NRC Form 366
(9-83)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 8/31/85

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
Robert E. Ginna Unit 1	0 5 0 0 0 2 4 4	1 OF 0 2

TITLE (4)
Inadvertent Start of the "A" Diesel Generator

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
0 8	1 7	8 4	8 4	— 0 0 9	— 0 0	0 9	1 4	8 4		0 5 0 0 0
										0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9)	N	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)			
POWER LEVEL (10)	1 0 0	20.402(b)	20.405(c)	X 50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
		20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
		20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
Thomas A. Meyer, Technical Manager	AREA CODE 3 1 5 — 5 2 4 - 4 4 4 6

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	
B	E I D	- I - H I S	E I 1 4 6	N							

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
X YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	NO		0 6	0 1	8 5

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On August 17, 1984, during the monthly testing of the undervoltage protection system on safeguard Bus 18 switches S5 and S6 were placed in the test position in accordance with the applicable steps in procedure PT-9.1. Upon placing these switches in the test position the "A" Diesel Generator automatically started. The cause of the event has been attributed to an intermittent contact in switch S5. The intermittent contact was apparently caused by a small amount of oxidation in the switch. The failure only occurred when the switches were in the test mode and did not affect the normal operation of the system. The failure was in the safe direction and at no time was the diesel generator or safeguard bus inoperable.

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FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
Robert E. Ginna Unit 1	0 5 0 0 0 2 4 4	8 4	— 0 0 9	— 0 0	0 2 OF 0 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

At 1445 hours on August 17, 1984, during the monthly testing of the undervoltage protection system on safeguard Bus 18 switches S5 and S6 were placed in the test position in accordance with the applicable steps in procedure PT-9.1. Switch S5, when placed in the test position, latches the control section so that it will not respond to any undervoltage conditions. Switch S6, when placed in the test position removes the actual Bus voltage signal and applies a variable test signal. Upon placing the switches in the test position the "A" Diesel Generator automatically started. The plant was operating at 100 percent power before and during the event. In addition, Bus 18 was energized from its normal power supply before and during the event.

The cause of the event has been attributed to an intermittent contact in switch S5. This intermittent contact caused a one out of two logic in one train to be established. This one out of two logic in either train is sufficient to cause the diesel generator to start. A one out of two logic in both trains is required in order to energize the bus from the diesel generator. Thus, this contact failure was in the safe direction and at no time was the diesel generator or safeguard bus inoperable.

The intermittent contact was apparently caused by a small amount of oxidation in switches. These switches are located in the screenhouse which has a relatively damp environment. Instrument and Control and Results and Test technicians were successful in repeating this failure several times. After several operations of switch S5, however, the contacts were apparently wiped clean and the failure could not be repeated. An inspection of the switch failed to reveal any visible defects. The vendor of the undervoltage protection system has been notified of this event, and will be evaluating methods to prevent recurrence. The failure only occurred when the switches were in the test mode and did not affect the normal operation of the system. A successful test of the undervoltage protection system was accomplished later on August 17, 1984.

ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION • 89 EAST AVENUE, ROCHESTER, N.Y. 14649-0001

ROGER W. KOBER
VICE PRESIDENT
ELECTRIC & STEAM PRODUCTION

TELEPHONE
AREA CODE 716 546-2700

September 13, 1984

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject: LER 84-009, Automatic Actuation of any Engineered Safety Feature

R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, Unit No. 1
Docket No. 50-244

Gentlemen:

In accordance with 10CFR50.73 "Licensee Event Report System" item (a)(2)(iv), which requests a report of "any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) including the Reactor Protection System (RPS)," the attached Licensee Event Report LER 84-009 is hereby submitted.

Very truly yours,

Roger W. Kober

Roger W. Kober

xc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region I
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

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