

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) <b>Turkey Point Unit 4</b>	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 5 1	PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 2
---	--------------------------------------	----------------------

TITLE (4)  
**Loss of Emergency Diesel Generator**

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)
0 1	2 9	8 5	8 5	0 0 2	0 0	0 2	2 8	8 5	Turkey Point Unit 3		0 5 0 0 0 2 5 0
									N/A		0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9) N	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § (Check one or more of the following) (11)									
POWER LEVEL (10) 0 0 0	20.402(b)	20.405(c)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)						
	20.406(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(1)	X 50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)						
	20.406(a)(1)(iii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vi)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)						
	20.406(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)							
	20.406(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)(B)							
	20.406(a)(1)(vi)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(v)							

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME <b>R. D. Hart, Licensing Engineer</b>	TELEPHONE NUMBER
	AREA CODE: 3 0 5    2 4 5 - 2 9 1 0

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS
X	E K	D G	F 0 1 9	Y					

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (if yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO
	MONTH:    DAY:    YEAR:

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces; i.e. approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

**Event:**

On January 29, 1985, while Unit 3 was at 100% power and Unit 4 was cooling down from hot shutdown, a malfunction caused Emergency Diesel Generator A (EDG A) to be Out of Service (OOS) so vital busses 3A and 4A did not have access to on-site emergency power. In addition, a previous malfunction on January 16, 1985, caused vital bus 4B to not have access to emergency power from EDG B. There are a total of four vital busses for both Units 3 and 4 but only vital bus 3B had on-site emergency power available. Similar occurrences: LER 250-84-036

**Cause of Event:**

During a routine check, it was noted and reported that lamp indicators on the local EDG A control panel were dark. A short in a diesel local panel light socket caused the loss of control power to EDG A and it was declared out of service (OOS) to both units. The loss of local control power would prevent automatic diesel start on demand but the diesel could have been started locally from the control panel throughout the event. Also, the previous and independent malfunction of breaker 4AB21 had put it OOS to Unit 4. On loss of off-site power, breaker 4AB21 connects vital bus 4B to emergency power from EDG B.

**Corrective Actions:** See Page 2.

8503110002 850228  
PDR ADOCK 05000251  
S PDR

IE22  
1/1

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)  <b>Turkey Point Unit 4</b>	DOCKET NUMBER (2)  0   5   0   0   0   2   5   1   8   5	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
			0   0   2	0   0	0   2	OF	0   2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

Corrective Actions:

For Unit 3, the conditions for continued operation were within the provisions of Technical Specification 3.0.2 because the engineered safety feature components for Unit 3 were operable by the normal or emergency power supplies. Specifically, vital busses 3A and 3B were energized by the normal start-up transformer while EDG B was subject to daily testing and available for emergency power to vital bus 3B.

For Unit 4, an interpretation of Technical Specification 3.7.1 would require both diesel generators to be operable at any time that a unit is between cold shutdown and power operation. EDG A was successfully started 8 hours and 24 minutes after it was declared out of service. However, the diesel was not declared back in service until 3 hours and 6 minutes later after engineering evaluation of the requirements of the replaced light socket. The diesel panel light socket was replaced with one of the same type and model. Unit 4 achieved cold shutdown 20 minutes later.

Breaker 4AB21 was returned to service prior to Unit 4 start-up thus providing emergency on-site power availability in compliance with Technical Specification 3.7.1. The health and safety of the public were not affected. Further evaluation of this incident is being conducted and should further actions or modifications be necessary, an LER update will be submitted describing such actions.



FEB 28 1985

L-85-87

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

Re: Reportable Event 85-002  
Turkey Point Unit 4  
Date of Event: January 29, 1985  
Loss of Emergency Diesel Generation

The attached Licensee Event Report is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR to provide notification of the subject event.

Very truly yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "J. W. Williams, Jr.", is written over a faint, larger version of the same signature.

J. W. Williams, Jr.  
Group Vice President  
Nuclear Energy

JWW/SAV/js

Attachment

cc: Dr. J. Nelson Grace  
Harold F. Reis, Esquire  
File 933.1  
PNS-LI-85-85-1

IE22  
1/1