



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 91 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-66

DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY

OHIO EDISON COMPANY

PENNSYLVANIA POWER COMPANY

BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 1

DOCKET NO. 50-334

Introduction

NRC Generic Letter 84-13, dated May 3, 1984, discussed revised technical specifications for snubbers and recommended that licensees amend their technical specifications to be consistent with the revised guidance. By letter dated October 10, 1984, Duquesne Light Company (the licensee) submitted a proposed amendment to the Technical Specifications (Appendix A of Operating License No. DPR-66) for Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 1, to accomplish this. Further, the proposed amendment contains changes to correct certain editorial errors and to revise certain surveillance requirements. We have reviewed the requested changes and the results are as follows.

Evaluation and Discussion

Currently, Tables 3.7-4a and 3.7-4b of Specification 3.7.12 list all snubbers required to be operable. The licensee proposes to delete the Tables and to simply require that all snubbers be operable except those snubbers on nonsafety-related systems whose failure would have no adverse effect on any safety-related system. Further, the licensee proposes to delete references to the Tables in Specifications 4.7.12 and 6.10.2.m. These proposed changes are intended to reduce the number of changes that have been needed to accurately maintain the tabular listings, and are in conformance with the recommended changes of NRC Generic Letter 84-13. The deletion of the Tables is acceptable.

Currently, note (1) to Table 4.3-12 requires that the quarterly channel functional test of instrument 1.c. (Auxiliary Feed Pump Bay Drain Monitor, RM-DA-100) demonstrate that automatic pathway isolation occurs for both instrument downscale failure and instrument controls not set in operate mode. The licensee proposes to delete this requirement, and to add a new note (6) which specifies the remaining requirements of demonstrating automatic pathway isolation and Control Room Annunciation when the instrument levels are above the alarm/trip setpoint, and Control Room Alarm Annunciation when instrument fails downscale or instrument controls are not set in the operate mode. The licensee states that the monitor does not have

the capability of automatic pathway isolation for downscale failure or controls not in operate mode and that the existing technical specification cannot be met. Further, the licensee states that operator action in response to the Control Room Alarm Annunciation is acceptable for downscale failure or controls not set in operate mode for this radioactivity monitor due to the very low contamination levels in the auxiliary feed pump bay. In a January 16, 1985 telephone conversation, a licensee representative, R. Ireland, agreed to editorial changes for clarification of the proposed requirements. The proposed change, as modified, is acceptable.

The licensee proposes to add an additional surveillance requirement for the Containment Recirculation Spray System as Specification 4.6.2.2.d.3. This would require the licensee to verify that, at least once per 18 months during shutdown, sufficient river water flow exists through the containment recirculation spray heat exchangers. In a January 17, 1985 telephone discussion, a licensee representative, K. Grada, agreed to editorial changes for clarification of the proposed requirement. The proposed change, as modified, is acceptable.

The licensee proposes to correct editorial errors in Specifications 3.10.1 (delete "and") and 4.1.1.1.b and d (correct reference). The proposed corrections are acceptable.

We have evaluated the proposed changes to the Technical Specifications and conclude that these changes are administrative and do not involve any physical change to the plant's safety-related structures, systems or components. Further, these changes do not increase the likelihood of a malfunction of safety-related equipment, or increase the consequences of an accident previously analyzed or create the possibility of a malfunction different from those previously evaluated. Therefore, as stated above, we find the licensee's requested changes to be acceptable.

Environmental Consideration

This amendment involves a change in the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that this amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, this amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR Sec 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.

Conclusion

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the

public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Dated: February 22, 1985

Principal Contributors:

Glenn W. Meyer