

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Salem Generating Station - Unit 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5   0 0   0 2   7   2	PAGE (3) 1 OF 0   3
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TITLE  
Containment Air Locks - Design Deficiency

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIA NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)
0	8	2	8	4	0	0	9	2	Salem Unit 2		0 5   0 0   0 3   1   1
0	8	2	8	4	0	0	9	2			0 5   0 0   0 0

OPERATING MODE (8) 5	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)									
POWER LEVEL (10) 0   0   0	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.402(b)	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.406(e)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(b)						
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.406(a)(1)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(e)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 73.71(e)						
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.406(a)(1)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.36(e)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vi)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)						
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.406(a)(1)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)							
	<input type="checkbox"/> 20.406(a)(1)(iv)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)							
<input type="checkbox"/> 20.406(a)(1)(v)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(ix)								

NAME				TELEPHONE NUMBER			
J. L. Rupp				6   0   9   3   3   9   -   4   3   0   9			
AREA CODE				6   0   9   3   3   9   -   4   3   0   9			

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)										
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPROS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPROS	

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)				EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (5)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO							

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e. approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (15)

On August 22, 1984, a review of a new Design Change Request to add an alarm for containment airlock pressurization revealed a design discrepancy involving the existing gages for monitoring differential pressure across the airlock doors. It was determined that the installed gages for both Unit 1 and Unit 2 airlocks were not qualified for containment design pressure; and consequently their failure would compromise containment integrity. Although their failure would result in an unisolable leakage path from the containment to the mechanical penetration area, it would not result in an unmonitored release to the atmosphere, since the penetration area ventilation is provided by the Auxiliary Building Supply and Exhaust Fans, whose discharge to the atmosphere is monitored. The gages in question were removed, and the gage lines were capped. Since the gages served as a redundant indication to the airlock design feature which assures that the pressure is equalized across the door prior to opening, they will not be replaced. This is acceptable, since the gages provided indication only, and their absence does not affect door operation or personnel safety. Because this design discrepancy involved possible degradation of one of the principal safety barriers of the plant, the event is reportable in accordance with 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii).

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PDR ADOCK 05000272  
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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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**PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION:**

Westinghouse - Pressurized Water Reactor

Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX].

**IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:**

Unit 1 and 2 Containment Airlocks - Design Deficiency

Discovery Date: 08/22/84

Report Date: 09/21/84

This report was initiated by Incident Report No. 84-134

**CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:**

Unit 1 - Mode 5 - Rx Power 000 % - Unit Load 0000 MWe

Unit 2 - Mode 1 - Rx Power 100 % - Unit Load 1130 MWe

**DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:**

On August 22, 1984, during a review of a Design Change Request to add an alarm for containment airlock pressurization, it was determined that the installed gages for monitoring differential pressure across the airlock doors were not qualified for containment design pressure. Subsequent investigation determined that the failure of these gages would compromise containment integrity. When this determination was made, the gages in question were removed and the gage lines were capped. In accordance with the requirements of the Code of Federal Regulations, 10CFR 50.72(b)(1)(ii), the NRC Operations Center was notified of the discovery at 1800 hours, on August 23, 1984.

**APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:**

This was a design discrepancy, involving both Unit 1 and Unit 2, with the gages in question being supplied by the manufacturer and installed as part of the original installation of the airlocks.

**ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:**

The fact that the gages could be damaged by containment design pressure was noted previously by the Inservice Inspection group, who specified that the gage inside containment be removed for the Type "A" Integrated Leak Rate Test. However, the potential effect on containment integrity was not identified at that time.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION


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**ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE: (cont'd)**

As previously noted, the failure of these gages during a containment pressurization would result in a direct path from the containment atmosphere to the mechanical penetration area. Although their failure would result in an unisolable leakage path from the containment, this would not result in an unmonitored release to the environment. This is because the penetration area ventilation, which is provided by the Auxiliary Building Supply and Exhaust Fans, is filtered and discharged to the atmosphere via the plant vent, which is monitored. Because the discovery of this design discrepancy involved possible degradation of one of the principal safety barriers of the plant, the event is reportable in accordance with the Code of Federal Regulations, 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii).

**CORRECTIVE ACTION:**

As previously stated, the gages were removed, and the gage lines were capped. Since the gages served as a redundant indication to the airlock design feature which assures that the pressure is equalized across the door prior to opening, it was decided not to replace the gages. The lines will remain capped. This is acceptable, since the gages provided indication only, and their absence does not affect door operation or personnel safety.

  
General Manager-  
Salem Operations

JLR:tns

SORC Mtg 84-126



Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

Salem Generating Station

September 21, 1984

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Washington, DC 20555

Dear Sir:

SALEM GENERATING STATION  
LICENSE NO. DFR-70  
DOCKET NO. 50-272  
UNIT NO. 1  
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 84-020-00

This Licensee Event Report is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii). This report is required within thirty (30) days of discovery.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "J. M. Zupko, Jr.", enclosed in a circular scribble.

J. M. Zupko, Jr.  
General Manager -  
Salem Operations

JR:k11

CC: Distribution

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