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Executive Vice President
Nuclear Generation

May 26, 1992
JPN-92-022

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
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Washington, D. C. 20555

SUBJECT: James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant
Docket No. 50-333
Reliability of Manual Bus Transfers Between Onsite and
Offsite Power Supplies and Resolution of 4.16 kV
Switchgear Deficiency (TAC M76947)

REFERENCE: NRC letter, B. C. McCabe to R. E. Beedie dated March 16,
1992 regarding the reliability of manual bus transfers
between onsite and offsite power supplies and resolution of
4.16 kV switchgear deficiency.

Dear Sir:

The NRC staff recently concluded that if certain preventative measures were followed, design modifications would not be required to address the potential effects of a three phase bolted fault on certain 4160 V switchgear at FitzPatrick. The basis for this conclusion was documented in the Safety Evaluation included with the referenced letter. The NRC staff asked the Authority to affirm its commitment to implement these measures prior to future emergency diesel generator (EDG) testing. The staff also concluded in this Safety Evaluation that loads need not be transferred from the Normal Station Service Transformer (NSST) to the Reserve Station Service Transformer (RSST) during emergency diesel generator (EDG) testing.

The Authority has reviewed the staff's Safety Evaluation and agrees that these measures will help to prevent conditions that could increase the possibility of a three phase bolted fault occurring during EDG tests. Accordingly, the Authority reaffirms its commitment to perform the recommended measures described on page 5 of the NRC's Safety Evaluation. Specifically, the Authority will take these special measures during the monthly EDG test or during any test when the EDGs are operated in parallel with the NSST. No maintenance work will be performed on the switchgear during EDG testing. Switchgear areas will be inspected prior to EDG testing to ensure that personnel are not working in these areas. However, personnel that must be in these areas for reasons associated with the test will be permitted access during testing.


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To ensure that the reliability of this switchgear is not degraded in the future, the Authority will implement the administrative measures described on page 6 of the Safety Evaluation. Specifically, future modifications will not adversely affect the momentary duty and interrupting duty capacity of the switchgear. Station management will assure that operators and maintenance personnel are trained regarding the three-phase switchgear deficiency and that preventative measures are taken to reduce the possibility of a fault occurring during EDG testing.

If you have any questions, please contact Mr. J. A. Gray, Jr.

Vary truly yours,



Ralph E. Beedle
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cc: Regional Administrator
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