Northern States Power Company

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10 CFR Part 50
Section 50 73

GENERATING PLANT
cense Nos. DPR-42
DPR-60

NET

July 24, 1992

U S Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

> PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT Docket Nos. 50-282 License Nos. DPR-42 50-306 DPR-60

Inoperability of Thermo-Lag 330 Fire Barriers on Cable Trays and Conduits

The Licensee Event Report for this occurrence is attached.

Please contact us if you require additional information related to this event.

Thomas M Parker

Manager

Nuclear Support Services

c: Regional Administrator - Region III, NRC NRR Project Manager, NRC Senior Resident Inspector, NRC State of Minnesota Attn: Kris Sanda

Attachment

(168.

50.36(0)(2)

50.73(#1(2)(i)

50.73(4)(2)(4)

50.73(a)(2)(iii)

TELEPHONE NUMBER 6,1,2

50.73(a)(2)(vii)

50.73(a)(Z)(viii)(A)

50.73(a)(2) (viii)(B)

50.73(a)(2)(x)

EXPIRES. 4/20/92

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73.71(b)

73.71 (e)

OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form (66.4)

3 8 8 1 - 1 1 1 211 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13) REPORTABLE TO NPRDS MANUFAC TURER REPORTABLE TO NPROS CAUSE CAUSE SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) MONTH DAY YEAR YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER 12

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces i.e. approximately fitteen single space typewritts y lines) (16

25.405(a)(1)(ii)

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20.405 (x)(1)((v)

20.406(a)(11(v)

Arne A Hunstad

On June 24, 1992, the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued NRC Bulletin 92-01, Failure of Thermo-Lag 330 Fire Barrier System To Maintain Cabling in Wide Cable Trays and Small Conduits Free from Fire Damage. This bulletin referred to tests which demonstrate the failure of Thermo-Lag 330 fire barrier systems to maintain cabling in wide cable trays and small conduits free from fire damage. The Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant has used this material to protect cables in both cable trays and conduits. Six fire areas are affected. Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant has applied our Technical Specification for inoperable Penetration Fire Barriers (TS.3.14.G.2.) for the appropriate interim compensatory measures.

# NRC FORM 366A

#### U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 4/30/92

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST, SOO HAS, FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (PRESD), US NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (1580-0104) OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND RUDGET WASHINGTON DC 20509.

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)	PAGE (3)
		YEAR SECUENTIAL PEVISION NUMBER	
Prairie Island Unit 1	0  5  0  0  0   2  8  2	9   2 - 0   0   8 - 0   0	0 2 0 0 13

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# EVENT DESCRIPTION

On June 24, 1992, the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued NRC Bulletin 92-01, Failure of Thermo-Lag 330 Fire Barrier System To Maintain Cabling in Wide Cable Trays and Small Conduits Free from Fire Damage. This bulletin referred to tests which demonstrate the failure of Thermo-Lag 330 fire barrier systems to maintain cabling in wide cable trays and small conduits free from fire damage. The Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant has used this material to protect cables in both cable trays and conduits. Six fire areas are affected. Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant has applied our Technical Specification for inoperable Penetration Fire Barriers (TS.3.14.G.2.) for the appropriate interim compensatory measures.

# CAUSE OF THE EVENT

This event was caused by the failure of certain configurations of Thermo-Lag 330 Fire Barrier Systems to adequately maintain cabling in wide cable trays and small conduits from fire damage. This determination was made after review of fire endurance tests performed by Texas Utilities Elect.c.

#### ANALYSIS OF THE EVENT

This event is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR Part 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) since inoperability of cable tray and conduit fire barriers is considered to be in violation of Technical Specification 3.14.6.2.

# CORRECTIVE ACTION

Presently a Special Order has been implemented which directs the site's compensatory actions. These actions include a once per hour roving fire watch covering the six affected fire areas. The Special Order also directs that, in the event that the fire detection system in these areas is rendered or found inoperable, a continuous fire watch will be established in that area. These compensatory actions are consistent with the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Technical Specifications for Penetration Fire Barriers (TS.3.14.G.2).

Appropriate actions to restore fire barrier operability are being developed through an industry program being coordinated by NUMARC. This program will include establishment of a test database, development of guidance for applicability of tests, development of generic installation guidance, and consideration and coordination of additional testing as appropriate. We will apply the results of these efforts, when completed, to Thermo-Lag installations within the scope of Bulletin 92-01.

MRC FORM 386A (6-89)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED DMB ...... 3150-0104 EXPIRES 4/30/97

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH IP-301, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20565, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (2150-0104) OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20602.

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (8)	PAGE (3)
		YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER	
Prairie Island Unit 1	0  5   0   0   0   2   8   2	9 2 - 0 0   8 - 0 0	0 3 0 0 0 3

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FAILED COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION

None.

PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS

None.