

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Sequoyah, Unit 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 2 7 1	PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 2
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TITLE (4)
Diesel Generator Start

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)														
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)												
1	0	9	8	4	4	0	6	6	0	0	1	1	0	8	8	4			0	5	0	0	0

OPERATING MODE (9) 1	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)																				
POWER LEVEL (10) 1 0 0	20.402(b)	20.405(a)(1)(i)	20.405(a)(1)(ii)	20.405(a)(1)(iii)	20.405(a)(1)(iv)	20.405(a)(1)(v)	20.406(c)	50.36(c)(1)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	50.73(a)(2)(ix)	73.71(b)	73.71(c)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
													<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>								

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME Glenn E. Duggin, Compliance Section Engineer	TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE: 6 1 5 8 7 1 0 - 6 1 4 6
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COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE): <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH: DAY: YEAR:
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ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e. approximately fifteen single space typewritten lines) (16)

During performance of Surveillance Instruction (SI) 258.2, "Inspection of Molded Case and Lower Voltage Circuit Breakers", personnel manually opened a breaker without an alternate power source to supply its loads. This action caused diesel generator (D/G) 2A-A to start on loss of power to its emergency start circuit. The other three D/Gs started due to the common emergency start circuitry. The breaker was closed and the D/Gs were stopped and reset 15-minutes after the incident. There was no effect on public health or safety.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1) Sequoyah, Unit 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 2 7 8 4 -	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		
		0	66	00	02	OF 02

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

During performance of surveillance instruction (SI) 258.2, "Inspection of Molded Case and Lower Voltage Circuit Breakers", Operations and Maintenance personnel manually opened a breaker (213) without supplying alternate power to its loads. This resulted in the loss of control power to diesel generator (D/G) 2A-A emergency start relay. When the emergency start relay lost power, the other three D/Gs started. This incident occurred at 1600 CST on 10/09/84. Unit 1 was in mode 1 (100 percent power, 2235 psig, 578 degrees F) and unit 2 was in mode 5 (0 percent power, 0 psig, 110 degrees F). The breaker was closed, and the D/Gs were stopped and reset at 1615 CST on 10/09/84. All equipment and personnel performed and responded as expected during the engineered safety features (ESF) actuation. There was no effect on public health or safety, and no plant safety margins were exceeded.

Electrical Maintenance and Operations personnel were performing a functional test of breaker 213 on the 125V vital battery board III. Fuse column D, which supplies control power to the 2A-A D/G emergency start circuit, should have been provided with an alternate power source before breaker 213 was opened, but, through personnel error, it was not. SI-258.2 has a note to use another instruction, MI-10.13, "Ground Detection on Vital Battery Boards", to provide alternate power. The importance of keeping the control power energized was not stressed to the personnel involved.

SI-258.2 is being revised to include the necessary steps to provide alternate power when the breaker is being tested. The importance of maintaining control power is being stressed in the procedure (SI) and to the personnel involved with the procedure. A signoff will also be added to SI-258.2 to ensure that an alternate power source is provided to the control power circuit.

Previous inadvertent ESF/Diesel Generator starts for 1984 - SQRO-50-327/84044 and SQRO-50-328/84004.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

Sequoyah Nuclear Plant
Post Office Box 2000
Soddy Daisy, Tennessee 37379

November 8, 1984

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555


Gentlemen:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 - DOCKET NO.
50-327 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-77 - REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE REPORT
SQRO-50-327/84066

The enclosed licensee event report provides details concerning an inadvertent start of all diesel generators. This event is reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, paragraph a.2.IV.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY



P. R. Wallace
Plant Manager

Enclosure
cc (Enclosure):

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NRC Inspector, NUC PR, Sequoyah

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