

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 8 0	PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 2
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TITLE (4)
FIRE DOOR OPEN

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)
0 8	2 3	8 4	8 4	0 18	0 0	0 9	2 1	8 4			0 5 0 0 0
											0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9) N	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § (Check one or more of the following) (11)									
POWER LEVEL (10) 8 0	20.402(b)		20.406(c)		50.73(a)(2)(iv)		73.71(b)			
	20.406(a)(1)(i)		50.36(c)(1)		50.73(a)(2)(v)		73.71(c)			
	20.406(a)(1)(ii)		50.36(c)(2)		50.73(a)(2)(vii)		OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 265A)			
	20.406(a)(1)(iii)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)					
	20.406(a)(1)(iv)		50.73(a)(2)(ii)		50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)					
20.406(a)(1)(v)		50.73(a)(2)(iii)		50.73(a)(2)(ix)						

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME R. F. SAUNDERS, STATION MANAGER	TELEPHONE NUMBER
	AREA CODE: 8 0 4 NUMBER: 3 5 7 - 3 1 8 4

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRPDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRPDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) NO

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single space typewritten lines) (16)

On August 23, 1984, at 0200 hours, with the unit at 80% power, an operator performing a routine walkdown discovered an air hose blocking open the fire door between mechanical equipment space #1 and the cable spreading room. The air hose would have prevented the door from closing in the event of a fire. At this time, no fire watch was present in the area as required by Technical Specifications. This event was caused by contractor personnel misinterpretation of end of shift walkdown procedures.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1) SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 8 0	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
		8 4	— 0 1 8	— 0 0	0 2	OF	0 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

1.0 Description of the Event

On August 23, 1984, at 0200 hours, with the unit at 80% power, the Shift Supervisor performing a routine walkdown discovered an air hose blocking open the fire door between mechanical equipment space #1 and the cable spreading room. The air hose would have prevented the door from closing in the event of a fire. At the time, no fire watch was present in the area as required by Technical Specifications.

Earlier at the end of the workday, a daily walkdown performed by a construction contractor foreman revealed the air hose blocking the fire door. Since the contractor was not using any air powered tools, he incorrectly concluded that securing the fire door was not his responsibility. This action was contrary to the existing end of shift walkdown procedure being used by the contractor.

2.0 Safety Consequences and Implications

The integrity of fire barriers ensures that a fire in one area of the plant will be confined, or adequately retarded from spreading to adjacent areas. Since all other fire warning and suppression systems were operable during the event, this did not constitute an unreveiwed safety question nor affect the health and safety of the public.

3.0 Cause

Due to the use of short time temporary labor in the cable spreading room and mechanical equipment space, the contract personnel responsible for placing the air hose through the fire door could not be identified.

Contractor personnel misinterpretation of the end of shift walkdown procedure allow the fire door to remain inoperable.

4.0 Immediate Corrective Action

The air hose was removed from the doorway.

5.0 Additional Corrective Action

None.

6.0 Actions Taken to Prevent Recurrence

The loss prevention supervisor re-emphasized the seriousness of the fire door violations to (contractor personnel). The foreman was re-instructed as to the proper way of performing his walkdown.

7.0 Generic Implications

None.

Vepco

VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER COMPANY

Surry Power Station
P. O. Box 315
Surry, Virginia 23883

SEP 21 1984

Serial No: 84-033

Docket No: 50-280

License No: DPR-32

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
016 Phillips Building
Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:


Pursuant to Surry Power Station Technical Specifications, the Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits the following Licensee Event Report for Surry Unit 1.

REPORT NUMBER

84-018-00

This report has been reviewed by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee and will be reviewed by Safety Evaluation and Control.

Very truly yours,



R. F. Saunders
Station Manager

Enclosure

cc: Mr. James P. O'Reilly
Regional Administrator
Suite 2900
101 Marietta Street, NW
Atlanta, Georgia 30323

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