

PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY

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January 22, 1979

Mr. Boyce H. Grier, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region I
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Grier:

SUBJECT: Licensee Event Report Narrative Description

The following occurrence was reported to Mr. Greenman,
Region I, Office of Inspection and Enforcement on January 9,
1979.

Reference: Bucket Numbers 50-277
 50-278

Report No: LER 2-79-2/1T
Report Date: January 22, 1979
Occurrence Date: January 8, 1979
Facility: Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station
 R.O. 1, Delta, PA 17314

Technical Specification Reference:

Technical Specification 3.14.B.4 states in part that if the requirements of 3.14.B.1, 2, or 3 cannot be met, establish a continuous fire watch with back-up fire suppression equipment for the unprotected area (MPC, Cable Spreading, Computer, Diesel Generator) within one hour.

Description of the Event:

The cable spreading room carbox system was disabled on the morning of 1/8/79 so that construction workers could perform cable work in the overhead. A firewatch was posted at that time. When the cable work was completed for the day at about 4:30 PM, the working group supervision failed to notify operating personnel that they were finished. The firewatch left the room

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when the day's work was completed. On the next shift as part of a normal surveillance of the area, operating shift personnel noticed the error and then placed the carder system in service.

Consequences of Event:

The consequences of this event are considered minimal because the fire detection system was fully operable and numerous people were in and out of the area during the 3-1/2 hour period in which the firewatch was not present.


Cause of Event:

The cause of this occurrence was a personnel error. Supervision of construction personnel working in the cable spreading room failed to notify shift supervision when the cable work was completed for the day.

Corrective Action:

Construction personnel were instructed in the importance of notifying shift supervision anytime that working conditions change in an area so that shift personnel can take appropriate action if required.

Yours truly,


H. J. Cooney
Superintendent
Generation Division-Nuclear

Attachment

cc. Director, NRC - Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Mr. Norman G. Heller, NRC - Office of Management &
Program Analysis