



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 179 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-57
AND AMENDMENT NO. 120 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NPF-5

GEORGIA POWER COMPANY, ET AL.

EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2

DOCKET NOS. 50-321 AND 50-366

1.0 INTRODUCTION

By letter dated September 21, 1990, as supplemented February 19, 1992, Georgia Power Company, et al. (the licensee), proposed changes to the Technical Specifications (TS) for the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2. The proposed changes are:

- (1) Revise Unit 1 TS Tables 3.1-1 and 3.2-1 to allow the placing of an inoperable channel in the tripped condition.
- (2) Revise Unit 1 TS Table 3.2-1 and Unit 2 TS Table 3.3.2-1 to allow the temporary bypassing (i.e., up to two hours) of the reactor water cleanup (RWCU) system differential flow isolation instrumentation during periods of system restoration, maintenance, or testing.

2.0 EVALUATION

2.1 Proposed Change 1

The proposed change allows the placing of an inoperable channel in the tripped condition.

For Table 3.1-1, "Reactor Protection system (RPS) Instrumentation Requirements," the addition to footnote 6 will not change the results of the actions required if the number of operable channels is not met for each trip system. However, for Table 3.2-1, "Instrumentation Which Initiates Reactor Vessel and Primary Containment Isolation," allowing the placing of an inoperable channel in the tripped condition in lieu of the entire trip system, will result in avoiding unnecessary isolations while still maintaining protection in accordance with the single failure criterion as defined in 10 CFR 50, Appendix A. These changes will also make Unit 1 TS similar to Unit 2 and the BWR/4 Standard TS.

Based on its review, the NRC staff finds that this change has no adverse impact on safety and does not pose an undue risk to public health and safety. Therefore, it is acceptable.

2.2 Proposed Change 2

The proposed change allows the temporary bypassing (i.e., up to two hours) of the RWCU system differential flow isolation instrumentation during periods of system restoration, maintenance, or testing.

Although isolation of the RWCU system is necessary to mitigate design basis events, General Electric (GE) report EASD-24-0489 (enclosed with the licensee's submittal) concludes the differential flow instrumentation is not required to accomplish this function, because other protective instrumentation is available. The report investigated the failure of both time delay relays, and demonstrated the safety-grade instrumentation provided for accident prevention (i.e., temperature instrumentation) would isolate the RWCU system during a loss-of-coolant accident or a high energy line break (HELB) event. Therefore, bypassing the isolation signals from the RWCU differential flow instrumentation will have no impact on the ability of the primary containment isolation system to mitigate design basis events.

Additionally, the GE report shows the differential flow sensors and their logic should not be considered as an engineered safety feature (ESF), because under any postulated accident scenario, containment isolation would be accomplished via the safety-related temperature and differential temperature sensors.

Furthermore, the licensee stated that, although the design basis HELB is unaffected, smaller line breaks and breaks in colder sections of the system could be mitigated more quickly by the high differential flow signal. Therefore, the licensee proposes to leave the instrumentation installed in order to protect plant equipment and retain the Unit 1 and Unit 2 TS requirements on differential flow instrumentation.

Based on its review, the staff finds that this change has no adverse impact on safety and does not pose an undue risk to public health and safety. Therefore, it is acceptable.

3.0 STATE CONSULTATION

In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Georgia State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments. The State official had no comments.

4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

The amendments change requirements with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no

significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (57 FR 11110). Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.

5.0 CONCLUSION

The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

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