

Virginia Electric and Power Company
North Anna Power Station
P. O. Box 402
Mineral, Virginia 23117

October 2, 1995

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

NAPS: MPW
Docket No. 50-338
License No. NPF-4


Dear Sirs:

Pursuant to North Anna Power Station Technical Specifications, Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby submits the following Licensee Event Report applicable to North Anna Unit 1.

Report No. 50-338/95-004-00

This Report has been reviewed by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee and will be forwarded to the Management Safety Review Committee for its review.

Very truly yours,




J. A. Stall
Station Manager

Enclosure:

cc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
101 Marietta Street, N.W.
Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30323

R. D. McWhorter
NRC Senior Resident Inspector
North Anna Power Station

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HOURS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) North Anna Power Station Unit 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 05000338	PAGE (3) 1 OF 3
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TITLE (4)
MISSED SURVEILLANCE OF N-16 RADIATION MONITORS DUE TO NI POWER SELECTOR SWITCH MALFUNCTION

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
09	07	95	95	004	00	10	02	95	FACILITY NAME	DOCKET NUMBER
										05000
										05000

OPERATING MODE (9) 1	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11)									
	20.402(b)			20.405(c)			50.73(a)(2)(iv)			73.71(B)
	20.405(a)(1)(i)			50.36(c)(1)			50.73(a)(2)(v)			73.71(C)
	20.405(a)(1)(ii)			50.36(c)(2)			50.73(a)(2)(vii)			OTHER
	20.405(a)(1)(iii)			X 50.73(a)(2)(i)			50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)			(Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
	20.405(a)(1)(iv)			50.73(a)(2)(ii)			50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)			
20.405(a)(1)(v)			50.73(a)(2)(iii)			50.73(a)(2)(x)				

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME Mr. J. A. Stall	TELEPHONE NUMBER (include Area Code) (540) 894-2101
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COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, completed EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X	NO	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
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ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

On September 7, 1995, at 2305 hours, with Unit 1 in Mode 1, 100 percent power, it was determined that the N-16 radiation monitor reactor power input indication was zero percent. Indication of primary to secondary leak rate in gallons per day from the N-16 detectors is valid only when the indicated reactor power level is greater than twenty percent. Subsequent investigation determined the N-16 monitors had been inoperable since September 4, 1995, when the reactor power instrumentation channels were calibrated. Since the N-16 monitors were believed to be operable the surveillance frequency for condenser air ejector grab samples was not increased as required by Technical Specification (TS) Action 3.4.6.4.a. This event is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i)(B) for a condition prohibited by the plant's TS.

Cause of the missed surveillance was a result of being unaware the N-16s were inoperable. Cause of the N-16s being inoperable was due to the NI power selector switch for the N-16 monitor not fully engaging in the N-43 position.

This event posed no significant safety implications because additional instrumentation was available to detect primary to secondary leakage. Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected at any time during this event.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

(See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block)

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FACILITY NAME (1)		DOCKET NUMBER (2)		LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
North Anna Power Station Unit 1		05000338		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	2 OF 3
				95	004	00	

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

1.0 Description of the Event

On September 7, 1995, at 2305 hours, with Unit 1 in Mode 1, 100 percent power, it was determined that the N-16 radiation monitor (EIS System-IL, Component-MON) reactor power input indication was zero percent. Indication of primary to secondary leak rate in gallons per day from the N-16 detectors is valid only when the indicated reactor power level is greater than twenty percent. Subsequent investigation determined the N-16 monitors had been inoperable since September 4, 1995, when the reactor power instrumentation channels (EIS System-IG, Component-CHA) were calibrated. Since the N-16 monitors were believed to be operable, the surveillance frequency for condenser air ejector (A/E) (EIS System-SH, Component-EJR) grab samples was not increased as required by Technical Specification (TS) Action 3.4.6.4.a. This event is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i)(B) for a condition prohibited by the plant's TS.

On September 3, 1995, power range instrumentation channel calibrations were being performed on the N-43 and N-44 NIs (EIS System-IG, Component-CHA). Reactor power level inputs from N-43 and N-44 Excore NIs are able to be selected by a switch (EIS System-IL, Component-33) on the N-16 RMS Status Panel. This three position switch allows selection of power level input from N-43, bottom position, N-44, top position, and no power indication in the mid position. In the mid position the N-16 monitor is unable to calculate leak rates. When testing one of the NIs the selector switch is adjusted to the second NI channel position to allow continued monitoring of leak rates. It is believed that following the completion of calibration on September 4, 1995, the selector switch was not fully engaged in the N-43 position even though the switch was depressed to that position.

On September 8, 1995, bench testing of the system response with a zero percent reactor power input confirmed the monitors would not calculate leak rates, thereby rendering the monitors inoperable. The TS required increase in condenser air ejector grabs samples to at least once during each four hour interval was not performed.

2.0 Significant Safety Consequences and Implications

This event posed no significant safety implications because additional instrumentation was available to detect primary to secondary leakage. Therefore, the health and safety of the public were not affected at any time during this event.

This event is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i)(B) for a condition prohibited by the plant's TS.

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FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
North Anna Power Station Unit 1	05000338	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	3 OF 3
		95	004	00	

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

3.0 Cause of the Event

Cause of the missed surveillance was a result of being unaware the N-16 monitors were inoperable. Cause of the N-16 monitors being inoperable was due to the NI power selector switch not being fully engaged in the N43 position. It is believed the selector switch for the N-16 monitor was not fully engaging in the N-43 position following calibration of the reactor power instrumentation channels on September 4, 1995. Subsequent trouble shooting on the selector switch revealed a problem with the switch making up when depressed to the N-43 position. Additional pressure was necessary when depressing the switch, with no discernible difference in switch position, in order for the power level input to register.

4.0 Immediate Corrective Actions

On September 7, 1995, the selector switch was operated to both NI selector positions and proper power levels were obtained/restored.

5.0 Additional Corrective Actions

The selector switch was replaced and the N-16 monitors were tested satisfactorily.

6.0 Actions to Prevent Recurrence

Periodic test procedures for primary to secondary leak rate determination were changed to include verification of a valid NI reactor power level input to the N-15 radiation monitors. This test evaluates the total and individual steam generator primary to secondary leakage every four hours using the N-16 and condenser A/E monitors.

The periodic test procedures for NIS power range level channel functional testing have been revised. Steps have been added to verify a valid reactor power level input when selecting the power range channel input to the N-16 detectors. The Instrument channel calibration procedures are being reviewed for applicable changes.

7.0 Similar Events

None

8.0 Additional Information

Unit 2 was operating in Mode 1, 100 percent power and was not affected by this event.