



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

PRC

SEP 26 1984

Docket Nos.: STN 50-454  
and STN 50-455

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Atomic Safety and Licensing Board for Byron:  
(I. Smith, D. Callihan, R. Cole)

The Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board for Byron:  
(A. Rosenthal, R. Gotchy, H. Wilber)


FROM: Thomas M. Novak, Assistant Director  
for Licensing  
Division of Licensing

SUBJECT: BYRON REINSPECTION PROGRAM (BOARD NOTIFICATION 84-159)

In accordance with the present NRC procedures for Board Notifications, the following information is being provided:

1. Letter from L. DelGeorge to J. Keppler dated August 22, 1984
2. Letter from R. L. Spessard to Cordell Reed enclosing Inspection Report No. 50-454/84-47; 50-445/84-41(DRS) dated August 28, 1984.

The August 22, 1984 letter clarified Commonwealth Edison's method for counting discrepancies from the Byron reinspection program. Section 4 of the Inspection Report enclosed with the August 28, 1984 letter states that the August 22, 1984 letter resolved the inspector's concerns regarding the method for counting discrepancies.

  
Thomas M. Novak, Assistant Director  
for Licensing  
Division of Licensing

Enclosure: As stated

cc: ACRS (10)  
Parties to the Proceeding  
See next page  
EDO

8409260425

NO05



Commonwealth Edison  
 One First National Plaza Chicago, Ill.  
 Address Reply to Post Office Box 761  
 Chicago, Ill. 60689

Received from CECO  
 on 8/22/84.

August 22, 1984

Mr. James G. Keppler  
 Regional Administrator  
 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
 799 Roosevelt Road  
 Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

Subject: Byron Generating Stations Units 1 and 2  
 Bryon QC Inspector Reinspection Program  
 I&E Inspection Report Nos. 50-454/82-05  
 and 50-455/82-04

- References (a): L.O. DelGeorge Letter to J.G. Keppler  
 dated February 24, 1984
- (b): L.O. DelGeorge Letter to J.G. Keppler  
 dated July 3, 1984

Dear Mr. Keppler:

This letter provides clarifying information regarding some of the data presented in reference (b) regarding the results of the Byron QC inspector reinspection program. This information is provided at the suggestion of a Region III inspector who has been involved in the detailed review of the June 1984 Supplement to the report on that reinspection program.

Chapter III of the June Supplement summarizes the results of supplemental inspections and evaluations for objective Hatfield inspection attributes. Sections III.B and III.C contain data on reinspections of equipment setting and equipment modification, respectively, which could be misinterpreted.

Relative to equipment setting, the report states "A total of 778 items were inspected and 34 discrepancies were identified". The number 778 refers to the number of inspections performed. Each of these inspections may consist of one or more elements. For example, the inspection of an equipment anchoring detail may consist of the objective examination of a welded holddown to assure that each of six welds is present. An entire inspection was termed discrepant if any element of that inspection contained a discrepancy. Using the previous example if one of the six welds were discrepant, the entire inspection was considered discrepant.


8408280274 PDR

If two fields of the six were discrepant, the entire inspection was still considered as a single discrepancy. The total number of inspection elements was considerably larger than the total number of inspections (778). Similarly, the total number of discrepant elements was greater than the total number of discrepant inspections (34). The results are presented in terms of inspection performed and inspections found discrepant because of the difficulty in counting all of the individual elements. For inspections containing more than one element, the number of discrepant elements was much smaller than the number of inspection elements for each inspection. This representation conservatively represents the quality of the work since the ratio of discrepant elements to elements inspected is smaller than the ratio of discrepant inspections to the number of inspections.


Relative to equipment modification, the report states "A total of 1,850 items covering a considerably larger number of inspection points were inspected and 44 discrepancies were identified". Similar to equipment setting, the number 1,850 refers to the number of inspections that were performed. An inspection of termination locations in a particular section of a panel was considered as one inspection. This inspection may include examination of approximately 250 terminal locations, each of which is considered an inspection point. If any of these inspection points was found to be discrepant, the inspection is considered to be discrepant. The 44 discrepancies stated in the report represent 44 discrepant inspections. The number of discrepant inspection points is larger than the 44 discrepant inspections. However, the number of discrepant inspection points was much smaller than the number of inspection points for each inspection. As with equipment setting, this represents a conservative presentation of the results. The ratio of discrepant inspection points to the total number of inspection points is considerably smaller than the ratio of discrepant inspections to the total number of inspections. As with equipment setting, the results were presented in terms of inspections rather than inspection points because of the difficulty in determining the exact number of inspection points.

Please address further questions regarding this matter to this office.

Very truly yours,

  
L.O. DelGeorge  
Assistant Vice-President

cc: Mr. H.R. Denton  
Mr. R.C. DeYoung



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
REGION III  
799 ROOSEVELT ROAD  
GLEN ELLYN, ILLINOIS 60137

*O'Shan - 1/10*

AUG 28 1984

Docket No. 50-454  
Docket No. 50-455

Commonwealth Edison Company  
ATTN: Mr. Cordell Reed  
Vice President  
Post Office Box 767  
Chicago, IL 60690

Gentlemen:

This refers to the routine safety inspection conducted by Messrs. R. S. Love and E. Christnot of this office on July 9 through August 11, 1984, of activities at Byron Station authorized by NRC Construction Permits No. CPPR-130 and CPPR-131 and to the discussion of our findings with Messrs. R. Tuetken and J. Binder and other members of your staff at the conclusion of the inspection.

The enclosed copy of our inspection report identifies areas examined during the inspection. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of a selective examination of procedures and representative records, observations, and interviews with personnel.


No items of noncompliance with NRC requirements were identified during the course of this inspection.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790(a), a copy of this letter and the enclosure(s) will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room unless you notify this office, by telephone, within ten days of the date of this letter and submit written application to withhold information contained therein within thirty days of the date of this letter. Such application must be consistent with the requirements of 2.790(b)(1). If we do not hear from you in this regard within the specified periods noted above, a copy of this letter and the enclosed inspection report will be placed in the Public Document Room.

*6409 260327 PDR*

We will gladly discuss any questions you have concerning this inspection.

Sincerely,

  
for B. L. Spessard, Director  
Division of Reactor Safety

Enclosure: Inspection Report  
No. 50-454/84-47(DRS); and  
No. 50-455/84-41(DRS)

cc w/encl:

D. L. Farrar, Director  
of Nuclear Licensing  
V. I. Schlosser, Project Manager  
Gunner Sorensen, Site Project  
Superintendent  
R. E. Querio, Station  
Superintendent  
DMB/Document Control Desk (RIDS)  
Resident Inspector, RIII Byron  
Resident Inspector, RIII  
Braidwood  
Phyllis Dunton, Attorney  
General's Office, Environmental  
Control Division  
Ms. Jane M. Whicher  
Diane Chavez, DAARE/SAFE  
W. Paton, ELD  
L. Olshan, NRR LPM

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Report No. 50-454/84-47(DRS); 50-455/84-41(DRS)

Docket No. 50-454; 50-455

License No. CPPR-130; CPPR-131

Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company  
Post Office Box 767  
Chicago, IL 60690

Facility Name: Byron Station, Units 1 and 2

Inspection At: Byron Site, Byron, Illinois

Inspection Conducted: July 9-13, 25-27, August 1-3, 9-11, 1984

Inspectors: *C. C. Williams for:*  
R. S. Love

8-27-84  
Date

*C. C. Williams for:*  
E. Christnot (July 11-13, 1984 Only)

8-27-84  
Date

Approved By: *C. C. Williams*  
C. C. Williams, Chief  
Plant Systems Section

8-27-84  
Date

Inspection Summary

Inspection on July 9-13, 25-27, August 1-3, 9-11, 1984 (Report No. 50-454/84-47;  
50-455/84-41(DRS))

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of licensee actions on previous inspection findings; SER open items; 10 CFR 50.55(e) reports; IDI findings; and supplemental reinspection program. The inspection involved a total of 122 inspection-hours onsite by NRC inspectors including 24 inspection-hours during off-shifts.

Results: No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

PDR ~~8409260335~~

DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Commonwealth Edison Company (CECO)

\*K. Hansing, Quality Assurance Superintendent  
\*R. Tuetken, Startup Coordinator  
\*M. E. Lohmann, Assistant Construction Superintendent  
#\*J. O. Binder, Project Electrical Supervisor  
\*R. B. Klinger, Project Quality Control Supervisor  
\*J. W. Rappeport, Quality Assurance Engineer  
\*E. T. Sager, PCD Electrical Engineer  
#\*J. L. Bergner, Quality Assurance Supervisor  
\*M. V. Dellabetta, Quality Assurance Engineer  
J. W. Zid, Quality Assurance Engineer  
L. Simon, Quality Assurance Engineer  
D. Kruger, Systems Test Engineer  
R. Campbell, Group Leader  
J. Richter, Observer  
R. Dorsey, Observer  
R. Hull, Observer

Hatfield Electric Company (HECO)

J. T. Hill, QA/QC Manager  
S. Bindenagel, Assistant QC Supervisor  
T. Ahlquist, Lead QC Inspector  
S. Hubler, Lead QC Inspector

The inspectors also contacted and interviewed other licensee and contractor personnel during this reporting period.

\*Denotes those persons present at the exit interview on July 13, 1984.

#\*Denotes those persons present at the exit interview on August 2, 1984.

2. Licensee Action on Previously Identified Items

- a. (Closed) Unresolved item (454/82-17-04; 455/82-12-04): This item pertained to the reinspection of cable tray hangers as required by HECO NCR-407. This item was upgraded to an item of noncompliance and is being tracked for proper closure as (454/84-27-01; 455/84-19-01).
- b. (Closed) Noncompliance (454/82-17-05; 455/82-12-05): During a previous inspection, it was identified that the licensee was not identifying, controlling, and correcting cable tray separation violations. As part of the corrective action, a concerted effort was made by CECO, HECO, and Sargent and Lundy (S&L) to identify and control all cable tray separation violations throughout the power block. This information was compiled and analyzed by S&L. The

corrective actions were: (1) relocate one or more trays to correct the violations; or (2) install cable tray covers; or (3) based on analysis, accept the installation as installed; and (4) place a distinctive mark on the applicable drawing to indicate that a separation violation had been identified and analyzed. The above listed corrective action was verified in Inspection Reports 454/84-27; 455/84-19.

- c. (Closed) Noncompliance (454/83-60-03): During a previous inspection, it was identified that the instrument sensing lines for a safety-related level transmitter were not installed per drawing in that the high and low taps were reversed. As a result of this finding, the licensee performed a 100% reinspection of all flow and level transmitters to verify proper sensing line connections. A review of records indicates that the inspections were conducted, and that additional deficiencies were identified and corrected. During a tour of the power block during this reporting period, no deficiencies were identified in this area.
- d. (Open) Noncompliance (454/84-27-01; 455/84-19-01): During a previous inspection it was identified that the licensee failed to identify and control nonconforming cable tray hangers during the reinspection required by HECO NCR 407R. As a result of the inspector's concerns, 295 hangers were reinspected. This reinspection resulted in 1 NCR and 44 DRs being prepared to document potential discrepancies. During this reporting period, the inspector reviewed the closed DRs. Following are the results of this review:
- (1) DR 5019, dated May 11, 1984. Wrong connection detail was utilized. Detail was accepted as is per FER 24973, dated June 8, 1984. The DR was closed on June 23, 1984.
  - (2) DR 5014, dated May 11, 1984. Wrong connection detail was utilized. Detail was accepted as is per FER 24860. DR was closed on June 28, 1984.
  - (3) DR 4947, dated May 15, 1984. Prepared in error, HDRF 3144 was still outstanding. DR was closed on June 6, 1984.
  - (4) DR 4948, dated May 15, 1984. Prepared in error, HDRF 3144 was still outstanding. DR was closed on June 6, 1984.
  - (5) DR 5030, dated May 11, 1984. Z dimension on DV-87 detail was out of elevation tolerance. ECN 7824, dated May 31, 1984 was issued to increase the allowable tolerance. DR was closed on June 30, 1984.
  - (6) DR 5029, dated May 11, 1984. Wrong connection detail utilized. Detail was accepted as is per FCR 25071. Dr was closed on July 21, 1984.
  - (7) DR 4943, dated May 11, 1984. Inspector error, read HL drawing wrong. DR was closed on June 30, 1984.



- (8) DR 4928, dated May 10, 1984. Inspector error, auxiliary steel size increased, was within tolerance. DR was closed on July 19, 1984.
- (9) DR 4930, dated May 10, 1984. Damaged horizontal hanger member was replaced. DR was closed on July 23, 1984.
- (10) DR 4922, dated May 10, 1984. Z dimension was out of elevation tolerance. ECN 7824 was issued to increase the allowable tolerance. DR was closed on June 30, 1984.
- (11) DR 4924, dated May 10, 1984. Bolts missing on pan to hanger connection. Bolts replaced and DR was closed on July 19, 1984.
- (12) DR 4935, dated May 11, 1984. Auxiliary steel connection clearance was out of tolerance. Accepted as is per FCR 25111. DR was closed on July 21, 1984.
- (13) DR 5024, dated May 14, 1984. DV84A clearance tolerance violation. Accepted as is per FCR 25121. DR was closed on July 21, 1984.
- (14) DR 4931, dated May 10, 1984. Fit-up gap exceeded tolerance. Accepted as is per FCR 24876. DR was closed on June 15, 1984.
- (15) DR 4938, dated May 10, 1984. Inspector error, hanger was being reworked per HDRF 2102. DR was closed on June 15, 1984.
- (16) DR 4936, dated May 10, 1984. Inspector error, tube-steel oversize was within tolerance. DR was closed on June 30, 1984.
- (17) DR 4937, dated May 10, 1984. Tube steel length was incorrect on HL drawing. Corrected by FCR 25058. DR was closed on July 17, 1984.
- (18) DR 5016, dated May 11, 1984. Weld rejected for length. Weld was repaired and DR was closed on June 12, 1984.
- (19) DR 4926, dated May 10, 1984. Wrong plate size on DV-89 connection. Memo 732 provided clarification to drawing O-3051 tolerances. Plate was acceptable and DR was closed on June 8, 1984.

The corrective action on the above listed DRs appears to be adequate. This item remains open pending a review of the remaining DRS and NCR 989 for proper closure.

- e. (Open) Noncompliance (454/84-27-02; 455/84-19-02): During a previous inspection it was observed that the Hatfield procedures failed to address the inspection of cable trays to verify the minimum separation requirements. As a result of the inspector's concerns, a reinspection of safety-related cable tray installed since February 1983 was initiated. Cable tray installed prior to February 1983 had

been 100% reinspected for minimum separation requirements under a previous reinspection program. Pending a review of completed reinspection program and corrective action, if required, this item remains open.

f. (Open) SER item (454/83-00-01): As required by BTPPSB-1, "Adequacy of Station Electric Distribution System Voltages," and SER paragraph 8.2.4, Test Procedure AP-11 was prepared to verify the voltage levels of the ESF busses. During this reporting period, the Region III inspector reviewed the test procedure (2.05.11) for the 30% load test portion of AP-11. The test objectives for this test were:

- (1) Demonstrate proper operation of the Station Auxiliary Transformers (SAT) loaded nominally to 30% of the start-up load.
- (2) Record the voltage transient on the ESF busses due to starting a large ESF and non-ESF motor, not concurrently, while the SAT is loaded nominally to 30% of the plant start-up load.

The test procedure (2.05.11) appeared to be adequate. During this reporting period, the Region III inspector witnessed the 30% load test. The inspector observed the CECO Systems Test Engineer verifying the prerequisites, initial system conditions, and recording test data. The test was conducted in three parts as follows:

- (1) With SAT 142-1 under load (x-winding, 6.9 KV, @ 14 MW (41.2% load), Y-winding, 4 KV, 10.5 MW (46.1% load)), 1250 HP ESF Motor 1SX01PA was started and data recorded. Motor 1SX01PA was then stopped, and 4 KV non-ESF motor OWS01PA, 2250HP, motor was started and data recorded. Motor OWS01PA was stopped. This concluded this portion of the test.
- (2) With SAT 142-1 under load as described in paragraph (1) above, circulating water pump 1CW01PC, 7000 HP, was started and data recorded. Motor 1CW01PC was stopped. This concluded this portion of the test.
- (3) With SAT 142-2 under load (X-winding, 6.9 KV, @ 8.5 MW (37.3% load); Y-winding, 4KV, @ 9.5 MW (45.0% load)), ESF motor 1SX01PB, 1250 HP, was started and data recorded. Motor 1SX01PB was stopped and 4 KV non-ESF motor OWS01PB, 2250 HP was started and data recorded. Motor OWS01PB was stopped and systems returned to normal. This completed the 30% load test portion of procedure AP-11.

NOTE: To obtain the voltage transients when the above listed motors were started, strip chart recorders were connected at panel 1PM01J and at MCC 1AP27E. During the transients, the recorders were operating at 50mm/sec.

The acceptance criteria for this test is that the measured ESF buss voltage be within 3% of the computer model and within the rated operating voltage of the equipment supplied by the bus. Pending a review of this analysis, this item remains open.

3. Licensee Action on 10 CFR 50.55(e) Reports

a. (Closed) 50.55(e) Report (454/83-06-EE): The reactor trip breakers and reactor trip bypass breakers are Westinghouse Model DS-416. Due to a discrepancy in design, there is a potential for misoperation of the undervoltage (UV) attachment in the breakers. The width of the retaining ring on the two pivot shafts of the UV trip is not compatible with the width of the groove on the pivot shafts that receives the retaining ring. This deficiency would increase the potential for misoperation of the DS-416 UV attachment, thereby creating a condition wherein the reactor trip breakers might not open on automatic demand from the reactor protection system. Westinghouse supplied replacement UV attachments for the DV-416 breakers. These replacement attachments have widened grooves to accommodate the new retaining rings. These new UV attachments were installed and tested in accordance with Westinghouse Field Change Notice (FCN) CAEM-10749. Equipment requiring new attachments are identified as 1RD05E-RTA, 1RD05E-RTB, 1RD05E-RYA, and 1RD05E-RYB.

b. (Open) 50.55(e) Report (454/83-14-EE; 455/83-14-EE): As a result of Region III inspector's concerns and CECo NCRs F-852 and F-869 in the area of electrical cable grip installations, the licensee filed a potential 50.55(e) report with Region III. Examples of deficiencies identified were:

- (1) Cable grips appear to be supporting the cables only at the point of installation of the upper ty-wrap.
- (2) Installations were found with one size larger cable grip installed than that specified for the installation.
- (3) Installations were found with two sizes larger cable grip installed than that specified for the installation.
- (4) Installations were found with one size smaller cable grip installed than that specified for the installation.
- (5) Installations were found with an excessive number of cables being supported by one cable grip, (S&L STD-EB-200 specifies a maximum number of cables per grip).
- (6) Installations were found without cable grips being installed.

On April 24-25, 1984, CECo performed tests using several cable grip/ty-wrap configurations. The configurations tested were selected as the worst case installations that may exist in the plant and to address concerns regarding ty-wrap installations on cable grips. The tests consisted of placing the cables and cable grip/ty-wrap assemblies on a stand and subjecting the cables to tension. The amount of tension applied was equivalent to the maximum tension which would be seen in a seismic event.

During this reporting period the inspector reviewed the test procedure, test results, and a video tape of the test. The tests conducted indicate that the cable grips will adequately support the cables as installed in vertical conduit runs and cable tray risers. It appeared that the tests conducted did not adequately address the last cable grip installed prior to termination. This situation would only be applicable where cables enter a panel, cabinet, etc. from the bottom. The largest concentration of this type installation (cables entering a panel from the bottom) is in the control room and electrical equipment room. During a tour of these areas, it was observed that there were several instances where cable grips were not installed or improperly installed. There was one instance where it appeared that the cable was in fact being supported by the terminations. Subsequent to the inspectors findings, the licensee agreed to evaluate this type of installation and take appropriate corrective action. Pending a review of the licensee's evaluation and corrective action, this item remains open.

#### 4. Review of Supplemental Reinspection Program

As part of the corrective action for an item of noncompliance (454/82-05-19; 455/82-04-19), the licensee instituted a reinspection of selected HECO work activities. Where the sample size was not statistically significant, the licensee committed to perform additional inspections on: (1) Equipment Setting, (2) Equipment Modifications, (3) A325 Bolting, and (4) Conduit Support Bolting. During this reporting period, the inspector reviewed all of the inspection reports generated as a result of this supplemental reinspection. A summary of this reinspection and the evaluation as to the safety significance of the discrepancies identified is documented in CECO's report to Region III, dated June 1984. The title of this report is "Supplement to Report on the Byron QC Inspector Reinspection Program". The inspector reviewed the corrective action for the identified discrepancies and found it to be adequate.

In the reinspection of equipment setting and equipment modifications, the inspector had problems correlating the number of reported discrepancies with the number of discrepancies identified on the inspection reports reviewed. During interviews with CECO and S&L personnel, it was learned that one or more weld deficiencies on a given panel would only count as one discrepancy. For example, the inspection report for panel 1AP06EQ identified two slot welds that were not welded, four slot welds that were only welded on two sides (slot welds required welding on all four sides), and one weld that was rejected for slag inclusions; however, this was identified as one discrepancy in the supplemental reinspection report. On August 16, 1984, Mr. R. S. Love (Region III) telephonically contacted Mr. R. Tuetken (CECO) and expressed the above noted concern regarding the accounting of discrepancies identified during the supplemental reinspection program. On August 22, 1984, CECO submitted a letter to Region III which satisfactorily clarified CECO's method of arriving at the number of deficiencies reported and resolved the inspector's concern.

Independent Inspection Effort

- a. During the deposition of Mr. R. S. Love (Region III) by counsel for the Applicant and counsel for the Intervenors on June 20, 1984, HECO QA/QC Memorandum No. 216 was introduced as Exhibit 10 to the Love deposition. This memorandum discusses missing weld travelers for cable tray/conduit hangers and provides guidance for recreating the missing weld travelers. Subsequent to the Love deposition, it was observed that paragraph 4 of the memorandum directs a given welder to affix his weld symbol stamp to another welders' work. This practice if implemented is contrary to the requirements of the Project Electrical Specifications, F2790, and American Welding Society (AWS) Code D1.1.

On June 21, 1984, Mr. J. Streeter (Region III) telephonically contacted Mr. T. R. Tramm (CECo) and discussed HECO Memorandum No. 216. Mr. Streeter requested that CECo investigate this matter and be prepared to discuss it in detail with Region III Staff during a subsequent inspection. Pending a review of the results of CECo's investigation, this item is unresolved (454/84-47-01; 455/84-41-01).

- b. During the Byron IDI review, it was observed that the present equipment qualification plan for the auxiliary feedwater pumps pressure switches, 1PSL-AF051 and 1PSL-AF055, employs a United Electric model J302-S156 pressure switch having a range from 0 to 100 psig. This range is different from the range of the pressure switches actually used which is 30 inches Hg vacuum to +20 psi. The low suction setpoint is at 1.22 inches Hg vacuum and the low-low suction setpoint is at 4.48 inches Hg vacuum. Since the qualification report had not been prepared, no justification for comparability was available for the IDI team review.

The licensee provided the following information:

"The qualification program for pressure switches 1PSL-AF051 and 1PSL-AF055 is described in the following discussion.

The original pressure switch specified for this application was United Electric Model J-302-S156, which is a metal bellows type sensor. Later, due to operating requirements, this switch was changed to Model J-302-552, which is a teflon diaphragm type sensor. Since the test program for Model J-302-S156 was in progress, it was decided to continue the test and evaluate the acceptability of the report upon receipt.

Since the time of the IDI, the report has been received, reviewed, and found to be unacceptable for qualification of Model J-302-552. Due to internal mechanism differences between the two switch models, seismic testing of Model J-302-552 is required and in progress.

Since the switches are located in a mild environment, the environmental qualification will be by a combination of similarity between the tested and supplied switch models for parts that are identical, and a material analysis for parts that are different."

Pending a review of the final environmental qualification report for the subject pressure switches, this item is unresolved (454/84-47-02).

6. Unresolved Items

Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance, or deviations. Unresolved items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in Paragraphs 5.a and 5.b.

7. Exit Interview

The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) on July 13 and August 2, 1984. The inspectors summarized the scope and findings of the inspection. The licensee acknowledged this information.

DISTRIBUTION LIST FOR BOARD NOTIFICATION

Byron Units 1&2  
Docket No. 50-454,455

Dr. A. Dixon Callihan  
Doug Cassel, Esq.  
Ms. Diane Chavez  
Dr. Richard F. Cole  
Joseph Gallo, Esq.  
Dr. Reginald L. Gotchy  
Mrs. Phillip B. Johnson  
Michael Miller, Esq.  
Ms. Pat Morrison  
Alan S. Rosenthal, Esq.  
Ivan W. Smith, Esq.  
John Streeter, Reg. III  
Dr. Bruce von Zellen  
Howard A. Wilber, Esq.  
Steven P. Zimmerman, Esq.

Atomic Safety and Licensing  
Board Panel  
Atomic Safety and Licensing  
Appeal Panel  
Docketing and Service Section  
Document Management Branch

Mr. Dennis L. Farrar  
Mr. William Kortier

Mr. Edward R. Crass  
Mr. Julian Hinds