U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Reports No. 50-266/88016(DRP); 50-301/88014(DRP)

Docket Nos. 50-266; 50-301 Licenses No. DPR-24; DPR-27

Licensee: Wisconsin Electric Company
231 West Michigan
Milwaukee, WI 53203

Facility Name: Point Beach Units 1 and 2

Inspection At: Two Creeks, Wisconsin

Inspection Conducted: July 1 through August 31, 1988

Inspectors: R. L. Hague

R. J. Leemon

Approved By: R. DeFayette, Chief
Reactor Projects Section 3A

11/10/88
Date

Inspection Summary

Inspection from July 1 through August 31, 1988 (Reports No. 50-266/88016(DRP); No. 50-301/88014(DRP))
Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection by resident inspectors of followup of previous inspection findings; operational safety verifications; maintenance observation; surveillance observations; physical security activities; and radiological protection activities.
Results: All activities observed were conducted in a satisfactory manner and no violations or deviations were identified. All other inspection results indicated acceptable licensee performance.

DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

*J. J. Zach, Manager, PBNP
T. J. Koehler, General Superintendent
G. J. Maxfield, Superintendent, Operations
J. C. Reisenbuechler, Superintendent, EQRS
W. J. Herrman, Superintendent, Maintenance & Construction
D. F. Johnson, Superintendent, Health Physics
R. Krukowski, Security Supervisor
*F. A. Flentje, Administrative Specialist
*J. E. Knorr, Regulatory Engineer
T. L. Fredrichs, Superintendent, Chemistry

The inspectors also talked with and interviewed members of the Operation, Maintenance, Health Physics, Chemistry and Instrument and Control Sections.

*Denotes personnel attending exit interviews.

2. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701)

a. (Closed) Open Item (266/87017-02(DRP)) Improper Environmental Qualification Paperwork Regarding Wire used to Extend Pigtails on Various Solenoid Valves - The licensee informed the resident inspector that the wires in question have been replaced with wire that has adequate QA qualifications and proper records of this replacement are on file.

b. (Closed) Generic Letter (266/85012-HH; 301/85012-HH) Automatic Trip of Reactor Coolant Pumps - A letter sent to Mr. C. W. Fay dated July 6, 1988, from NRR states, "The staff finds that the licensee has complied with the requirements of Generic Letter 85-12 and it has therefore met the requirements in regard to implementation of TMI Action Item II.K.3.5 (Auto Trip of RCPS)."

3. Operational Safety Verification and Engineered Safety Features System Walkdown (71707 and 71710)

The inspectors observed control room operations, reviewed applicable logs and conducted discussions with control room operators during the period of inspection. During these discussions and observations, the inspectors ascertained that the operators were alert, cognizant of plant conditions, attentive to changes in those conditions, and took prompt action when appropriate. The inspectors verified the operability of selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to service of affected components. Tours of the Auxiliary and Turbine Buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, and excessive vibrations and to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance.

The inspectors observed plant housekeeping/cleanliness conditions. During the period of inspection, the inspectors walked down the accessible portions of the Auxiliary Feedwater, Vital Electrical, Diesel Generating, Component Cooling, Safety Injection, and Containment Spray systems to verify operability.

These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility operations were in conformance with the requirements established under Technical Specifications, 10 CFR, and administrative procedures.

a. Unit 1 and Unit 2

Both units operated at full power throughout the period with brief power reductions for monthly testing of the turbine stop and governor valves.

On July 28, 1988, NRC Chairman Lando Zech toured the Point Beach Nuclear Power Station with the Deputy Regional Administrator, Dr. Carl Paperiello. The areas of the plant they toured were the cable spreading room, Control Room, North Building, Turbine Building, Auxiliary Building, and Chemistry Lab. The Chairman was pleased with the operation of the plant. He was very pleased that the alarm panels were dark boards which means no alarms were on, a situation he very rarely encounters. He also said the plant housekeeping was good. However, he thought that the plant was noisy because of the over use of the plant paging system.

b. Drill

On August 17, 1988, Wisconsin Electric Company conducted a utility only emergency plan drill. The drill resulted in activation of the Technical Support Center (TSC), Operations Support Center (OSC), Emergency Operations Facility (EOF), Offsite Health Physics Facility, and the Nuclear Engineering and Public Information support facilities at the Corporate Headquarters. Both in-plant and off-site teams were dispatched during the drill.

The drill initiated in the Drill Control Room at 0630 hours and was terminated at approximately 1430 hours. Seventy-six objectives were selected for demonstration. The licensee observers noted that all but a few of the objectives had been satisfied. The objectives included items noted by the NRC (1987 observed exercise) as requiring improvement. An impending licensee report will address specific weaknesses observed.

The scenario involved an offsite release originating from a burning cryogenic system charcoal filter bed. A failed filter damper on the auxiliary building vent resulted in relatively high iodine concentrations offsite, and a medical response was required to an injured man. Although lifesaving first aid was simulated, some of the techniques were not consistent with Red Cross first aid protocol, i.e., treatment for shock was not properly simulated.

The drill also provided an opportunity for the licensee to use the newly reconfigured Emergency Operations Facilities. Drill players and observers noted that the new configuration, telecommunications modifications, and new status boards improved the operation of the facility.

Control of teams from the OSC as well as coordination of health physics (HP) were improved over previous drills.

c. Inoperable Sample Isolation Valve

On August 23, 1988, the Control Room was notified by the Chemistry Department that the Unit 1 sample valve (1-953) "pressurizer liquid sample isolation valve" was indicating open by the valve position status light on the local sample panel. This valve had been operated earlier and returned to the shut position. When the valve was found open, it was cycled and returned to the shut position.

On August 24, 1988, the valve again was opened and then would not close. The licensee notified the NRC via the Emergency Notification System (ENS). Later that day the valve drifted closed as indicated by the valve position lights on the local control panel. A valve lineup was made from the pressurizer to the sample sink with the valve in the indicated closed position. There was sample flow to the sample sink indicating that the valve was not closed. The other valves in the sample line were then closed and red tagged. A special maintenance work procedure is being written to inspect and repair valve (1-953). This is an open item (266/88016-01(DRP)).

d. NRC Bulletin 88005 Response

The NRC requested the licensee to determine if flanges supplied by two New Jersey firms were present at its facility and, if so, to assure that they met the specifications of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) and the American Society of Testing Materials (ASTM), or otherwise were suitable for their intended use. The firms are Piping Supplies, Inc., (PSI), of Folsom, New Jersey, and West Jersey Manufacturing Company (WJM) of Williamstown, New Jersey. The licensee determined that Unit 1 has one 4-inch (WJM) flange installed on a containment penetration. The penetration was used to run cables into the containment for integrated leak rate tests (ILRT) and is blank flanged on the inside and outside of containment. The outer flange is the (WJM) flange.

Unit 2 has the same penetration and the same arrangement of flanges. These are the only two (WJM) flanges installed in the plants. Both of these flanges have been tested and meet the required specifications. One other (WJM) flange is installed on a test rig that is no longer used. The licensee also has onsite the following (WJM) flanges:

* 2-10" flanges that are in the hold area which failed to meet required specifications when tested.

* 1-10" fixture not installed which is assumed to be bad.

* 4-4" flanges - one tested high and the other three tested satisfactorily.

* 1-1 1/2" flange which tested satisfactorily.

* 3-10" flanges that are in stock and which tested satisfactorily.

* 2-4" flanges that are installed on a test rig which were tested satisfactorily.

The licensee will be disposing of the above (WJM) flanges. The licensee has not received any Piping Supplies, Inc. (PSI) flanges.

All activities observed were conducted in a satisfactorily manner and no violations or deviations were identified.

4. Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)

The inspector observed technical specification required surveillance testing on the Reactor Protection and Safeguards Analog Channels and Nuclear Instrumentation and verified that: testing was performed in accordance with adequate procedures; test instrumentation was calibrated; limiting conditions for operation were met; removal and restoration of the affected components were accomplished; test results conformed with technical specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test; and any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by appropriate management personnel.

a. TS-1, "Emergency Diesel Generator G01" - On August 31, 1988, Diesel Generator G01 auto started when it was shutting down at the end of the scheduled surveillance test (TS-1). There was no obvious cause for the auto start but since the engine increased in speed when the governor returned to the fast start position, the solenoid valve on the governor that causes the fuel to be shut off to the engine (or its associated control circuitry) was suspected to be the cause. Therefore, the circuitry for the valve was tested, including the relays, but no problems were identified. The valve itself was then examined to determine if the adjustments were within tolerance or if the solenoid plunger was sticking. No problems were identified with the valve. The engine then was started and stopped successfully three times after which the surveillance test again was conducted; no problems or failures occurred. Because no problems were identified in the licensee's inspections, and the diesel generator shut down properly after each of the tests, it was returned to service the same day. Prior to these trouble shooting activities the other emergency diesel generator was tested satisfactorily.

b. ICP 2.7 (Unit 2), "Periodic Test Nuclear Instrumentation Power Range N-41" - Channel N-41 overpower rod stop and overpower trip high bistables had almost no lockup adjustment left. The licensee replaced the high voltage power supply and the two bistables. The bistables were then satisfactorily adjusted.

c. The inspector also witnessed or reviewed portions of the following test activities:

ICP 2.1	Reactor Protection and Safeguards Analog (Unit 2)
ICP 2.11	Analog Rod Position Periodic Test
ICP 2.13	Periodic Test 4160 Volt Undervoltage
IT-07	Inservice Testing of Service Water Pumps & Valves, Units 1 and 2
IT-40	Inservice Testing of Safety Injection Valves, Unit 1
IT-45	Inservice Testing of Safety Injection Valves, Unit 2
IT-72	Inservice Testing of Service Water Valves (Quarterly)
IT-85	Post Maintenance or Special Inservice Test for Type XI Valves 2MS-2083
TS-4	Main Turbine Stop and Governor Valves with Turbine Trip Test (Monthly), Unit 2
TS-32	Safety Valve Acoustic Monitoring - Subcooling Margin Computing System - Containment Purge Valve Position
TS-33	Containment Accident Fan-Cooler Units, Unit 1
TS-34	Containment Accident Fan-Cooler Units, Unit 2
RESP 6.1	Core Power Distribution and Nuclear Power Range Detector Calibration (Unit 2)

All activities observed were conducted in a satisfactory manner and no violations or deviations were identified.

5. Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)

Station maintenance activities on safety related systems and components listed below were observed/reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry codes or standards, and in conformance with technical specifications.

The following items were considered during this review: the limiting conditions for operation were met while components or system were removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the work;

activities were accomplished using approved procedures and were inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality control records were maintained; activities were accomplished by qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented; and fire prevention controls were implemented.

Work requests were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety related equipment maintenance which may affect system performance.

The following maintenance activities were observed/reviewed:

* Unit 1 Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feed Pump - Change oil and lubricate.

* Diesel Firewater Pump - Inspect, clean and lubricate engine.

* Service Water Pump (P-032F) - Section XI disassembly and inspection.

* Alternate Inverter 125V DC/120V AC (DYOC) - Clean and inspect for damaged parts and/or circuit boards.

* Diesel Generator (G01) - auto started when it was shutting down after the biweekly test.

* Diesel Fire Pump - Now has four new batteries.

All activities observed were conducted in a satisfactory manner and no violations or deviations were identified.

6. Physical Security (71881)

The inspectors, by observation and direct interview, verified that physical security was being implemented in accordance with the station security plan. During the inspection period, the inspectors verified that the security force compliment was as required by the security plan, that search equipment was operational, and that access control for personnel and packages was implemented in accordance with licensee procedures. The inspectors verified that the protected and vital area barriers were being well maintained and, when required, appropriate compensatory measures were taken.

All activities observed were conducted in a satisfactory manner and no violations or deviations were identified.

7. Radiological Protection (71709)

During the inspection period, the inspectors verified that health physics supervisory personnel conducted plant tours and were aware of activities which may cause unusual radiological conditions. The inspectors verified that radiation work permits (RWP) contained required information and for selected RWPs, the inspectors verified that controls were being implemented as required at the work site. The inspectors observed