

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

APPROVED OMB NO. 3180-0104  
EXPIRES - 9/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1) <b>INDIAN POINT , UNIT 2</b>	DOCKET NUMBER (2) <b>0 5 0 0 0 1</b>	PAGE (3) <b>1 OF 3</b>
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TITLE (4)  
**FLOODING OF COMPONENT COOLING PUMP MOTORS**

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)		REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
08	13	84	84	011		09	12	84	0 5 0 0 0 1

OPERATING MODE (9)	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 50. (Check one or more of the following) (11)							
	20.402(b)	20.406(a)(1)(i)	20.406(a)(1)(ii)	20.406(a)(1)(iii)	20.406(a)(1)(iv)	20.406(a)(1)(v)	20.406(a)(1)(vi)	20.406(a)(1)(vii)
POWER LEVEL (10)								

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)		TELEPHONE NUMBER	
NAME <b>MICHAEL BLATT</b>		AREA CODE <b>9 1 4</b>	<b>5 2 6 5 1 2 7</b>

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)									
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC
X	K I G	Y W I 3 I V		Y					

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	<input type="checkbox"/> NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On August 13, 1984, at 10:50 a.m., while at cold shutdown for a Refueling - Maintenance outage, two operating Component Cooling Water Pumps and subsequently the standby pump automatically tripped on receipt of an overcurrent protection signal. The overcurrent condition was caused by wetting of the Component Cooling Water Pump motors with Service Water. Leakage through a Service Water valve permitted Service Water flow into the Component Cooling Water Pump compartment through an opening in the service water piping being prepared for a test. The Central Control Room was promptly notified of water conditions in the compartment and the CCR operators immediately secured the operating Service Water Pumps which stopped the flow. The water was pumped and drained from the compartment. No. 21 Component Cooling Pump was flushed with fresh water, dried and returned to service at 1:44 p.m.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)  INDIAN POINT, UNIT 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2)  0 5 0 0 0 2 4 7 8 4	LER NUMBER (5)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		
		8 4	0 1 1		2	OF 3

TEXT (if more space is required use additional NRC Form 3686) (17)

On August 13, 1984, while at cold shutdown, for a refueling - maintenance outage, two operating Component Cooling Water pumps and subsequently the standby pump automatically tripped on overcurrent protection due to Service Water wetting the pump motor coils. The source of the water was an opening previously prepared and isolated in Service Water piping on the non-essential header on elevation 78' due to removal of valve SWN-32. The valve had been removed without leakage so that a blind flange could be installed for an Inservice Inspection Hydrostatic test,

On August 12, 1984 removal of valve SWN-32 was initiated and the valve had been partially removed without signs of water. By 10:15 a.m. on August 13, 1984, the valve had been completely removed when the Construction crew performing thw work left the area temporarily. There were no signs of water. When they returned at 10:45 a.m. approximately four feet of water was present in the pump room and the control room was notified. Floor drainage and a sump pump were unable to accommodate the incoming water. Ultimately, the pump motors were submerged. The two operating pumps tripped at 10:50 a.m. on overcurrent. The standby pump attempted to start on a low pressure signal but it also tripped on overcurrent.

Only the three Service Water Pumps on the essential header were in operation. The flow into the pump room was stopped by terminating their operation from the Control Room. After the water was removed from the pump room, the motor coils were blown out using station air, fresh water rinsed and dried. One Component Cooling pump (#21 CCV) was restored to operation at 1:44 p.m. This pump was secured when a spare was placed in service.

The cause of the incident was Service Water leakage between the essential header and the non-essential header. This leakage did not immediately appear at the piping opening in the Component Cooling pump room because it flowed past defective Service Water Pump Check Valves (on the discharge side) and back to the river through open pump isolation valves.

On August 13 when the Service Water piping was being prepared for the hydrostatic test, numbers 21 and 22 Service Water pumps (non-essential headers) were observed during a normal operator round to be rotating in a direction opposite to normal. Since these pumps were not inservice, the rotation was evidently due to back flow from the operating header. The isolation valves on the discharge side of the pumps were then closed to prevent pump damage. This diverted the leakage towards the opening in the system piping.

The only heat load for which Component Cooling was necessary was the Spent Fuel Pool which contained spent fuel assemblies plus the entire core. During the period when Component Cooling was interrupted, the Spent Fuel Pool temperature rose from 97°F to 107°F. Contingency measures were initiated to assure continued spent fuel cooling but were unnecessary due to timely

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FACILITY NAME (1)  INDIAN POINT, UNIT 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2)  0 5 0 0 0 1 1	LER NUMBER (8)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	3	OF 3
		84	011	1		

TEXT (if more space is required use additional NRC Form 366A (17))

return of normal cooling. The three wetted Component Cooling Pump motors will be refurbished (CCW 21, 22 and 23) based upon an evaluation of CCW 23 motor. The check valves on the discharge of the Service Water pumps will be repaired. (SWN-1, -1-1, -1-2). All other service water valves needed for isolation of essential and non-essential headers will be inspected for through leakage and corrective action taken as necessary.

Garrett W. Groscup  
Vice President, Engineering

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September 12, 1984


Re: Indian Point Unit No. 2  
Docket No. 50-247  
LER-84-011-00

Document Control Desk  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D. C. 20555

Dear Sirs:

The attached Licensee Event Report LER-84-011-00 is hereby submitted in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50.73.

Very truly yours,



attach.

cc: Dr. Thomas E. Murley,  
Regional Administrator-Region I  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
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41