

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) EDWIN I. HATCH, UNIT I	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 2 1 1	PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 2
--	---	-----------------------------

TITLE (4)
Reactor Protection System Actuation

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)
1	0	1	8	4	0 2 1	1	1	1			0 5 0 0 0
1	0	1	8	4	0 0 1	1	1	1			0 5 0 0 0

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § (Check one or more of the following) (11)

OPERATING MODE (9) 5	20.402(b)	20.406(c)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
POWER LEVEL (10) 0 0 0	20.406(a)(1)(i)	50.38(c)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
	20.406(a)(1)(ii)	50.38(c)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
	20.406(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
	20.406(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
	20.406(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(ix)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME T. L. Elton, Acting Superintendent of Regulatory Compliance	TELEPHONE NUMBER
	AREA CODE: 9 1 2 NUMBER: 3 1 6 7 + 1 7 8 5 1 1

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPROS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPROS
A	J E	G E N G O	8 0	N					

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) <input type="checkbox"/> NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On 10/19/84, with the reactor in cold shutdown for refueling, contract personnel were installing relays in main control room panel H11-P611 (channel "B" primary containment isolation and reactor protection system vertical board). Channel "B" of the reactor protection system (RPS) was placed in half scram for relay replacement. At the same time, other contractor personnel were tracing spare wires in main control room panel H11-P609 (channel "A" primary containment isolation and reactor protection system vertical board). It is postulated that a wire was shorted to a live circuit in panel H11-P609 which caused a half scram in channel "A". Subsequently, a full scram signal was received. This event is a result of contractor personnel error, and it is reportable per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv).

8411200384 841111
PDR ADOCK 05000321
S PDR

IE22

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1) EDWIN I. HATCH, UNIT I	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 2 1 8 4	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		
			- 0 2 1	- 0 1 0	0 2	OF

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

This 30 day LER is required by 10CFR50.73 (a)(2)(iv) because this event shows that an unplanned actuation of an engineered safety feature (ESF) (i.e., an unplanned reactor protection system [RPS] actuation which gave a full scram signal) occurred.

On 10/19/84, at approximately 1530 CDT, with the reactor in cold shutdown for refueling, contract personnel were installing relays in control room panel H11-P611 (channel "B" primary containment isolation and reactor protection system vertical board). Prior to allowing work in control panel H11-P611, operating personnel generated a half scram signal by tripping channel "B" of the reactor protection system (RPS). At the same time, a different crew of contract personnel were tracing spare leads inside main control room panel H11-P609 (Channel "A" primary containment isolation and reactor protection system vertical board).

It is postulated that a member of the crew which was working in the confined space inside main control room panel H11-P609 unintentionally shorted a spare lead to a live circuit. This caused the reactor protection system motor generator set's (C71-S001A) circuit breaker to trip, thus causing RPS channel "A" to give a half scram signal. The existing half scram on RPS channel "B", in addition to the unintentional half scram on RPS channel "A", caused a RPS full scram signal.

This event is the result of contractor personnel error in that greater caution should have been exercised while working in control room panel H11-P609.

Personnel responsible for this event have been counseled to use a greater degree of caution when working inside a control panel. The health and safety of the public were not affected by this non-repetitive event.

On 10/19/84, at approximately 1630 CDT, power was restored to reactor protection system channel "A" per the "120 VAC RPS POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM" procedure (HNP-1-1666), and the scram condition was cleared.

This event had no potential or actual safety consequences because the reactor was in cold shutdown with all control rods inserted when the event occurred.

Georgia Power Company
Post Office Box 439
Baxley, Georgia 31513
Telephone 912 367-7781
912 537-9444



Georgia Power


Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant

November 11, 1984
GM-84-1015

PLANT E. I. HATCH
Licensee Event Report
Docket No. 50-321

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

Attached is Licensee Event Report No. 50-321/1984-021. This report is required by 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv).


H. C. Nix
General Manager

JCL
HCN/TLE/vlz

xc: R. J. Kelly
R. E. Conway
J. T. Beckham, Jr.
P. D. Rice
K. M. Gillespie
Superintendent of Regulatory Compliance
R. D. Baker
Control Room
Document Control

IE22
1/1