

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) EDWIN I. HATCH, UNIT 2 DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 6 6 1 OF 0 4 PAGE (3)

TITLE (4) ISOLATION OF THE REACTOR WATER CLEANUP SYSTEM

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)
01	15	84	84	003	01	09	17	84			050000
THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § (Check one or more of the following) (11)											

OPERATING MODE (9) 4	20.402(b)	20.405(c)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
POWER LEVEL (10) 000	20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(c)
	20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	X 50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
	20.405(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
	20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
	20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(ix)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME T. L. Elton, Acting Superintendent of Regulatory Compliance TELEPHONE NUMBER 912 367 1785

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS
A	CRE	IFTR	369	Y					
A	CRE	ISVP	341	Y					

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) NO EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On 01/15/84, with the reactor in cold shutdown, operating personnel were in the process of lowering reactor water level with the reactor water cleanup (RWCU) pump by dumping the water into the main condenser. At the beginning of this process, a Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) valve group 5 isolation signal occurred which should have closed RWCU system isolation valves 2G31-F001 and 2G31-F004. The RWCU inboard isolation valve 2G31-F001 closed; however, the RWCU system outboard isolation valve 2G31-F004 did not close.

An investigation has determined that the isolation signal occurred during this event because the reactor water cleanup dump flow transmitter (2G31-N012) had been installed incorrectly during completion of a design change request.

The RWCU dump flow transmitter was reinstalled correctly and returned to service on 01/17/84.

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 388A's) (17)

This LER is required by 10CFR 50.73(A)(2)(VI) because the Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) System dump flow transmitter was installed incorrectly.

On 01/15/84, with the plant in cold shutdown for reactor recirculation pipe replacement, operating personnel were in the process of lowering the reactor's water level by using the RWCU pump to dump water to the main condenser. At the beginning of this process, a RWCU high differential flow isolation signal occurred. This signal is a Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) valve group 5 isolation signal, and it should have closed the RWCU system isolation valves, 2G31-F001 and 2G31-F004 (EIIS-CE). The RWCU inboard isolation valve 2G31-F001 closed; however, the RWCU outboard isolation valve 2G31-F004 (EIIS-CE) did not close.

The Primary Containment Isolation System is not required to be operable when the plant is in cold shutdown. Although 2G31-N012 (EIIS-CE) was improperly installed, the RWCU system isolation valves would still have received a PCIS valve group 5 valve isolation signal in the event of a line break. The failure of the RWCU outboard isolation valve 2G31-F004 to isolate would not have affected plant safety had the plant been operating because the inboard isolation valve 2G32-F001 isolated as required.

The reactor water cleanup area temperature detection system (2G31-N600A-F) which also gives an isolation valve group 5 isolation signal was operable during this event.

The cause of the PCIS valve group 5 isolation signal was incorrect installation of the RWCU dump flow transmitter (2G31-N012, EIIS-CE) during completion of a Design Change Request (DCR 83-285) on 12/21/83. Test shop personnel who replaced the existing transmitter with a new transmitter inadvertently connected the sensing lines up backwards to the new transmitter. Then, due to an inadequate functional test (the specified procedure called for a functional test and calibration which covered from the transmitter to the valve actuation, and did not verify the correct configuration of the sensing lines), this transmitter was returned to service when it should not have been. The RWCU dump flow transmitter was reinstalled correctly and returned to service on 01/17/84.

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As a result of an engineering study, it is concluded that when time delay relay 2G31-R616C received its leak detection signal, it closed the inboard isolation valve 2G31-F001 and tripped the reactor water cleanup pump, thus stopping pump flow and removing the leak detection signal from alarm unit 2G31-N603B. With the signal removed from the alarm unit, the time delay relay 2G31-R616D reenergized before its 45 second \pm 5 second time delay had lapsed. Since relay 2G31-R616D had energized, no signal was given to isolation valve 2G31-F004. This is the proper system response when the closing of the first isolation valve controls the apparent leakage. The reactor water cleanup system has since been demonstrated to be operable by satisfactorily performing the "RWCU SYSTEM DIFFERENTIAL FLOW INST. FT&C" procedure (HNP-2-3501) on 8/20/84. Additionally, the "RWCU AUTO ISOLATION LSFT" procedure (HNP-2-3504) was satisfactorily completed on 8/23/84.

A general presentation was given to test shop personnel on being careful to reconnect the proper sensing lines to the proper places on instruments.

Since this event, a MANAGEMENT OVERVIEW COMMITTEE FOR REVIEW OF SAFETY RELATED MAINTENANCE REQUESTS has been formed for the purpose of reviewing safety-related maintenance work orders before and after work. This committee's efforts should help eliminate events of this sort.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION


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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 386A's) (17)

IDENTIFICATION OF EACH FAILED COMPONENT

..... MASTER PARTS LIST NUMBER MANUFACTURER MODEL NUMBER
.2B21-N012	Rosemount, Inc.	1151DP5B22T003PB
.2G31-F004	W. M. Powell Co.	19023 WE

Georgia Power Company
Post Office Box 439
Baxley, Georgia 31513
Telephone 912 367-7781
912 537-9444




Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant

September 17, 1984
GM-84-785

PLANT E. I. HATCH
Licensee Event Report
Docket No. 50-366

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

Attached is Licensee Event Report No. 50-366/1984-03, Rev. 1. This report is required by 10CFR 50.73 A.2.VI.



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HCN/TLE/vlz

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