984 to prevent smoke infiltration into the Reactor Building stairwell. Oyster Creek Procedure 645.6.017, "Fire Barrier Penetration Surveillance" will be revised to incorporate a review of all stairwells which serve as escape and access routes for fire fighting at least once every 18 months. This procedure revision should be completed within the first quarter of 1985.

Mr. Krasopoulos requested additional information in order to close Unresolved Item (50-219/80-07-02). This unresolved item was initiated as a



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Mr. Thomas T. Martin, Director U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2.

result of an inspection conducted on February 12-15, 19-20, and 26-29, 1980 by Mr. P. Koltay of your staff. By JCP&L letter (attachment 1) dated March 3, 1980, Mr. J. F. Mancinelli sent to Mr. Koltay the information requested. Based on a follow-up phone conversation with Mr. Koltay on March 12, 1980 and no additional correspondence since, it was our impression that this item was closed. It is requested that Mr. Krasopoulos review the information submitted by our March 3, 1980 letter, then advise accordingly.

Mr. Krasopoulos also requested additional information in order to close Unresolved Item (50-219/82-07-01). As discussed with Mr. Krasopoulos via telephone on December 6, 1984 additional time is needed to gather this information. We plan to submit this information to you by December 31, 1984.

In paragraph 3.5.1 of the inspection report, Mr. Krasopoulos issued Unresolved Item (50-219/84-21-01), noting that the licensee did not have a program to inspect, test or maintain the Heating, Ventilating and Air Conditioning (HVAC) duct work fire dampers. In addition, Mr. Krasopoulos stated that "The licensee committed to develop a program, prior to startup, for surveillance testing and inspection of the fire dampers." While GPUN did commit to developing this program, we believe that we did not commit to having this program in place prior to startup.

On November 8, 1984, Oyster Creek Procedure 645.6.026, "Fire Damper Functional Test" was issued for review. The procedure scope includes functional testing and preventative maintenance of fire dampers protecting safety related fire areas. This procedure will be implemented in the first quarter of 1985 following final procedure approval.

Should you require any additional information, please contact Mr. Steve DeMerchant, BWR Licensing Engineer at (201)299-2254.

Very truly yours.

eter b. Fiedler

Vice President and Director

Oyster Creek

PBF/SDM/dam Attachments

cc: Dr. Thomas E. Murley, Administrator
Region I
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, PA 19406

NRC Resident Inspector Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Forked River, NJ 08731



Jersey Central Power & Light Company Madison Avenue at Punch Bowl Road Morristown, New Jersey 07960 (201) 455-8200

March 3, 1980

Mr. Peter Koltay Nuclear Regulatory Commission 631 Park Ave. King of Prussia, PA 19406


Dear Mr. Koltay:

SUBJECT: 4160 Volt Fire Protection Vault

Please find the following documents and drawings that you requested concerning the 4160 volt switchgear vault:

- System description for 4160 volt Switchgear Room; 218-77-18.1, Rev. 1.
- Safety evaluation for the Fire Protection System Augmentation 4160 volt switchgear vault, 218-77-18.2, Rev. 0.
- 3. Design criteria 218-77-38, Rev. O.
- 4. Installation Specification, 218-77-45, Rev. 2.
- 5. Installation Specification, 218-77-61, Rev. 1.
- GPU drawings E-1-110-313-001, Rev. 1; E-1-110-313-002, Rev. 1, and E-1-110-313-003, Rev. 1.
- 7. Marine Fabricators drawings Job #26465 101 thru 110, Rev. 2.
- Bowman Construction drawings, 28555, Sheets 1, 2, and 3 dated 12-20-79.

Please be advised that some of your concerns regarding the 4160 volt vault have been previously addressed in the following letters:



Jersey Central Power & Light Company is a Member of the General Public Utilities System

a. Ivan Finfrock to the Director, NRC, dated
March 23, 1972;

b. Ivan Finfrock to the Director, NRC, dated
June 1, 1979.

In addition, all fire protection modifications have been reviewed in detail and approved by JCP&L's Fire Protection Consultant, Professional Loss Control, Inc.

With respect to the exterior walls of the vault, they have been

With respect to the exterior walls of the vault, they have been designed to provide a three-hour fire barrier to protect the switchgear from the lube oil fire hazard. This has been accomplished by a coating of fire retardant material applied to the exterior surfaces of the vault walls and ceiling. Manufacturer's test data, based upon ASTM E-119 testing, indicates that a two inch coating on walls and decks is the required thickness needed to provide a three-hour fire barrier.

Any fire originating inside the vault will be of short duration due to the low fire loading, the detection system, and the manual CO2. For this reason, the interior wall separating the redundant switchgear is a two-hour fire barrier by design. In actuality, however, the fire rating is probably much greater. Detail 4 on GPUSC drawing E-1-110-313-001 shows the interior design or wall covered on each side with lath and 1-11/16" of Pyrocrete 102. In sordance with the manufacturer's test data, this would be equivalent to a two-hour barrier on each side of the interior wall.

Concerning the seismic adequacy of Pyrocrete, manufacturer's test data indicates excellent adhesion and minor indentation without cracking resulting from impact testing, as compared with poured in place concrete.

If you have any further questions, please contact me.

Very truly yours,

J. F. Mancinelli

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