

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Reports No. 50-456/39010(DRSS); 50-457/89010(DRSS)

Docket Nos. 50-456; 50-457

Licenses No. NPF-72; NPF-77

Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company
P.O. Box 767
Chicago, IL 60690

Facility Name: Braidwood Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2

Inspection Conducted: Between February 2 and March 28, 1989

Date of Previous Physical Security Inspection: January 3-6, 1989

Type of Inspection: Unannounced Physical Security Inspection

Inspectors:

G. M. Christoffer
G. M. Christoffer
Physical Security Inspector

4/5/89
Date

J. L. Belanger
J. L. Belanger
Physical Security Inspector

4-6-89
Date

Approved By:

James R. Creed
James R. Creed, Chief
Safeguards Section

4/4/89
Date

Inspection Summary

Inspection Between February 2 and March 28, 1989 (Reports No. 50-456/89010(DRSS); No. 50-457/89010(DRSS))

Areas Inspected: Included a review of licensee plans for coping with strikes; licensee's initial implementation of strike plans; and return to normal security operations.

Results: The licensee was found to be in compliance with NRC requirements within the areas examined. Planning and implementation of plans to cope with the security force strike were adequate. Transition of security operations appeared adequate.

The guard contractor provided post strike guidance to all supervisors in a memorandum dated March 9, 1989. In this memorandum, the roles and responsibilities of supervisors were re-emphasized. Supervisors were alerted to the real possibility for potential problems because of the mixed group of employees onsite, i.e., employees who actively supported the strike and those who did not, and the fact that there were several incidents during the strike that affected both guards and supervisors alike. Supervisors were encouraged to be objective and open minded with regards to the returning employees.

Interviews with security force members conducted by the inspector on March 28, 1989 showed that there was a general state of mistrust and animosity between those members of the security force who walked the picket lines during the strike and those who chose to remain off the job until the conclusion of the strike. As noted above, the contractor was aware of this mixed group and has alerted supervisors to be sensitive to this situation. These interviews also showed that those members of the security force who did not cross the picket lines felt that they were treated unfairly because approximately 14 of them were downgraded to watchmen, yet guards hired during the strike to take the place of striking guards continue to hold Nuclear Security Officer (NSO) positions. (Note: Contract management met with each of the NSOs, who returned as watchpersons to let them know how long it will be before they can return to an NSO position, and to explain job related issues such as standing on the seniority list in relationship to the rest of the guard force, vacation/sick pay, duties and responsibilities as a watchperson, uniforms, equipment, and benefits.)

In conclusion, the termination of the strike has resulted in a mixed group of individuals onsite, i.e., those that supported the strike versus those that did not. Management is aware of the sensitivity of this situation and has taken measures to minimize the effect. Guard force performance is adequate to implement the commitments of the approved security plan.

Guard force performance will continue to be monitored in future inspections.