

NORTHEAST UTILITIES

THE CONNECTICUT LIGHT AND POWER COMPANY
WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS ELECTRIC COMPANY
HOLYOKE WATER POWER COMPANY
NORTHEAST UTILITIES SERVICE COMPANY
NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY

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September 21, 1984

Docket No. 50-423
B11319

Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Mr. B. J. Youngblood, Chief
Licensing Branch No. 1
Division of Licensing
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

- Reference: (1) B. J. Youngblood to W. G. Council, SER for Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 3, dated August 2, 1984.
- (2) W. G. Council to B. J. Youngblood, Transmittal of Amendment 8, dated June 4, 1984.

Dear Mr. Youngblood:

Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 3
Transmittal of Responses to the SER Confirmatory Items

Enclosed are Northeast Nuclear Energy Company's responses to the SER Confirmatory Items 39 and 41. The FSAR section referenced in the response to the confirmatory item 41 was provided in Amendment 8 to the FSAR (Reference 2). These responses should fully resolve the Staff's concern regarding the Confirmatory Items 39 and 41.

If there are any questions, please contact our licensing representative directly.

Very truly yours,

NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY
et. al.

BY NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY
Their Agent

W. G. Council
Senior Vice President

Millstone Unit No. 3
Confirmatory Items
Instrumentation and Control Systems Branch

SER-C39 Non-Class 1E Control Signals to Class 1E Control Circuits (SER 7.3.3.11)

The staff requested the applicant to provide a list of non-Class 1E control signals that are used as inputs to Class 1E control circuits and assess their effects on the safety systems. By a letter dated May 4, 1984, the applicant provided a list of non-Class 1E signals to Class 1E circuits. The applicant stated that these non-Class 1E signal can only act to the safe direction and therefore will not degrade safety systems. This is a confirmatory item subject to staff's review of all the related electrical drawings, which are not available at the present time.

Response:

A copy (microfiche) for each of the following drawings was provided directly to your Mr. Hulbert Li, Instrumentation and Control Systems Branch on June 19, 1984.

Logic Diagrams

3TMB FSK 16-5 issue 6
3CHS FSK 26-2 issue 13
3MSS FSK 03-01 issue 11
3HVC FSK 22-9 issue 8

Elementary Diagrams

ESK-5BB	ESK-7J	ESK-7JE
ESK-5BC	ESK-7K	ESK-7QE
ESK-5BD	ESK-7L	ESK-7QF
ESK-5BE	ESK-7CR	ESK-7QG
ESK-5BF	ESK-7CS	ESK-7QH
ESK-5BG	ESK-7CT	ESK-7TA
ESK-5EX	ESK-7CU	ESK-7TC
ESK-6AN	ESK-7CV	ESK-7ABU
ESK-6AP	ESK-7CW	ESK-7AB
ESK-6GD	ESK-7DX	ESK-8DA
ESK-6GE	ESK-7FE	ESK-8DB
ESK-6PK	ESK-7FF	ESK-8JB
ESK-6PL	ESK-7FG	ESK-8JC
ESK-6PM	ESK-7FH	ESK-8JD
ESK-6PN	ESK-7JA	ESK-8JF
ESK-6ADG	ESK-7JB	ESK-8HC
ESK-6AMG	ESK-7JC	ESK-8HG
ESK-7H	ESK-7JD	

Millstone Unit No. 3
Confirmatory Items
Instrumentation and Control Systems Branch

SER-C41 BOP Instrumentation and Control System Testing Capability (SER 7-3.3.14)

FSAR Sections 7.2.2.2.3 and 7.3.2.2.5 describe the capability for testing the reactor trip system and the engineered safety features (ESF) system. Most of the descriptions are based on NSSS scope of supply equipment. It is not clear whether all the BOP instrumentation and control systems satisfy the same criteria. The staff cited an example of the refueling water storage tank (RWST) level measurement, which is a BOP design. The low-low loop signal from one out of two level switches will automatically stop the residual heat removal pump. The empty tank signal from one out of two level switches will automatically stop the quench spray pumps. The testing of these actuation logic circuits is not discussed in the FSAR, and they are not tested by the same method as NSSS ESF instrument systems. The staff requested that the applicant perform a thorough evaluation of the BOP safety-related instrumentation and control systems with respect to testing capabilities, identify any instrument channels that cannot be tested as described in Sections 7.2.2.2.3 and 7.3.2.2.5, and justify that the design is in conformance with the testing requirements of GDC 21. By a letter dated April 2, 1984, the applicant provided a draft response to address each BOP safety-related instrumentation and control system with respect to testing capabilities and its conformance with the testing requirements of GDC 21. On the basis of its audit review, the staff finds that there is reasonable assurance that the BOP designs are in conformance with GDC 21. This is a confirmatory item subject to documentation in the FSAR.

Response:

Refer to the revised FSAR Section 7.3.1.1.5 (FSAR Amendment 8, dated May 1984).

Status

Closed.