

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Sequoyah, Unit 1		DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 2 7	PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 2
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TITLE (4)
Breach of Auxiliary Building Secondary Containment Enclosure (ABSCE)

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)
0	8	20	8	4	8	0	5	0	Sequoyah, Unit 2		0 5 0 0 0 3 2 8
0	8	20	8	4	8	0	5	0			0 5 0 0 0 3 2 8

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)

OPERATING MODE (9) 1	20.402(b)	20.405(c)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
POWER LEVEL (10) 1 1 0 1 0	20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
	20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
	20.405(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
	20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
	20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(ix)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME Michael R. Cooper, Compliance Engineer	TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE 6 1 5 8 7 0 - 6 1 4 6
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COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
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ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

Work was being performed on the Auxiliary Building roof, which required access through two doors which are arranged in an air lock configuration. The outer door is a vital area boundary door and was unlocked using administrative controls. A security officer was stationed at the door to maintain the vital area boundary. The personnel working at this location failed to realize the doors were an ABSCE boundary and blocked the doors open.

This configuration would have prevented the Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System from maintaining a minus 1/4 inch water gauge pressure as required per Technical Specification 3.7.8 Surveillance 4.7.8.d.3.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1) Sequoyah, Unit 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 2 7	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
		8 4	- 0 5 5	- 0 0	0 2	OF	0 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 386A's) (17)

This LER involves two separate incidents that occurred on 08/20/84. Two doors (A207 and A206) are located in the auxiliary building and give access to the roof. The outer door is a vital area boundary door and is secured locked. At approximately 0700 CST on 08/20/84, maintenance personnel notified security that work was required on the roof and that a security officer was needed to open the secured door. The door was unlocked and a security guard was posted at the door. Neither the maintenance personnel nor security personnel were aware that the outer door was a part of the Auxiliary Building Secondary Containment Enclosure (ABSCE) boundary. The work being performed on the roof required 110 volt power, so an extension cord was run through the door. At 0830 CST a Field Services supervisor (who was aware of the boundary) told the men to shut the door and notified Operations in the control room. An ASE was sent to the doors and verified that the doors were closed. The maintenance and security personnel still did not understand these requirements for closing the doors and they were reopened. The requirements for these doors as part of the ABSCE were reemphasized to maintenance management and the doors closed at 1330 CST. The second door-breaching can be attributed to failure of communication between first-line management and personnel performing the work.

The major contributing factor to these breaches was the failure of a plant procedure to list which doors are part of the ABSCE boundary. The control room does not issue security door control paperwork and was unaware of these breaches. The majority of auxiliary building doors are fire barriers and require a permit from Operations. The two doors involved are not fire doors, which also contributed to these two breaches of ABSCE.

Corrective Actions Taken

- 1) Plant procedure TI-77 has been revised to list all doors which are part of the ABSCE boundary.
- 2) Personnel involved were instructed on requirements of maintaining ABSCE.
- 3) A night order was issued by Operations Supervisor to require all auxiliary building door breaches to be evaluated by the shift engineer.
- 4) All ABSCE boundary doors will be appropriately labeled.

Previous occurrences - none.

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

Sequoyah Nuclear Plant
Post Office Box 2000
Soddy Daisy, Tennessee 37379

September 20, 1984

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Gentlemen:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 - DOCKET NO.
50-327 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-77 - REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE REPORT
SQRO-50-327/84055

The enclosed licensee event report provides details concerning breach of
Auxiliary Building Secondary Containment Enclosure (ABSCE). This event
is reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, paragraph (a)(2)v).

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

RE Alex

for P. R. Wallace
Plant Manager

Enclosure
cc (Enclosure):

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NRC Inspector, NUC PR, Sequoyah