

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) LaSalle County Station	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 7 3	PAGE 3 1 OF 0 3
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TITLE (4)
Secondary Containment Isolation During Testing

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		
0 8	2 4	8 4	8 4	0 4	9	0 8	2 4	8 4	LaSalle Co. Unit 2		
									DOCKET NUMBER(S) 0 5 0 0 0 3 7 4		
									0 5 0 0 0 3 7 4		

OPERATING MODE (9) 1

POWER LEVEL (10) 0 1 9 9

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)

20.402(b)	<input type="checkbox"/>	20.408(a)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	80.73(a)(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/>	73.71(b)	<input type="checkbox"/>
20.405(a)(1)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/>	80.38(a)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/>	80.73(a)(2)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/>	73.71(a)	<input type="checkbox"/>
20.405(a)(1)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/>	80.38(a)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/>	80.73(a)(2)(vi)	<input type="checkbox"/>	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 385A)	<input type="checkbox"/>
20.408(a)(1)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/>	80.73(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/>	80.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)	<input type="checkbox"/>		
20.408(a)(1)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/>	80.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/>	80.73(a)(2)(vii)(B)	<input type="checkbox"/>		
20.408(a)(1)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/>	80.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/>	80.73(a)(2)(ix)	<input type="checkbox"/>		

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
Tom Hammerich, extension 259	8 1 5 3 5 7 1 - 1 6 7 1 6 1

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC
D	J C	Z Z Z Z	Z Z Z Z	N					

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) NO

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)

MONTH	DAY	YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On August 24, 1984, at 1550 a Division I isolation signal was received on Unit 2 during a surveillance of the RPS bus electric power monitors (EPM). This occurred during transfer of the RPS bus from its normal to alternate power supply. Another isolation signal occurred later at 1725. While a procedural revision was performed to prevent this from occurring, the procedure did not cover all sources of the isolation. This was due to the unusual system interactions which were unknown or not remembered by the reviewers of the procedure. Procedures will be revised and personnel trained on the system interactions. The design will be reviewed for possible improvements.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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TEXT (if more space is required, use additional NRC Form 305A's) (17)

I. EVENT DESCRIPTION

On August 24, 1984, at 1550 a Division 1 isolation signal (JM) was received on Unit 2 during the performance of LES-RP-102, RPS Electric Power Monitoring (EPM) Assembly Channel Functional Test, by O.A.D. This also caused a Secondary Containment isolation of Unit 1. This occurred when transferring the Unit 2 B RPS Bus (EF) from its Motor Generator (M/G) set to its alternate feed. Another isolation signal was received at 1725 on the same day when transferring back to the M/G set.

At the time of the event, Unit 1 was in the Run Mode at 99% power and Unit 2 was in Cold Shutdown.

II. CAUSE

During the performance of this procedure, jumpers were installed as allowed by the Technical Specifications to prevent an isolation of the Secondary Containment during the transfer process. A Secondary Containment (NG) isolation affects both Unit 1 and Unit 2.

However, while the jumpers which were installed were proper, it was not remembered at the time of the procedure revision and approval that the loss of the B RPS bus would cause a trip of both Divisions of isolation logic. Thus when transferring the B RPS Bus, a Division 1 isolation occurred.

This isolation of Division 1 is caused because the "B" manual isolation push button is powered from RPS Bus B but causes isolations to occur in Division 1 valves whose isolation logic relays are powered from RPS Bus A. This system design is acceptable as is, but has this little known idiosyncrasy.

The second isolation which occurred when returning the B RPS bus to its normal M/G set feed was caused by the Reactor Building Vent and Fuel Pool Exhaust Radiation Monitors (IL) being tripped. These radiation monitors fail safe on loss of power but do not automatically reset upon restoration of power. This fact was unknown both to the reviewers of the procedure and the personnel on shift during the event.

III. PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE EVENT

The safety function of the circuits involved operated as designed and all isolation functions were proper. Secondary Containment integrity was maintained at all times and the Technical Specifications were adhered to. After both isolations normal Reactor Building ventilation (VA) was restored without incident. This event had no impact on safe plant operations.

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

IV. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

The operating procedure for transferring RPS busses and what actions are expected on the loss of an RPS bus has been reviewed and will be revised to incorporate the lessons learned from this event. In addition, a description of what actions will occur when RPS busses are transferred will be added to the procedure. (AIR 1-84-67138) LES-RP-102 and LES-RP-103 (Calibration) will be revised to reference the operating procedure. (AIR 1-84-67139)

This event will be incorporated into the training program so that the unusual system interactions which were discovered will be more generally known. (AIR 1-84-67140)

The design of the "B" manual push button is being reviewed to determine if a circuit revision can be performed to prevent the Division 1 isolation from occurring on a loss of the "B" RPS bus. (AIR 1-84-67141)

V. PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES

None.

VI. NAME AND TELEPHONE NUMBER OF PREPARER

Tom Hammerich, 815/357-6761, extension 259.



Commonwealth Edison
LaSalle County Nuclear Station
Rural Route #1, Box 220
Marseilles, Illinois 61341
Telephone 815/357-6761

September 18, 1984

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Sir:

Reportable Occurrence Report #84-049-00, Docket #050-373 is being submitted to your office in accordance with 10CFR 50.73.

CE Dargent

for G. J. Diederich
Superintendent
LaSalle County Station

GJD/MLD/kg

Enclosure

xc: NRC, Regional Director
INPO - Records Center
File/NRC

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