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PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

PG&E +

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OFFICE OF SECRETARY  
DOCKETING & SERVICE  
BRANCH

October 1, 1984

VIA EXPRESS MAIL

Secretary  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Attention: Docketing and  
Service Section


Re: In the Matter of Pacific  
Gas and Electric Company (Diablo  
Canyon Power Plant Units 1 and 2)  
Docket Nos. 50-275 and 50-323 *OL*

Dear Sir:

In Pacific Gas and Electric Company's Response to the  
Appeal Board's Order of September 10, 1984, filed on September 28,  
1984, we inadvertently omitted Exhibit A to the Connell-Valhstrom  
affidavit. A copy of that Exhibit (April 9, 1984, letter to  
the NRC) is enclosed.

We regret any inconvenience this oversight may have  
caused.

Very truly yours,



RFL:sls

cc: Diablo Canyon Service List

Enclosures

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PDR ADDCK 05000275  
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# PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

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J. O. SCHUYLER  
VICE PRESIDENT  
NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION

April 9, 1984

PGandE Letter No.: DCL-84-137

Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director  
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Re: Docket No. 50-275, OL-DPR-76  
Diablo Canyon Unit 1  
Jet Impingement Evaluations


Dear Mr. Denton:

In the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board decision dated March 20, 1984 (ALAB-763), the Board ruled (pp. 67 and 68) that PGandE must perform jet impingement evaluations for three lines inside containment that were not included within the scope of the pressure/temperature criteria PGandE used for identifying lines for analysis.

The enclosure to this letter identifies those lines and provides the results of PGandE's analysis of the lines with respect to jet impingement. No modifications resulted from this analysis.

Kindly acknowledge receipt of this material on the enclosed copy of this letter and return it in the enclosed addressed envelope.

Sincerely,



Enclosure

cc: D. G. Eisenhut  
G. W. Knighton  
J. B. Martin  
H. E. Schierling  
Service List

## ENCLOSURE

ADDITIONAL LINES CONSIDERED FOR JET IMPINGEMENT

The Diablo Canyon Project's reverification of the effects of jet impingement inside containment originally considered as jet impingement sources those lines with a pressure greater than 275 psi and a temperature greater than 200°F, which also met the size and usage criteria of the Standard Review Plan. Since the original reverification, the scope has been expanded to include, as sources, those lines with pressure greater than 275 psi or temperature greater than 200°F, which also meet the size and usage criteria. It was shown that only three lines or classes of lines would be affected:

1. The charging line from the containment penetration to the regenerative heat exchanger;
2. The reactor coolant pump seal injection lines; and
3. The accumulator injection lines upstream of the check valves

The first two classes of lines cannot produce a jet even if the lines are assumed to rupture because there is no high energy reservoir to provide a driving head. In the forward flow direction, both lines depend on the positive displacement charging pump to provide pressure. This pressure will immediately drop if the line is ruptured. Reverse flow is (1) prevented by redundant check valves for the first case, or (2) greatly restricted by the reactor coolant pump seals such that the pressure is less than 50 psi for the second case. This was discussed with the NRC Staff in a meeting in October 1983.

A rupture in the accumulator injection lines could produce a jet. Accordingly, these lines were added to the jet impingement walkdown and reviewed. As expected, due to the layout of these lines, there are no unacceptable consequences from the hypothetical rupture of these lines. This was documented, along with the disposition for all other high energy lines, in PGandE Letter No. DCL-84-041, dated February 6, 1984, to the NRC.

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