TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

CHATTANOOGA. TENNESSEE 37401 400 Chestnut Street Tower II

84 SEP 14 September 11, 1984

BLRD-50-438/84-44 BLRD-50-439/84-40

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II Attn: Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - RIGOROUSLY ANALYZED SUPPORT LOCATIONS NOT VERIFIED - BLRD-50-438/84-44, BLRD-50-439/84-40 - FIRST INTERIM REPORT

The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-OIE Inspector P. E. Fredrickson on August 9, 1984 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) as NCR 3337. Enclosed is our first interim report. We expect to submit our next report on or about January 4, 1985.

If you have any questions concerning this matter, please get in touch with R. H. Shell at FTS 858-2688.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

DS Kammer

For L. M. Mills, Manager Nuclear Licensing

Enclosure

cc: Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director (Enclosure)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Records Center (Enclosure)
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
1100 Circle 75 Parkway, Suite 1500
Atlanta, Georgia 30339

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ENCLOSURE

BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2
RIGOROUSLY ANALYZED SUPPORT LOCATIONS NOT VERIFIED
BLRD-50-438/84-44, BLRD-50-439/84-40
NCR 3337
10 CFR 50.55(e)
FIRST INTERIM REPORT

Description of Deficiency

Nonconformance report (NCR) 2208 (BLRD-50-438/83-18, BLRD-50-439/83-14) identified inspections of rigorously analyzed pipe supports that were not correctly performed. The support installation locations were not verified against the seismic analysis isometric locations for those cases when the installed location deviated from TVA's Division of Engineering Design's (EN DES) detail location. Approximately 3800 completed inspection records were identified on NCR 2208. An additional 752 supports have been identified that were not investigated on NCR 2208. The apparent cause of the omission of the 752 supports was an incorrect assumption by responsible personnel that all rigorously analyzed supports were uniquely identified in the Pipe Hanger Information System (PHIS) computer program. During input of information into the program, certain supports did not contain data points on the support detail drawings and therefore were not identified in the computer program as rigorously analyzed supports.

Interim Progress

Since the review of the 3800 supports originally identified on NCR 2208, EN DES has indicated in the PHIS program those supports that are rigorously analyzed. TVA's Division of Construction (CONST) is reviewing the program for all (completed-final) inspection of rigorously analyzed supports to ensure that all supports have been identified. Any support location found to be unacceptable will be dispositioned accordingly on an individual basis. TVA will provide further details upon completion of our review.