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(9-83)	LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION									U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMIS APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 8/31/85					
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On August 21 at approximately 1145 hours a momentary violation of secondary containment occurred during normal reactor power operation. The violation involved two secondary containment airlock doors being simult neously open. By DAEC Technical Specification 3.7.C.1, secondary containment integrity is required during power operation. Therefore, this event constitutes a condition prohibited by our technical specifications and is being reported accordingly. In all circumstances, however, standby gas treatment system (EIIS Code BH) was operable but not required to be operating to provide filtered elevated effluent pathway. Hence there was no impact on the health and safety of the public.

The event occurred on August 21 while in normal full power operation. Equipment transfer was in progress which required the large equipment airlock door between the Reactor Building and the Reactor Building railroad airlock to be open. Interlock mechanisms, in this configuration, provide a latch for three outer airlock doors. One of these doors is the machine shop normal egress and ingress door. An individual inside the machine shop requested, by telephone, permission from licensed personnel to defeat the interlock mechanism in order to exit the machine shop. The permission was denied by licensed personnel. The individual proceeded to direct a second individual (on the opposite side of the machine shop door) to remove a fuse on the airlock side of the machine shop door. As this action defeated the latching device, the individual was able to exit the machine shop. The fuse was restored following this exit.

Following investigation of the incident, both individuals' employment at DAEC was terminated. Appropriate disciplinary action was taken regarding a third individual who exited the machine shop with the first individual, but who did not participate in the interlock defeat. The duration of the secondary containment violation was the length of time necessary to open the machine shop door, or approximately a few seconds. Personnel involved in the equipment transfer observed the violation and properly initiated in-plant notification to supervisory and licensed personnel.

NRC Form 366A (9-83)	LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION									
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Corrective action has been initiated to eliminate such occurrences. There are several prime means by which secondary containment integrity is maintained in airlocks. Primarily, plant personnel are responsible to observe administrative controls and not open doors simultaneously. While inside an airlock, line of sight is available to avoid violations. From both inside and outside airlocks, a light is provided immediately below the door actuating push button that indicates whether another door is ajar. Explicit postings are provided on all airlock doors to identify the door as an airlock and remind personnel of these restrictions. Thirdly, the push button switches utilize a solenoid to latch other doors to prevent simultaneous door openings. Although not overly sensitive, the large amount of traffic through airlocks by personnel occasionally requires repair of these mechanisms. Upon identification of defective mechanisms, corrective maintenance has been and continues to be implemented. Personnel awareness of secondary containment importance has been reinforced by actions arising from this event and by memorandum reinforcing secondary containment importance. A routine scheduled surveillance and test program is being instituted for interlock doors and mechanisms. During interlock corrective maintenance, personnel are being posted to prevent blind-side airlock entries and special signs that identify airlock maintenance in progress will be utilized. Finally, engineering review of interlock improvements, discussed in LER's 82-09 and 83-29, has been expedited.

Iowa Electric Light and Power Company

September 20, 1984 DAEC-84-593

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555

> Subject: Duane Arnold Energy Center Docket No. 50-331 Op. License DPR-49 Licensee Event Report No. 84-030

Gentlemen:

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73 please find attached a copy of the subject Licensee Event Report.

Very truly yours,

Daniel L. Mineck Plant Superintendent - Nuclear Duanc Arnold Energy Center

DLM/WJM/kp

attachment

cc: Mr. James G. Keppler
Regional Administrator
Region III
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, IL 60137

NRC Resident Inspector - DAEC

File A-118a