

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

APPROVED OMB NO. 3160-0100
EXPIRES 6/30/83

FACILITY NAME (1): INDIAN POINT, UNIT 2
DOCKET NUMBER (2): 051001021471 OF 02

TITLE (4): REACTOR TRIP/HIGH PRESSURIZER PRESSURE

EVENT DATE (8)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (9)													
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)											
0	2	04	8	5	0	0	2	0	0	3	0	6	8	5		0	5	0	0	0		

OPERATING MODE (9):
POWER LEVEL (10): 110.0

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5. (Check one or more of the following) (11)

<input type="checkbox"/> 20.402(b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.408(a)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 60.73(a)(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(b)
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.408(a)(1)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/> 60.36(a)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 60.73(a)(2)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(c)
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.408(a)(1)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/> 60.36(a)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/> 60.73(a)(2)(vi)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 386A)
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.408(a)(1)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/> 60.73(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 60.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)	
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.408(a)(1)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 60.73(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 60.73(a)(2)(vii)(B)	
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.408(a)(1)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 60.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 60.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12):
NAME: JOHN ELLWANGER
TELEPHONE NUMBER: 914 5216175, 1812

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC
B	SIL	101R		N					
B	SIL	1S1EP		N					

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14):
YES (If you complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) NO

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15): MONTH DAY YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 11 lines single-spaced typewritten text) (16)

On February 4, 1985, while at full power, one of the two main boiler feed pump tripped.

Following procedures, the operator rapidly reduce steam flow to the turbine. In the course of the resultant transient, a reactor trip occurred due to high pressurizer pressure.

There was no impact on plant safety. The Reactor Protection System responded as designed.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (5)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		
INDIAN POINT, UNIT 2	05000247	85	002	00	02	OF 02

TEXT (if more space is required, use additional NRC Form 266A (1))

While operating at 100% power, the #22 Main Boiler Feed Pump automatically tripped upon loss of control oil. In accordance with procedures, the operators rapidly reduced steam flow to the turbine. The steam dump valves were placed in the "pressure" mode to reduce steam demand associated with steam dump operation. The Control Rods were in the "manual" mode with one Pressurizer spray control valve in the "automatic" mode and the other spray valve in the "manual" mode.

Turbine generator load was reduced from 895 megawatts to 550 megawatts in approximately 40 seconds. Due to the operating mode of the steam dump valves, there was no steam venting. Increasing RCS temperature caused a rise in pressurizer level with a resultant increase in pressurizer pressure. The pressurizer power operated relief valves (PORVs) cycled; however, closed block valves prevented discharge of reactor coolant to the Pressurizer Relief Tank. Thus the reactor coolant pressure rose until a reactor trip occurred (due to high pressurizer pressure).

With the exception of the operation of one of the spray valves which could not be verified, all equipment functioned in accordance with design. A computer thermal analysis was performed to determine whether the operation of the spray valve would have had any effect on the pressure excursion. The results indicated that a high pressurizer pressure trip would have occurred regardless of spray operation.

The cause of the malfunction of the Main Boiler Feed Pump control oil system was clogged orifices. The orifices were cleaned and the oil system functioned normally. Fouling of the oil is attributed to an inoperable Westphalia oil/water separator. Up to the time of the event, the water level rose to 1% resulting in increased corrosion and particle agglomeration. This in turn, clogged the orifices. The Westphalia separator has since been repaired.

There was no impact on plant safety as plant equipment functioned as designed. Future operation with the block valves of the PORVs remaining in the closed position will continue, in accordance with plant procedures, due to the experience gained at TMI-2. It should be noted that even if the block valves were in the open position, a low steam generator level would have occurred, tripping the reactor.

John D. O'Toole
Vice President

Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc.
4 Irving Place, New York, NY 10003
Telephone (212) 460-2533

February 26, 1985


Re: Indian Point Unit No. 2
Docket No. 50-247
LER-85-002-00

Document Control Desk
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Dear Sirs:

The attached Licensee Event Report LER-85-002-00 is hereby submitted in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50.73.

Very truly yours,



attach.

cc: Dr. Thomas E. Murley,
Regional Administrator-Region I
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pa. 19406

Senior Resident Inspector
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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