Docket No. 50-423 B13747

Attachment 1

Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 3

Proposed Revision to Technical Specifications Accident Monitoring Instrumentation--Reactor Vessel Monitoring

9208030314 920727 PDR ADDCK 05000423 P PDR July 1992

INSTRUMENTATION

ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.3.3.6 The accident monitoring instrumentation channels shown in Table 3.3-10 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTION:

- a. With the number of OPERABLE accident monitoring instrumentation channels except the containment area high range radiation monitor, the containment hydrogen monitor, and reactor vessel water level, less than the Total Number of Channels shown in Table 3.3-10, restore the inoperable channel(s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days, or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.
- b. With the number of OPERABLE accident monitoring instrumentation channels except the containment area-high range radiation monitor, the containment hydrogen monitor, and reactor vessel water level less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirements of Table 3.3-10, restore the inoperable channel(s) to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.
- c. With the number of OPERABLE channels for the containment area-high range radiation monitor less than required by either the total or the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirements, initiate an alternate method of monitoring the appropriate parameter(s), within 72 hours, and either restore the inoperable channel(s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days or prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission, pursuant to Specification 6.9.2, within 14 days that provides actions taken, cause of the inoperability, and the plans and schedule for restoring the channels to OPERABLE status.
- d. With the number of OPERABLE channels for the containment hydrogen monitors less than the total number of channels shown in Table 3.3-10, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 30 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours. With the number of operable channels for the containment hydrogen monitors less than the minimum channels OPERABLE requirement of Table 3.3-10, restore the inoperable channel(s) to OPERABLE status within 72 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours.
- e. With the number of OPERABLE channels for the reactor vessel water level monitor less than the Total number of Channels shown in Table 3.3-10, either restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 7 days if repairs are feasible without shutting down or prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 30 days following the event outlining the

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action taken, the cause of the inoperability, and the plans and schedule for restoring the channel to OPERABLE status.

- f. With the number of OPERABLE channels for the reactor vessel water level monitor less than the minimum channels OPERABLE requirements of Table 3.3-10, either restore the inoperable channel(s) to OPERA-BLE status within 48 hours if repairs are feasible without shutting down or:
 - Initiate an alternate method of monitoring the reactor vessel inventory;
 - Prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 30 days following the event outlining the action taken, the cause of the inoperability, and the plans and schedule for restoring the channel(s) to OPERABLE status; and
 - Restore the channel(s) to OPERABLE status at the next scheduled refueling.
- g. Entry into an OPERATIONAL MODE is permitted while subject to these ACTION requirements.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.3.3.6 Each accident monitoring instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of the CHANNEL CHECK and CHANNEL CALIBRATION at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-7.

TABLE 3.3-10 (Continued)

ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

| INST | RUMENT | TOTAL NO. OF CHANNELS | MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE |
|------|---|-----------------------------|---------------------------------|
| 16. | Containment Area - High Range Radiation Monitor | 2 | 1 |
| 17. | Reactor Vessel Water Level | 2* | 1* |
| 18. | Containment Hydrogen Monitor | 2 | 1 |
| 19. | Neutron Flux | 2 | 1 |

*A channel consists of eight sensors in a probe. A channel is operable if four or more sensors, half or more in the upper head region and half or more in the upper plenum region, are operable.

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TABLE 4.3-7 (Continued)

ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

CHANNEL CHANNEL INSTRUMENT CHECK CALIBRATION 16. Containment Area - High Range Radiation Monitor м 2* 17. Reactor Vessel Water Level M D++ 18. Containment Hydrogen Monitor M 2 19. Neutron Flux M R

*CHANNEL CALIBRATION may consist of an electronic calibration of the channel, not including the detector, for range decades above 10 R/h and a one point calibration check of the detector below 10 R/h with an installed or portable gamma source.

**Electronic calibration from the ICC cabinets only.

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INSTRUMENTATION

BASES

REMOTE SHUTDOWN INSTRUMENTATION (Continued)

instrumentation, control, and power circuits and transfer switches necessary to eliminate effects of the fire and allow operation of instrumentation, control and power circuits required to achieve and maintain a safe shutdown condition are independent of areas where a fire could damage systems normally used to shut down the reactor. This capability is consistent with General Design Criterion 3 and Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50.

3/4.3.3.6 ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION

The OPERABILITY of the accident monitoring instrumentation ensures that sufficient information is available on selected plant parameters to monitor and assess these variables following an accident. The instrumentation included in this specification are those instruments provided to monitor key variables, designated as Category 1 instruments following the guidance for classification contained in Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 2, "Instrumentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants To Assess Plant and Environs Conditions During and Following an Accident."

In the event more than four sensors in a Reactor Vessel Level channel are inoperable, repairs may only be possible during the next refueling outage. This is because the sensors are accessible only after the missile shield and reactor vessel head are removed. It is not feasible to repair a channel except during a refueling outage when the missile shield and reactor vessel head are removed to refuel the core. If only one channel is inoperable, it should be restored to OPERABLE status in a refueling outage as soon as reasonably possible. If both channels are inoperable, at least one channel shall be restored to OPERABLE status in the nearest refueling outage.

3/4.3.3.7 FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION

The OPERABILITY of the fire detection instrumentation ensures that both adequate warning capability is available for prompt detection of fires and that Fire Suppression Systems, that are actuated by fire detectors, will discharge extinguishing agents in a timely manner. Prompt detection and suppression of fires will reduce the potential for damage to safety-related equipment and is an integral element in the overall facility Fire Protection Program.

Fire detectors that are used to actuate Fire Suppression Systems represent a more critically important component of a plant's Fire Protection Program than detectors that are installed solely for early fire warning and notification. Consequently, the minimum number of OPERABLE fire detectors must be greater.

The loss of detection capability for Fire Suppression Systems, actuated by fire detectors, represents a significant degradation of fire protection for any area. As a result, the establishment of a fire watch patrol must be initiated at an earlier stage than would be warranted for the loss of detectors that provide only early fire warning. The establishment of frequent fire patrols in the affected areas is required to provide detection capability until the inoperable instrumentation is restored to OPERABILITY.

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