FORT CALHOUN STATION PERFORMANCE INDICATORS

Omaha Public Power Distric



AUGUST 1995

SAFE OPERATIONS PERFORMANCE EXCELLENCE COST EFFECTIVENESS

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ADOCK

PDR

Pursuit of excellence is an attitude... it involves wisdom and sound judgment ... it is a lifetime, career-long commitment... it is a way of life...it is doing the job right the first time, every time. It is inner-directed, not the result of external pressure, it is our own self worth-who we are and the pride and satisfaction that comes from being the right kind of person, not just in doing the right things. James J. O'Connor

OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT FORT CALHOUN STATION PERFORMANCE INDICATORS REPORT

Prepared By: Production Engineering Division System Engineering Test and Performance Group

AUGUST 1995

FORT CALHOUN STATION

August 1995 MONTHLY OPERATING REPORT

OPERATIONS SUMMARY

During the month of August, Fort Calhoun Station (FCS) operated at a nominal 100% power until 1114 hours on August 24th. At that time, the plant experienced a reactor trip and associated diesel generator (DG) starts. The trip occurred during the performance of the Diverse Scram System Actuation Relay Operability Test, when a licensed operator inadvertently repositioned the incorrect switch from TEST to NORMAL. All systems responded normally to the trip with the exception of the DG-1 accelerating to full speed vice idle speed. After evaluation of the DG-1 electrical system conditions, this DG-1 full speed event was reported on August 28th in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B). The reactor was taken critical at 0220 hours on August 26th and was generating at 100% capacity by August 29th. Reactor criticality was delayed because of a failure of the motor brake on one of the Control Rod Drive Motors.

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INPO Performance Indicators



NRC Performance Indicators

Year-To-Date Value Performance Categories



Performance better than Industry Average Trend



Performance better than 1995 OPPD Goal



Performance Not Meeting 1995 OPPD Goal



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FORT CALHOUN STATION PERFORMANCE INDICATORS REPORT August 1995 - SUMMARY

POSITIVE TREND REPORT

A performance indicator with data representing three consecutive months of improving performance or three consecutive months of performance that is superior to the stated goal is exhibiting a positive trend per Nuclear Operations Division Quality Procedure 37 (NOD-QP-37).

The following performance indicators exhibited positive trends for the reporting month:

Safety System Failures (Page 7)

High Pressure Safety Injection System Safety System Performance (Page 8)

Significant Events (Page 20)

Missed Surveillance Tests Results in Licensee Event Reports (Page 21)

Unplanned Auto Scrams per 7,000 Hours Critical (Page 29)

Unplanned Safety System Actuations (INPO Definition) (Page 30)

Unplanned Safety System Actuations U. Definition) (Page 31)

Primary System Chemistry Percent of Hours Out of Limit (Page 39)

Secondary System Chemistry (Page 40)

Hazardous Waste Produced (Page 53)

Contaminated Radiation Controlled Area (Page 54)

End of Positive Trend Report.

ADVERSE TREND REPORT

A performance indicator with data representing three consecutive months of declining performance or three consecutive months of performance that is trending toward declining as determined by the Manager - Station Engineering, constitutes an adverse trend per Nuclear Operations Division Quality Procedure 37 (NOD-QP-37). A supervisor whose performance indicator exhibits an adverse trend by this definition may specify in written form (to be published in this report) why the trend is not adverse.

The following performance indicators exhibited adverse trends for the reporting month:

Thermal Performance (Page 33)

Maintenance Workload Backlogs (Page 46)

End of Adverse Trend Report.

INDICATORS NEEDING INCREASED MANAGEMENT ATTENTION REPORT

A performance indicator with data for the reporting period that is inadequate when compared to the OPPD goal is defined as "Needing Increased Management Attention" per Nuclear Operations Division Quality Procedure 37 (NOD-QP-37).

The following performance indicators exhibited positive trends for the reporting month:

Industrial Safety Accident Rate (Page 3)

Emergency AC Power System (Page 10)

Emergency Diesel Generator Unit Reliability (Page 11)

Diesel Generagor Reliability (25 Demands) (Page 12)

Emergency Diesel Generator Unreliability (Page 13)

Fuel Reliability Indicator (Page 14)

FORT CALHOUN STATION PERFORMANCE INDICATORS REPORT August 1995 - SUMMARY

INDICATORS NEEDING INCREASED MANAGEMENT ATTENTION REPORT (continued)

Number of Control Room Equipment Deficiencies (Page 15)

Number of On-Line and Outage Control Room Equipment Deficiencies (Page 16)

Collective Radiation Exposure (Page 17)

Forced Outage Rate (Page 24)

Unit Capability Factor (Page 27)

Unit Capability Loss Factor (Page 28)

Equipment Forced Outage Rate (Page 35)

Temporary Modifications (Page 58)

PERFORMANCE INDICATOR REPORT IMPROVEMENTS/CHANGES

This section lists significant changes made to the report and to specific indicators within the report since the previous month.

The annual Year-to-date Unit Capability Factor (Page 27) was revised to reflect a calculation correction change in the unplanned energy loss.

Procedural Noncompliance Incidents (Maintenance) -Page 49, has been revised to reflect human performance related to IRs assigned to the maintenance functional area.

End of Report Improvements/Changes Report.

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OPPD NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION GOALS

Vice President - 1995 Priorities

MISSION

The safe, reliable and cost effective generation of electricity for OPPD customers through the professional use of nuclear technology. The Company shall conduct these operations prudently, efficiently and effectively to assure the health, safety and protection of all personnel, the general public and the environment.

GOALS

Goal 1: SAFE OPERATIONS

Supports: April 1994 Corporate Strategic Plan Goal 3, Obj: 3 & 4

A proactive, self-critical and safety conscious culture is exhibited throughout the nuclear organization. Individuals demonstrate professionalism through self-ownership and personal initiative and open communication.

1995 Priorities:

- Improve SALP ratings.
- Improve INPO rating.
- Reduce NRC violations with no violations more severe than level 4.
- No unplanned automatic reactor scrams or safety system actuations.

Objectives to support SAFE OPERATIONS.

OBJECTIVE 1-1:

No challenges to a nuclear safety system.

OBJECTIVE 1-2:

Conduct activities in accordance with applicable policies, technical specifications, procedures, standing orders and work instructions.

- Less than 1.4 NRC violations per 1,000 inspection hours.
- Fewer significant Corrective Action Documents (CADs) originating from activities.

OBJECTIVE 1-3:

Identify conditions BEFORE they affect plant safety and reliability.

OBJECTIVE 1-4:

Achieve all safety-related 1995 performance indicator goals in the Performance Indicator Report.

OBJECTIVE 1-5:

Zero Lost Time Injuries and recordable injuries rate BELOW 1.5 percent.

OPPD NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION GOALS

Vice President - 1995 Priorities

Goal 2: PERFORMANCE

Supports: April 1994 Corporate Strategic Plan Goal 3, Obj: 2 and Goal 4, Obj: 1

Achieve high standards of performance at Fort Calhoun Station resulting in safe, reliable and cost effective power production.

1995 PRIORITIES:

- Improve Quality, Professionalism and Teamwork.
- Improve Plant Reliability.
- Meet or exceed INPO key parameters and outage performance goals.
- Reduce the number of Human Performance errors.
- Identify Programmatic performance problems through effective self assessment.

Objectives to support PERFORMANCE:

OBJECTIVE 2-1:

Achieve an annual plant capacity factor of 70% and a unit capability factor of 81%.

OBJECTIVE 2-2:

Execute the 1995 refueling outage in 49 days; emphasize shutdown plant safety.

OBJECTIVE 2-3:

Achieve all performance related 1995 performance indicator goals in the Performance Indicator Report.

OBJECTIVE 2-4:

All projects and programs are planned, scheduled, and accomplished according to schedules, resource constraints, and requirements.

OBJECTIVE 2-5:

Team/Individual ownership, accountability, performance and teamwork is evident by improved plant reliability; improved ratings for both INPO and NRC; reduced number of human performance errors and identification of performance problems by effective self assessment and for individuals as measured by the successful completion of department goals & objectives and other specific measures.

OPPD NUCLEAR ORGANIZATION GOALS

Vice President - 1995 Priorities

Goal 3: COSTS

Supports: April 1994 Corporate Strategic Plan Goal 2, Obj: 1, 2 and 3, and Goal 6, Obj: 1

Operate Fort Calhoun in a manner that cost effectively maintains nuclear generation as an economically viable contribution to OPPD's "bottom line". Cost consciousness is exhibited at all levels of the organization.

1995 Priorities:

- Maintain total O&M and Capital Expenditures within budget.
- Streamline work process to improve cost effectiveness.

Objectives to support COSTS:

OBJECTIVE 3-1:

Conduct the nuclear programs, projects, and activities within the approved Capital and O&M budgets.

OBJECTIVE 3-2:

Implement nuclear related Opportunity Review recommendations according to approved schedules and attain the estimated cost savings.

Goals Source:

Scofield (Manager)

SAFE OPERATIONS

Goal: A proactive, self-critical and safety conscious culture is exhibited throughout the nuclear organization. Individuals demonstrate professionalism through self-ownership and personal initiative and open communication.



INDUSTRIAL SAFETY ACCIDENT RATE

As stated in INPO's December 1993 publication 'Detailed Descriptions of World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) Performance Indicators and Other Indicators for Use at U.S. Nuclear Power Plant': "The purpose of this indicator is to monitor progress in improving industrial safety performance for utility personnel permanently assigned to the station."

The INPO industrial safety accident rate value year to date was 1.39 at the end of August 1995. The value for the 12 months from September 1, 1994, through August 31, 1995, was 1.08.

There were no restricted-time and no lost-time accidents in August 1995.

The values for this indicator are determined as follows:

(number of restricted-time accidents + lost-time accidents + fatalities) x 200,000 (number of station person-hours worked)

The 1995 Fort Calhoun year-end goal is ≤ 0.50 . The 1995 INPO industry goal is ≤ 0.50 . The approximate industry upper ten percentile value (for the period from 7/93 through 6/94) is 0.12.

| Data Source: | Sorensen/Skaggs (Manager/Source) |
|-----------------|--------------------------------------|
| | Chase/Booth (Manager/Source) |
| Accountability: | Chase/Conner |
| Trend: | Needs Increased Management Attention |



DISABLING INJURY/ILLNESS FREQUENCY RATE (LOST-TIME ACCIDENT RATE)

This indicator shows the 1995 disabling injury/illness frequency rate. The 1994 disabling injury/illness frequency rate is also shown.

The disabling injury/illness frequency rate year to date was **1.39** at the end of **August 1995.** There were **no** disabling injury/illness cases reported for the month.

The disabling injury/illness frequency rate for the **12 months** from September 1, 1994, through August 31, 1995, was **1.08**.

The 1995 Fort Calhoun year-end goal for this indicator is a maximum value of 0.5.

Data Source: Accountability: Trend: Sorensen/Skaggs (Manager/Source) Chase/Conner None

SEP 25, 26 & 27



RECORDABLE INJURY/ILLNESS FREQUENCY RATE

This indicator shows the 1995 recordable injury/illness frequency rate. The 1994 recordable injury/illness cases frequency rate is also shown.

A recordable injury/illness case is reported if personnel from any of the Nuclear Division are injured on the job and require corrective medical treatment beyond first aid. The recordable injury illness cases frequency rate is computed on a year-to-date basis

There have been **eight** recordable injury/illness cases in 1995. The recordable injury/ illness cases frequency rate year to date was **1.59** at the end of **August 1995**. There was **one** recordable injury/illness case reported for the month of **August**. These injuries were the result of a slip by an employee when getting out of a car causing a fractured foot.

The recordable injury/illness cases frequency rate for the 12 months from September 1, 1994, through August 31, 1995, was 1.48.

The 1995 Fort Calhoun year-end goal for this indicator is a maximum value of 1.5.

| Data Source: | Sorensen/Skaggs (Manager/Source) |
|-----------------|----------------------------------|
| Accountability: | Conner |
| frend: | None |

SEP 15, 25, 26 & 27

4

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CLEAN CONTROLLED AREA CONTAMINATIONS

This indicator shows the Personnel Contamination Events in the Clean Controlled Area for contaminations ≥1,000 disintegrations/minute per probe area for the reporting month.

There were 2 contamination events in August 1995. There has been a total of 48 contamination events in 1995 through the end of August. This compares to 39 at this time last year.

| Data Source: | Chase/Cartwright (Manager/Source) |
|-----------------|-----------------------------------|
| Accountability: | Chase/Lovett |
| Trend: | None |

SEP 15 & 54



PREVENTABLE/PERSONNEL ERROR LERS

This indicator depicts 18-month totals for numbers of "Preventable" and "Personnel Error" LERs.

The graph shows the 18-month totals for preventable LERs, the 18-month totals for Personnel Error LERs and the Personnel Error totals for each month. The LERs are trended based on the LER event data as opposed to the LER report date.

In July 1995, there were no events which were subsequently reported as an LER. No LERs were categorized as Preventable or as a Personnel Error for the month of July. The total LERs for the year 1995 (through July 31, 1995) is three. The total Personnel Error LERs for the year 1995 is zero. The total Preventable LERs for the year is one.

The 1995 goal for this indicator is that the year-end values for the 18-month totals be no more than 12 Preventable and 5 Personnel Error LERs.

| Data Source: | Trausch/Cavanaugh (Manager/Source) |
|-----------------|------------------------------------|
| Accountability: | Chase |
| Trend: | None |



This indicator illustrates the number of NRC Safety System Failures as reported by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data in the biannual "Performance Indicators for Operating Commercial Nuclear Power Reactors" report.

The following safety system failures occurred between the 2nd quarter of 1992 and the 1st quarter of 1995:

1st Quarter 1993: The SG low pressure scram signal block reset values, for all 4 channels of both SGs, were greater than the allowed limits, rendering this scram input inoperable during certain operating conditions.

2nd Quarter 1993: A section of the piping configuration for the borated water source of the safety injection system was not seismically qualified. This could have resulted in a failure of the system to meet design requirements during a seismic event.

4th Quarter 1993: 1) During surveillance testing, both PORVs for the LTOP system failed to open during multiple attempts. The failures were a result of differential expansion caused by a loop seal, excessive venting line back pressure, and cracked valve disks; 2) Calibration errors of the offsite power low signal relays could have prevented offsite power from tripping and the EDGs from starting in the required amount of time during a degraded voltage condition; 3) Both AFW pumps were inoperable when one was removed from service for testing and the control switch for the other pump's steam supply valve was out of the auto position; 4) Only one train of control room ventilation was placed in recirc when both toxic gas monitors became inoperable. Later during surveillance, the other train auto-started and brought cutside air into the control room for a six-minute period.

1st Quarter 1994: A design basis review determined that an ESF relay could result in loss of safety injection and spray flow, due to premature actuation of recirculation flow.

4th Cluarter 1994: An accident scenario was identified that could result in the inoperability of both control room air conditioning units. Following certain accident conditions, CCW temperature could rise causing compressor rupture disc failure and a release of freon.

7

There were no safety system failures in the 1st quarter of 1995.

 Data Source:
 Nuclear Regulatory Commission

 Accountability:
 Chase

 Trend:
 Positive



HIGH PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM SAFETY SYSTEM PERFORMANCE

This indicator shows the High Pressure Safety Injection System unavailability value, as defined by INPO in the Safety System Performance Indicator Definitions, for the reporting month.

The High Pressure Safety System unavailability value for the month of **August 1995** was **0.0**. There was **0** hours of planned unavailability, and **0** hours of unplanned unavailability, during the month. The 1995 year-to-date HPSI unavavailability value was **0.0002** at the end of the month. The unavailability value for the last 12 months was **0.0002**.

There has been a total of **2.83** hours of planned unavailability and **0.0** hours of unplanned unavailability for the high pressure safety injection system in 1995.

The 1995 Fort Calhoun year-end goal fc. this indicator is a maximum value of 0.004. The 1995 INPO industry goal is 0.02 and the industry upper ten percentile value (for the three-year period from 1/92 through 12/94) is approximately 0.001.

| Data Source: | Jaworski/Schaffer |
|-----------------|-------------------|
| Accountability: | Jaworski/Schaffer |
| Trend: | Positive |



AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM SAFETY SYSTEM PERFORMANCE

This indicator shows the Auxiliary Feedwater System Unavailability value, as defined by INPO in the Safety System Performance Indicator Definitions, for the reporting month.

The Auxiliary Feedwater System Unavailability Value for **August 1995** was **0.0**. There was **0** hours of planned and **0** hours of unplanned unavailability during the month. The year-to-date unavailability value was **0.0034** and the value for the last 12 months was **0.003** at the end of the month.

There has been a total of 29.56 hours of planned unavailability and 12.92 hours of unplanned unavailability for the auxiliary feedwater system in 1995.

The 1995 Fort Calhoun year-end goal for this indicator is a maximum value of 0.01.

The 1995 INPO industry goal is 0.025 and the industry upper ten percentile value is approximately 0.002.

Data Source: Jaworski/Nay Accountability: Jaworski/Nay Trend: None



EMERGENCY AC POWER SYSTEM SAFETY SYSTEM PERFORMANCE

This indicator shows the Emergency AC Power System unavailability value, as defined by INPO in the Safety System Performance Indicator Definitions, for the reporting month.

The Emergency AC Power System unavailability value for **August 1995** was **0.143**. During the month, there were **6.8** hours of planned unavailability for testing, and **205.8** hours of unplanned unavailability due to inadvertent switch position. The Emergency AC Power System unavailability value year-to-date was **0.022** and the value for the last 12 months was **0.018** at the end of the month.

The switch on DG-1 was believed to have been mispositioned on August 16 and discovered 8 days later on August 24 for a total of over 200 hours of unavailable time.

There has been a total of **50.3** hours of planned unavailability and **205.8** hours of unplanned unavailability for the emergency AC power system in 1995.

The 1995 Fort Calhoun year-end goal for this indicator is a maximum value of 0.024.

The 1995 INPO industry goal is 0.025 and the industry upper ten percentile value is approximately 0.0035.

| Data Source: | Jaworski/Ronning |
|-----------------|--------------------------------------|
| Accountability: | Jaworski/Ronning |
| Trend: | Needs Increased Management Attention |
| 10 | |



EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR UNIT RELIABILITY

This bar graph shows three monthly indicators pertaining to the number of failures that were reported during the last 20, 50, and 100 emergency diesel generator demands at the Fort Calhoun Station. Also shown are trigger values which correspond to a high level of confidence that a unit's diesel generators have obtained a reliability of greater than or equal to 95% when the failure values are below the corresponding trigger values. The Fort Calhoun 1995 goal is to have fewer failures than these trigger values.

DG-1 was declared inoperable for over 200 hours on August 24th due to a mispositioned governor control switch.

The demands counted for this indicator include the respective number of starts and the respective number of load-runs for both Diesel Generators combined. The number of start demands includes all valid and inadvertent starts, including all start-only demands and all start demands that are followed by load-run demands, whether by automatic or manual initiation. Load-run demands must follow successful starts and meet at least one of the following criteria: a load-run that is a result of a real load signal, a load-run test expected to carry the plant's load and duration as stated in the test specifications, and a special test in which a diesel generator was expected to be operated for a minimum of one hour and to be loaded with at least 50% of design load (see exceptions and other demand criteria in the Definition Section of this report).

| Data Source: | Jaworski/Ronning (Manager/Source) |
|-----------------|--------------------------------------|
| Accountability: | Jaworski/Ronning |
| Trend: | Needs Increased Management Attention |



This indicator shows the number of failures experienced by each emergency diesel generator during the last 25 start demands and the last 25 load-run demands. A trigger value of 4 failures within the last 25 demands is also shown. This trigger value of 4 failures within 25 demands is the Fort Calhoun goal for 1995.

It must be emphasized that, in accordance with NUMARC criteria, certain actions will take place in the event that any one emergency diesel generator experiences 4 or more failures within the last 25 demands on the unit. These actions are described in the Definitions Section of this report. A System Engineering Instruction has been approved for the Fort Calhoun Station to institutionalize and formally approve/adopt the required NUMARC actions.

Diesel Generator DG-1 has experienced two failures during the last year. On December 8, 1994, DG-1 failed its monthly surveillance test because the inlet air damper would not open. On August 14, it was discovered that DG-1 was inoperable due to a mispositioned switch. Without this failure, it would have been more than 25 demands since the last failure of DG-1. The August 24 failure replaces the December 8 failure.

Diesel Generator DG-2 has not experienced **any** failures during the last 25 demands on the unit.

Special diesel testing during hot weather took place during July. This testing enabled the diesel high temperature operability limits to be raised.

| Data Source: | Jaworski/Ronning (Manager/Source) |
|-----------------|--------------------------------------|
| Accountability: | Jaworski/Ronning |
| Trend: | Needs Increased Management Attention |



EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR UNRELIABILITY

The purpose of this indicator is to monitor the likelihood that emergency AC power generators will respond to off-normal events or accidents. It also provides an indication of the effectiveness of maintenance, operation and test practices in controlling generator unreliability.

The year-to-date station EDG unreliability at the end of August 1995 was 0.038. The 1995 goal for this indicator is a maximum value of 0.05.

- For DG-1: There were 5 start demands for the reporting month with 1 failure. In addition, there was 1 load-run demand without a failure.
- For DG-2: There were 4 start demands for the reporting month without a failure. In addition, there was 1 load-run demand without a failure.

DG-1 was declared inoperable for over 200 hours on August 24th due to a mispositioned governor control switch.

Emergency diesel generator unreliability is calculated as follows:

value per DG = SU + LU - (SU x LU)

where SU = Start Unreliability = <u>number of unsuccessful starts</u> number of valid start demands

> LU = Load-run Unreliability = <u>number of unsuccessful load-runs</u> number of valid load-run demands

Station Value = average of DG-1 and DG-2 values

| Data Source: | Jaworski/Ronning (Manager/Source) |
|------------------|--------------------------------------|
| Accountability : | Jaworski/Ronning |
| Trend: | Needs Increased Management Attention |



FUEL RELIABILITY INDICATOR

The FUEL RELIABILITY INDICATOR (FRI) for August 1995 was 29.71 X 10⁻⁴ microcuries/gram. The purpose of the FRI is to monitor industry progress in achieving and maintaining a high level of fuel integrity. An effective fuel integrity and performance monitoring program provides a means to detect fuel failures and assess the fuel failure number, physical condition, exposure, mechanism, and location.

The August FRI value is based on data from August 2 through 23. The days selected are when the plant chemistry values were at equilibrium from steady-state full power operation.

Cycle 16 plant operation started on April 13 and attained 100% power was achieved on April 23. During the months of June and July the plant operated at 100% power. At the end of August, the plant tripped and was not part of the FRI evaluation after August 23.

The August FRI value of **29.71 X 10⁴** microcuries/gram indicated an increase from the July FRI value of 17.29 x 10⁴ microcuries/gram. No new fuel failures were observed during the month based on the equilibrium Xenon data. This increase in FRI is consistent with the increasing size of the existing rod defects, based on the evaluation of RCS chemistry isotopic ratios. The chemistry data was at equilibrium levels for the month, prior to the plant trip. A recent analysis performed by the fuel vendor indicates four to six failed rods at core average power. The analysis indicates failures in several different burnup levels. OPPD personnel estimate that 10 to 15 rods are failed based on the results from the Cycle 15 and 16 RCS chemistry data and the fuel inspection project.

The INPO July 1995 report, "WANO Performance Indicator Program Utility Data Coordinator Reference Notebook" (INPO No. 94-009, Rev. 1) states that the Industry 1995 Goal for fuel reliability is: "units should strive to operate with zero fuel defects". The 1995 Fort Calhoun Station FRI Performance Indicator goal is to maintain a monthly FRI below 5.0 x 10⁻⁴ microcuries/gram. A value larger than 5.0 x 10⁻⁴ microcuries/ gram indicates a high probability of reactor core operation with one or more fuel defects.

Data Source: Accountability: Trend: Hotthaus/Weber Chase/Spilker Needs Increased Management Attention



NUMBER OF CONTROL ROOM EQUIPMENT DEFICIENCIES

This indicator measures the timeliness of closing Control Room Deficiencies.

Target Completion Dates are established by the Emergent Work Committee. The goal is to close at least 80% of all CRD's within the Target Due Date.

There were **41** Control Room Deficiencies completed during **August 1995**, and **26** were completed within the target completion date.

A Scheduling Coordinator has been assigned to track performance on a weekly basis and identify problem areas. Revisions are being made to the scheduling process to allow for more timely completion of CRD's.

The 1995 Fort Calhoun goal for this indicator is a completion rate of 80%.

| Data Source: | Chase/Walling (Manager/Source) |
|-----------------|---|
| Accountability: | Chase/Faulhaber |
| Trend: | Needs Increased Management Attention - Performance Below Goal |



NUMBER OF ON-LINE AND OUTAGE CONTROL ROOM EQUIPMENT DEFICIENCIES

This indicator shows the total number of On-Line and Outage Control Room Deficiencies, and the number of overdue Control Room Deficiencies.

There were 28 on-line (14 were overdue) and 23 outage (2 were overdue) Control Room Deficiencies at the end of August 1995.

The 1995 Fort Calhoun goal for these indicators are less than 8 overdue on-line and no overdue outage Control Room Deficiencies.

| Data Source: | Chase/Walling (Manager/Source) |
|-----------------|--|
| Accountability: | Chase/Faulhaber/Clemens |
| Trend: | Needs Increased Management Attention - Number of On-Line CRD's |
| | <8 Overdue exceeds goal. |



COLLECTIVE RADIATION EXPOSURE

The 1995 Fort Calhoun goal for collective radiation exposure is less than 143.1 person-Rem.

> The exposure for August 1995 was 2.857 person-Rem (ALNOR). The year-to-date exposure through the end of August was 137.772 person-Rem (TLD).

The 1995 INPO industry goal for collective radiation exposure is 185 person-rem per year. The current industry best quartile is 145 person-rem per year. The yearly average for Fort Calhoun Station for the three years from 8/92 through 7/95 was 111.16 person-rem per year.

| Data Source: | Chase/Cartwright (Manager/Source) | |
|-----------------|--------------------------------------|--------|
| Accountability: | Chase/Lovett | |
| Trend: | Needs Increased Management Attention | SEP 54 |



MAXIMUM INDIVIDUAL RADIATION EXPOSURE

During August 1995, an individual accumulated 360 mRem, which was the highest individual exposure for the month. (This dose was received while adding oil to RC-3C.)

The maximum individual exposure for the year of 1,000 mRem was exceeded during March 1995 when an individual received 1,266 mRem (875 mRem of this was received during orifice plate repair in a steam generator). However, the OPPD 4500 MRem/yr limit is not expected to be exceeded.

The OPPD limit for the maximum yearly individual radiation exposure is 4,500 mRem/ year. The 1995 Fort Calhoun year-end goal is a maximum of 1,000 mRem.

| Data Source: | Chase/Cartwright (Manager/Source) |
|-----------------|-----------------------------------|
| Accountability: | Chase/Lovett |
| Trend: | None |



VIOLATION TREND

This indicator illustrates a 12-month trend for Fort Calhoun Station Cited Violations, Non-Cited Violations and Cited Violations for the Top Quartile plants in Region IV. Additionally, the Fort Calhoun Station cited and non-cited violations for the past 12 months will be illustrated monthly. The 12-month trend for the Region IV top quartile lags 2-3 months behind the Fort Calhoun Station trend. This lag is necessary to compile information on other Region IV plants.

The following inspections were completed during August 1995:

| IER No. | Title |
|---------|---|
| 95-11 | Engineering & Technical Support Team Inspection |
| 95-12 | Resident Monthly Inspection |

To date, OPPD has received five violations for inspections conducted in 1995.

| Level III Violations | 0 |
|----------------------|---|
| Level IV Violations | 3 |
| Level V Violations | 0 |
| Non-Cited Violations | 2 |
| Total | 5 |

The 1995 Fort Calhoun Station Goal for this performance indicator is to be at or below the cited violation trend for the top quartile plant in Region IV.

| Data Source: | Trausch/Cavanaugh (Manager/Source) |
|-----------------|------------------------------------|
| Accountability: | Trausch |
| Trend: | None |



SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

This indicator illustrates the number of NRC and INPO Significant Events for Fort Calhoun Station as reported by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data in the biannual "Performance Indicators for Operating Commercial Nuclear Power Reactors" report and INPO's Nuclear Network.

The following <u>NRC</u> significant events occurred between the 2nd quarter of 1992 and the 1st quarter of 1995:

3rd Quarter 1992: The failure of a Pressurizer Code safety valve to reseat initiated a LOCA with the potential to degrade the reactor coolant pressure boundary.

4th Quarter 1994: A potential accident scenario involving a large break loss of coolant accident or a main steam line break inside containment could result in the inoperability of both control room A.C. units.

4

The following <u>iNPO</u> significant events, as reported in Significant Event Reports (SERs), occurred between the 2nd guarter of 1992 and the 1st Quarter of 1995:

2nd Quarter 1992: Intake of Transuranics during Letdown Filter Change-out.

3rd Quarter 1992: 1) RC-142 LOCA; and 2) Premature Lift of RC-142.

1st Quarter 1993: Inoperability of Power Range Nuclear Instrumentation Safety Channel D.

2nd Quarter 1993: SBFU Breaker Relay (Switchyard) Plant Trip

4th Quarter 1993: Unexpected CEA Withdrawal.

1st Quarter 1994: Unplanned dilution of Boron concentration in the RCS.

 Data Source:
 Nuclear Regulatory Commission & INPO

 Accountability:
 Chase

 Trend:
 Positive

 20
 Positive



NUMBER OF MISSED SURVEILLANCE TESTS RESULTING IN LICENSEE EVENT REPORTS

This indicator shows the number of missed Surveillance Tests (STs) that result in Licensee Event Reports (LERs) during the reporting month. The graph on the left shows the yearly totals for the indicated years.

There were no missed surveillance tests resulting in LERs during August 1995.

On December 28, 1994, during the performance of OP-ST-SHIFT-0001, data was not entered for Steam Generator level per Surveillance Requirements.

The 1995 Fort Calhoun monthly goal for this indicator is 0.

| Data Source: | Monthly Operating Report & Plant Licensee | Event Reports (LERs) |
|-----------------|---|----------------------|
| Accountability: | Chase/Jaworski | |
| Trend : | Positive | SEP 60 & 61 |
PERFORMANCE

Goal: To strive for Excellence in Operations utilizing the highest standards of performance at Fort Calhoun Station that result in safe, reliable plant operation in power production.



STATION NET GENERATION

During the month of **August 1995**, a net total of **304,623.0 MWH** was generated by the Fort Calhoun Station. Cumulative net generation for Cycle 16 was **1,221,597.6 MWH** at the end of the month.

Energy losses for August 1995 were attributable to a plant trip during a test of a backup automatic shutdown system, which began on August 24th. The generator was brought back on-line at 3:43 p.m. on Saturday, August 26th, after a two-day outage.

Energy losses for May 1995 were attributable to: (1) the component cooling water, which was leaking into the lube oil system of RC-3D reactor coolant pump motor; and (2) the generator and reactor were again manually tripped because of a similar leak. The generator was put on-line after replacement of all of the reactor coolant pump lube oil cooler heat exchangers.

Data Source: Station Generation Report Accountability: Chase Trend: None



FORCED OUTAGE RATE

The forced outage rate (FOR) was reported as 3.5% for the twelve months from September 1, 1994, through August 31, 1995. The 1995 year-to-date FOR was 5.8% at the end of the month.

Energy losses for August 1995 were attributable to a plant trip during a test of a backup automatic shutdown system, which began on August 24th. The generator was brought back on-line at 3:43 p.m. on Saturday, August 26th, after a two-day outage.

Energy losses for May 1995 were attributable to two separate shutdowns to repair component cooling water leaks in the lube oil system of RC-3D reactor coolant pump motor oil leaks. The generator was put on-line after replacement of all four of the reactor coolant pump lube oil cooler heat exchangers.

The 1995 Fort Calhoun year-end goal for this indicator is a maximum value of 2.4%.

| Date Source: | Monthly Operating Report |
|-----------------|--------------------------------------|
| Accountability: | Chase |
| Trend: | Needs Increased Management Attention |



UNIT CAPACITY FACTOR

This indicator shows the plant monthly Unit Capacity Factor, the Unit Capacity Factor for the current fuel cycle, year to date and the 36-month average Unit Capacity Factor.

At the end of the month, the Cycle 16 Unit Capacity factor was **78.33%**, and the Unit Capacity Factor for the last 36 months was **81.20%**. The 1995 Fort Calhoun annual goal for this indicator is 79.65%. The Fort Calhoun 3-year average capacity factor goal for 1995 is 84.05%.

Energy losses for May and August 1995 are discussed on the previous page.

The Unit Capacity Factor is computed as follows:

Net Electrical Energy Generated (MWH)

Maximum Dependable Capacity (Mwe) X Gross Hours in the Reporting Period

Data Source: Accountability: Trend: Monthly Operating Report Chase None



EQUIVALENT AVAILABILITY FACTOR

This indicator shows the plant monthly Equivalent Availability Factor (EAF), the year-todate average monthly EAF, and the year-end average monthly EAF for the previous three years.

The EAF for August 1995 was reported as 83.73%. The year-to-date monthly average EAF was 77.9% at the end of the month.

Energy losses for May and August 1995 are explained on page 24.

The Fort Calhoun average monthly EAF for the three years prior to this report was 87.8%. The industry median EAF value for the three-year period from 7/90 through 6/93 was 76.7%.

| Data Source: | Dietz/Kulisek (Manager/Source) |
|-----------------|--------------------------------|
| Accountability: | Chase |
| Trend: | None |



This indicator shows the plant monthly Unit Capability Factor (UCF) value, the year-todate UCFs, the 36-month average UCFs, and the UCF goals. UCF is defined as the ratio of the available energy generation over a given period of time to the reference energy generation (the energy that could be produced if the unit were operated continuously at full power under reference ambient conditions) over the same time period, expressed as a percentage (refueling periods excluded).

The UCF for August 1995 was reported as 87.7%. The year-to-date UCF was 65.5%, the UCF for the last 12 months was 76.8%, and the 36-month average UCF was reported as 85.3% at the end of the month.

Energy losses for May and August 1995 are explained on page 24.

The 1995 INPO industry goal is 80% and the industry current best quartile value (for the three-year period ending 12/94) is approximately 85%. The 1995 Fort Calhoun annual goal for this indicator is a minimum of 81.64%. The 3-year average capability factor goal for 1995 is 85.5%.

Data Source:Generation Totals Report & Monthly Operating ReportAccountability:ChaseTrend:Needs Increased Management Attention



UNPLANNED CAPABILITY LOSS FACTOR

This indicator shows the plant monthly Unplanned Capability Loss Factor (UCLF), the year-to-date UCLF and the goal. UCLF is defined as the ratio of the unplanned energy losses during a given period of time, to the reference energy generation (the energy that could be produced if the unit were operated continuously at full power under reference ambient conditions), expressed as a percentage.

The UCLF for the month of August 1995 was reported as 12.3%. Unplanned energy loss is defined as the energy that was not produced during the period of unscheduled shutdowns, outage extensions, or load reductions due to causes under plant management control. Energy losses are considered to be unplanned if they are not scheduled at least four weeks in advance. The year-to-date UCLF was 14.66%, the UCLF for the last 12 months was 9.76%, and the 36-month average UCLF was reported as 4.99% at the end of the month.

Energy losses for May and August 1995 are explained on page 24.

The 1995 INPO industry goal is 4.5% and the industry current best quartile value is approximately 3.2% or lower. The 1995 Fort Calhoun year-end goal for this indicator is a maximum value of 3.97%.

| Data Source: | Generation Totals Report & Monthly Operating Report |
|-----------------|---|
| Accountability: | Chase |
| Trend: | Needs Increased Management Attention |
| 28 | |



UNPLANNED AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAMS PER 7,000 HOURS CRITICAL

The upper graph shows the number of unplanned automatic reactor scrams per 7,000 hours critical (as defined in INPO's 12/93 publication "Detailed Descriptions of International Nuclear Power Plant Performance Indicators and Other Indicators") for Fort Calhoun Station. The lower graph shows the number of unplanned automatic reactor scrams that occurred during each month for the last twelve months.

The year-to-date station value was 0.0 at the end of August 1995. The value for the 12 months from September 1, 1994, through August 31, 1995, was 0.0. The value for the last 36 months was .94.

The 1995 Fort Calhoun goal for this indicator is 0. The 1995 INPO industry goal is a maximum of one unplanned automatic reactor scram per 7,000 hours critical. The industry upper ten percentile value is approximately 0.48 scrams per 7,000 hours critical.

| Data Source: | Monthly Operations Report & Plant Licensee Event Reports (LERs) |
|-----------------|---|
| Accountability: | Chase |
| Trend: | Positive |



UNPLANNED SAFETY SYSTEM ACTUATIONS - (INPO DEFINITION)

There were no INPO unplanned safety system actuations during the month of August 1995.

There was one INPO unplanned safety system actuation during the month of February 1994. It occurred on February 11, 1994, when supervisory relay 86B/CPHSS failed, which resulted in tripping relay 86B/CPHS. The CPHS relay trip actuated the Safety Injection Actuation Signal, Containment Isolation Actuation Signal, Ventilation Isolation Actuation Signal and Steam Generator Isolation Signal. The Steam Generator Isolation Signal automatically closed both main stam isolation valves, which resulted in a concurrent turbine and reactor trip.

An INPO unplanned safety sytem actuation also occurred during the month of July 1992 due to the loss of an inverter and the subsequent reactor trip on 7/3/92.

The 1995 Fort Calhoun goal for this indicator is 0.

Data Source: Accountability: Trend: Monthly Operations Report & Plant Licensee Event Reports Jaworski/Foley/Ronning Positive



UNPLANNED SAFETY SYSTEM ACTUATIONS - (NRC DEFINITION)

This indicator shows the number of unplanned safety system actuations (SSAs), which includes the High and Low Pressure Safety Injection Systems, the Safety Injection Tanks, and the Emergency Diesel Generators. The NRC classification of SSAs includes actuations when major equipment is operated and when the logic systems for these safety systems are challenged.

An unplanned safety system actuation occurred in December 1993 when the main turbine and reactor tripped during Electro-Hydraulic Control pump start testing. Also, there was an unplanned Safety system actuation during the month of February 1994 when supervisory relay 86B/CPHSS failed, which resulted in a concurrent turbine and reactor trip.

There has been no unplanned safety system actuations in the last 12 months. The 1995 Fort Calhoun goal for this indicator is 0.

Data Source: Accountability: Trend: Monthly Operations Report & Plant Licensee Event Reports (LERs) Jaworski/Foley/Ronning Positive





This indicator shows the Gross Heat Rate (GHR) for the reporting month, the year-to-date GHR, the goals and the year-end GHR for the previous three years.

The gross heat rate for Fort Calhoun Station was **10,538** for the month of **August 1995**. The 1995 year-to-date GHR was **10,273** at the end of the month.

*The GHR varies with fluctuations in river water temperature. In general, the GHR improves during the winter months and degrades during the summer. This is because the gross heat rate is not normalized to the design river water temperature of 60 degrees Fahrenheit.

The 1995 Fort Calhoun year-end goal for this indicator is ≤10,157.

| Data Source: | Holthaus/Willett (Manager/Source) |
|-----------------|-----------------------------------|
| Accountability: | Chase/Jaworski |
| Trend: | None* |



THERMAL PERFORMANCE

This indicator shows the Thermal Performance Value for the reporting month, the year-todate average monthly thermal performance value, the Fort Calhoun goals, the 1995 INPO industry goal and the approximate upper ten percentile value.

The thermal performance value for August 1995 was 99.18. The year-to-date average monthly thermal performance value was 99.4, at the end of the month. The average monthly value for the 12 months from September 1, 1994, through August 31, 1995, was 99.3%.

The 1995 Fort Calhoun year-end goal for this indicator is a minimum of 99.6%. The 1994 Fort Calhoun goal was a minimum of 99.5%. The 1995 INPO industry goal is 99.5% and the industry upper 10 percentile value is approximately 99.9%.

The reason for not making the goal is explained in the Action Plan on pages 73 and 74.

| Data Source: | Jaworski/Shubert |
|-----------------|------------------|
| Accountability: | Jaworski/Gorence |
| Trend: | Adverse |



DAILY THERMAL OUTPUT

The thermal output graph displays the daily operating power level during August 1995, the 1500 thermal megawatt average technical specification limit, and the 1495 thermal megawatt Fort Calhoun goal.

Energy losses for August 1995 were attributable to a plant trip during a test of a backup automatic shutdown system, which began on August 24th. The generator was brought back on-line at 3:43 p.m. on Saturday, August 26th, after a two-day outage.

| Data Source: | Holthaus/Willett (Manager/Source) |
|-----------------|-----------------------------------|
| Accountability: | Chase/Tills |
| Trend: | None |



EQUIPMENT FORCED OUTAGES PER 1,000 CRITICAL HOURS

The equipment forced outage rate per 1,000 critical hours for the 12 months from **September 1, 1994,** through **August 31, 1995**, was **0.41**. The year-to-date rate per 1,000 critical hours for the months from **January** through **August 1995** was **0.69**.

An equipment forced outage also occurred on February 20, 1995, when the plant experienced a problem with a control element assembly motor drive and a related small leak of reactor coolant.

Two equipment forced outages also occurred during May 1995, which were attributable to the component cooling water, which was leaking into the lube oil system of RC-3D reactor coolant pump motor.

The 1995 Fort Calhoun year-end goal for this indicator is a maximum value of 0.20.

| Data Source: | Monthly Operations Report & Plant Licensee Event Reports (LERs) |
|----------------|---|
| Accontability: | Chase/Jaworski |
| Trend: | Needs Increased Management Attention |



COMPONENT FAILURE ANALYSIS REPORT (CFAR) SUMMARY

The top chart illustrates the number of component categories, application categories and total categories in which the Fort Calhoun Station has significantly higher (1.645 standard deviations) failure rates than the industry failure rates during the past 18-month Component Failure Analysis Report (CFAR) reporting period (from **November 1993** through **April 1995**). Fort Calhoun Station reported a higher failure rate in **5** of the 87 component categories (valves, pumps, motors, etc.) during the past 18-month CFAR period. The station reported a higher failure rate in **6** of the 173 application categories (main steam stop valves, auxiliary/emergency feedwater pumps, control element drive motors, etc.) during the past 18-month CFAR period.

The pie chart depicts the breakdown by INPO cause categories (see the "Definitions" section of this report for descriptions of these categories) for the **63** failure reports with known failure causes that were submitted to INPO by Fort Calhoun Station during the past 18-month CFAR period. The pie chart reflects known failure causes. A total of **88** failure reports were submitted to INPO during the past 18-month CFAR period.

| Data Source: | Jaworski/Frank (Manager/Source) |
|-----------------|---------------------------------|
| Accountability: | Jaworski/Dowdy |
| Trend: | None |
| 36 | |



REPEAT FAILURES

The Repeat Failures Indicator (formerly called the "Maintenance Effectiveness Performance Indicator) was developed in response to guidelines set forth by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data (NRC/AEOD). The NRC requirement for a Maintenance Effectiveness Performance Indicator has been dropped, but station management considers it useful to continue to track repetitive component failures using the Nuclear Plant Reliability Data System (NPRDS).

This indicator shows the number of NPRDS components with more than one failure during the 18-month Component Failure Analysis Report (CFAR) period and the number of NPRDS components with more than two failures during the 18-month CFAR period.

During the last 18-month CFAR period, there were 3 NPRDS components with more than one failure. None of these 3 had more than two failures. The tag numbers of the components with more than one failure are: Raw Water Pump AC-1B Reactor Protection System Channel 'A' Axial Power Distribution Trip Calculator Multiplier/Divider Module AI-31A-AW15-B4, 5 and Component Cooling water Heat Exchanger 'B' Raw Water Outlet Valve Operator HCV-2881B-0. Recommendations and actions to correct these repeat failures are listed in the biannual CFAR.

| Data Source: | Jaworski/Frank (Manager/Source) |
|-----------------|---------------------------------|
| Accountability: | Chase |
| Trend | None |



This indicator shows the volume of the monthly radioactive waste buried, the cumulative year-to-date radioactive waste buried, the Fort Calhoun and INPO goals, and the approximately industry upper 10%.

| | CU.Ft. |
|---|--------|
| Amount of solid radwaste shipped off-site for processing during current month | 0 |
| Volume of solid radwaste buried during current month | 152.4 |
| Cumulative volume of solid radioactive waste buried in 1995 | 152.4 |
| Amount of solid radwaste in temporary storage | 0 |

The 1995 Fort Calhoun goal for the volume of solid radioactive waste (buried) is 900 cubic feet. The 1995 INPO industry goal is 110 cubic meters (3,884 cubic feet) per year. The industry upper ten percentile value is approximately 27.33 cubic meters (965.3 cubic feet) per year.

| Data Source: | Chase/Breuer (Manager/Source) |
|-----------------|-------------------------------|
| Accountability: | Chase/Lovett |
| Trend: | None |





The Primary System Chemistry Percent of Hours Out of Limit indicator tracks the primary system chemistry performance by monitoring 6 key chemistry parameters. The key parameters are: lithium, dissolved oxygen, chlorides, flouride, hydrogen and syspended solids. 100% equates to all 6 parameters being out of limit for the month.

The Primary System Chemistry Percent of Hours Out of Specification was **1.09%** for the month of **August 1995**. Hydrogen and Lithium were out of specification during the plant trip and recover of 8/24/95.

The 1995 Fort Calhoun monthly goal for this indicator is a maximum of 2% hours our of limit.

| Data Source: | Smith/Spires (Manager/Source) |
|-----------------|---|
| Accountability: | Chase/Smith |
| Trend: | Positive due to performance better than goal. |



SECONDARY SYSTEM CHEMISTRY

Criteria for calculating the Secondary System Chemistry Performance Index (CPI) are: 1) the plant is at greater than 30% power; and 2) the power is changing at less than 5% per day.

The CPI for August 1995 was 1.30. The 12-month average CPI value was 1.23 at the end of the month. The CPI fell below the goal because of a reduction in the Steam Generator sulfate concentration as well as a decrease in the Condensate Pump Discharge dissolved oxygen concentration.

The Chemistry Performance Index (CPI) was above the goal in July due to slightly higher than average sodium and chloride values. Also the values provided as industry averages by INPO for 1995 are considerably lower than FCS historically has been able to achieve for secondary chemistry values. Iron, the one industry average that we are below, almosty by half, does not assist in lowering the CPI because of the way the CPI is calculated.

| Data Source: | Smith/Spires (Manager/Source) |
|-----------------|--|
| Accountability: | Chase/Smith |
| Trend : | Positive due to performance better than goal |

COST

Goal: Operate Fort Calhoun Station in a manner that cost effectively maintains nuclear generation as an economically viable contribution to OPPD's bottom line. Cost consciousness is exhibited at all levels of the organization.



CENTS PER KILOWATT HOUR

The purpose of this indicator is to quantify the economical operation of Fort Calhoun Station.

The cents per kilowatt hour indicator represents the budget and actual cents per kilowatt hour on a 12-month rolling average for the current year. The basis for the budget curve is the approved 1994 and 1995 revised budgets. The basis for the actual curve is the Financial and Operating Report.

The December 31 amounts are also shown for the prior years 1991 through 1994. In addition, the report shows the plan amounts for the years 1996 through 1999 for reference. The basis for the dollars are the Nuclear Long Range Financial Plan and the 1995 Corporate Planning and Budget Review. The basis for the generation is provided by Nuclear Fuels.

The 12-month average unit price (**3.10** cents per kilowatt hour for **August 1995**) averaged slightly above than budget due to 12-month generation not meeting the budget expectations. The Unit Price for the current month (September 1995) is not available at this time.

Data Source:Scofield/Jamieson (Manager/Source)Accountability:ScofieldTrend:None4242



STAFFING LEVEL

The actual staffing levels for the three Nuclear Divisions are shown on the graph above.

The authorized staffing levels for 1995 and 1996 are:

| Authorized Staffing | | |
|---------------------|------|--|
| 1995 | 1996 | |
| 440 | 432 | Nuclear Operations Division |
| 181 | 175 | Production Engineering Division |
| 114 | 113 | Nuclear Services Division |
| 735 | 720 | Total |

Data Source: Accountability: Trend: Ponec/Kobunski Ponec None



Spare Parts Inventory Value

The spare parts inventory value at the Fort Calhoun Station at the end of August 1995 was reported as \$15,965,520.

| Data Source: | Steele/Huliska (Manager/Source) |
|-----------------|---------------------------------|
| Accountability: | Willrett/McCormick |
| Trend: | None |

DIVISION AND DEPARTMENT PERFORMANCE INDICATORS

Goal: Achieve high standards at Fort Calhoun Station resulting in safe, reliable and cost effective power production.



MAINTENANCE WORKLOAD BACKLOGS

This indicator shows the backlog of non-outage Maintenance Work Orders remaining open at the end of the reporting month. It also includes a breakdown by maintenance classification and priority. The 1995 goal for this indicator is 400 non-outage corrective maintenance MWOs. To ensure that the MWO backlog is worked in a timely manner, non-outage maintenance completion goals have been established as follows:

| D | E | OUAI | |
|------------|-----------------------------------|----------|--|
| Priority 1 | Emergency | N/A | |
| Priority 2 | Immediate Action | 2 days | |
| Priority 3 | Operations Concern | 14 days | |
| Priority 4 | Essential Corrective | 90 days | |
| Priority 5 | Non-Essential Corrective | 180 days | |
| Priority 6 | Non-Corrective/Plant Improvements | N/A | |

Improvements in the maintenance planning and scheduling process will allow more timely responses to maintenance work requests.

This indicator is considered an adverse trend. An action plan has been established to identify problem areas and reduce the backlog.

| Data Source: | Chase/Schmitz (Manager/Source) |
|-----------------|--------------------------------|
| Accountability: | Chase/Faulhaber |
| Trend: | Adverse |
| Trend: | Adverse |

Cool



PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE TEMS OVERDUE

The top graph shows the ratio of completed non-outage preventive maintenance to total completed non-outage maintenance. The ratio was **58.4%** for the month of **August 1995**.

The lower graph shows the percentage of scheduled preventive maintenance items that are overdue. During August 1995, 554 PM items were completed. All of these PM items was completed within the allowable grace period or were administratively closed.

The 1995 Fort Calhoun monthly goal for the percentage of preventive maintenance items overdue is a maximum of 0.5%.

| Data Source: | Chase/Schmitz/Melstad (Manager/Sources) |
|-----------------|---|
| Accountability: | Chase/Faulhaber |
| Trend: | None |

SEP 41 & 44



PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL MWOS COMPLETED PER MONTH IDENTIFIED AS REWORK

This graph indicates the percentage of total MWOs completed per month identified as rework. Rework activities are identified by maintenance planning and craft.

This indicator is calculated from the 15th to the 15th of each month due to delay in closin, open MWO's at the end of each month.

The Fort Calhoun monthly goal for this indicator is <3%. A detailed review will be conducted of revork items for August to identify generic concerns.

| Data Source: | Faulhaber/Schmitz (Manager/Source) |
|-----------------|------------------------------------|
| Accountability: | Chase/Faulhaber |
| Trend: | None |

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MAINTENANCE OVERTIME

The Maintenance Overtime Indicator monitors the ability to perform the desired maintenance activities with the allotted resources.

The percent of overtime hours with respect to normal hours was reported as **7.0%** for the month of **August 1995**. The 12-month average percentage of overtime hours with respect to normal hours was reported as **12.6%** at the end of the month.

The 1995 Fort Calhoun monthly "on-line" goal for this indicator is a maximum value of 10%.

Data Source:Chase/Schmitz (Manager/Source)Accountability:Chase/FaulhaberTrend:None



PROCEDURAL NONCOMPLIANCE INCIDENTS (MAINTENANCE)

This indicator shows the number of human performance IRs related to procedural noncompliance incidents assigned to the Maintenance Department.

There were 15 human performance related IRs assigned to the maintenance functional area in August 1995.

Data Source: Faulhaber Accountability: Chase/Faulhaber Trend: None

SEP 15, 41 & 44



DAILY SCHEDULE PERFORMANCE PERCENT OF SCHEDULED ACTIVITIES COMPLETED

This indicator shows the percent of Integrated Plant Schedule activities completed on schedule. All work groups and activities are included. Measurement of daily performance was initiated in June.

The Plant Manager has established schedule performance as a high priority. Daily schedule performance is discussed at the 7:15 A.M. and 12:30 P.M. plant meetings. Weekly critique meetings are being held to address problem areas.

The 1995 Fort Calhoun monthly goal for completed scheduled maintenance activities is 85%.

| Data Source: | Chase/Schmitz (Manager/Source) |
|-----------------|--------------------------------|
| Accountability: | Chase/Faulhaber |
| Trend: | None |



IN-LINE CHEMISTRY INSTRUMENTS OUT-OF-SERVICE

This indicator shows the percentage of hours the in-line chemistry system instruments are inoperable for the reporting month. The chemistry systems involved in this indicator include the Secondary System and the Post Accident Sampling System (PASS).

At the end of August 1995, the percentage of hours the in-line chemistry system instruments were inoperable was 12.08%. The following instruments were out of service during the month:

- CE-1578 A Mixed Bed Effluent Conductivity
- · CE-1582A B Cation Bed Conductivity
- CE-1535 Primary Water Storage Tank Deaerated Water Dissolved Oxygen
- CE-1547B Primary Water Storage Tank Deaerated Water Specific Conductivity

The in-line instrument indicator is above the goal because of four Martek instruments that are out of service long term. Also, 6 instrument loops at Al-126 were out of service the first 10 days of the month due to an annunciator manfunction.

The entire instrument channel is considered inoperative if: 1) the instrument is inoperative, 2) the chart recorder associated with the instrument is inoperative, or 3) the alarm function associated with the instrument is inoperative. If any of the functions listed above are not operational, then the instrument is not performing its intended function.

The 1995 Fort Calhoun monthly goal for this indicator is a maximum of 10% in-line chemistry instruments inoperable. 5 out-of-service chemistry instruments make up 10% of all the chemistry instruments that are counted for this indicator.

*The out-of-service instruments have been consistently between 4 and 8%. As was stated above, this month's performance was higher than the goal due primarily to a single failure on AI-125, causing a substantial number of out-of-service instruments. Given the previous month's indicators, it was concluded that the trend was none though, by definition, need's increased management attention.

| Data Source: | Chase/Reneaud (Manager/Source) |
|-----------------|--------------------------------|
| Accountability: | Chase/Jaworski |
| Trend: | None* |
| | |



HAZARDOUS WASTE PRODUCED

This indicator shows the total amount of hazardous waste produced by the Fort Calhoun Station each month, the monthly average goal and the monthly average total for hazardous wast produced during the last 12 months. This hazardous waste consists of non-halogenated hazardous waste, halogenated hazardous waste, and other hazardous waste produced.

During the month of **August 1995**, **0.0** kilograms of non-halogenated, **0.0** kilograms of halogenated and **0.0** kilograms of other hazardous waste was produced. The total hazardous waste produced during the last 12 months is **654.1** kilograms.

Hazardous waste is counted based upon a full drum of waste.

The 1995 Fort Calhoun monthly average goal for hazardous waste produced is a maximum of 150 kilograms.

Data Source:Chase/Carlson (Manager/Source)Accountability:Chase/SmithTrend:Positive



CONTAMINATED RADIATION CONTROLLED AREA

This indicator shows the percentage of the RCA that is contaminated based on the total square footage. The 1995 monthly non-outage goal is a maximum of 9.5% contaminated RCA.

At the end of August 1995, the percentage of the total square footage of the RCA that was contaminated was 9.4%.

Data Source: Chase/Gundal (Manager/Source) Accountability: Chase/Lovett Trend: Positive

SEP 54



RADIOLOGICAL WORK PRACTICES PROGRAM

The Radiological Work Practices Program Indicator shows the number of Poor Radiological Work Practices (PRWPs) which were identified during the reporting month.

The number of PRWPs which are identified each month should indirectly provide a means to qualitatively assess supervisor accountability for their workers' radiological performance.

During the month of August 1995, there were 0 PRWPs identified.

There have have 14 PRWPs in 1995.

The 1995 year-end goal for PRWPs is a maximum of 20.

| Data Source: | Chase/Cartwright | (Manager/Source) |
|-----------------|------------------|------------------|
| Accountability: | Chase/Lovett | |
| Trend: | None | |



This indicator shows the number of completed, scheduled, and overdue (greater than 6 months past the scheduled due date) biennial reviews for the reporting month. These document reviews are performed in-house and include Special Procedures, the Site Security Plan, Maintenance Procedures, Preventive Maintenance Procedures, and the Operating Manual.

During August 1995, there were 123 document reviews scheduled, while 91 reviews were completed. At the end of the month, there were 2 document reviews more than 6 months overdue. There were 4 new documents initiated during August.

Data Source: Chase/Plath Accountability: Chase/Jaworski Trend: None



LOGGABLE/REPORTABLE INCIDENTS (SECURITY)

This graph shows the Loggable/Reportable Incidents (Security) Indicator and depicts (1) the total number of ioggable/reportable incidents concerning system failures which occurred during the reporting month, and (2) the total number of loggable/reportable incidents non-system failures concerning Security Badges, Access Control and Authorization, Security Force Error, and Unsecured Doors.

During the month of August 1995, there were 21 loggable/reportable incidents identified compared to 21 for the previous month. System failures accounted for 17 (81%) of the loggable/reportable incidents. Repairs on the security system computer are scheduled in September 1995. There were four (4) security force errors during the reporting month, all of which are currently being addressed by security management.

| Data Source: | Sefick/Woerner (Manager/Source) |
|-----------------|---------------------------------|
| Accountability: | Sefick |
| Trend: | None |


TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS

This indicator provides information on the number of temporary modifications greater than one fuel cycle old requiring a refueling outage (RFO) for removal and the number of temporary modifications removable on-line that are greater than six months old. The 1995 Fort Calhoun monthly goals for this indicator are zero. However, **one** temporary modification (BAST level indication) has been approved by management to exceed these goals due to cost effectiveness considerations (reference PED-STE-94-042).

There is currently **1** temporary modification that is greater than one-fuel cycle old requiring a refueling outage to remove: RC-3D cover gasket pressure indicator, which is awaiting completion of MWO 941450, which is scheduled for a future refueling outage whenever cover gaskets are replaced. In addition, at the end of **August 1995**, there were **5** temporary modifications installed that were greater than six months old that can be removed on-line. These were: 1) Local indication for BAST CH-11A and CH-11B, in which Licensing sent FLC 94-001 to the NRC 6/27/95 for approval; 2) Control system for intensifier on HCV-2987, which is awaiting completion of ECN 94-280, scheduled for completion 9/95; 3) brace to IA header "T" to water plant, which is awaiting completion of ECN 94-482, scheduled for issue from DEN-Mechanical 9/15/95; 4) braces on main instrument air header, which is awaiting completion of ECN 94-482, scheduled for issue from DEN-Mechanical 9/15/95; and 5) mechanical seal and seal flush for DW-434, which is awaiting completion of ECN 95-096, scheduled for completion 9/95.

At the end of **August 1995**, there was a total of **19** TMs installed in the Fort Calhoun Station. **7** of the **19** installed TMs require an outage for removal and **12** are removable online. In 1995, a total of **28** temporary modifications have been installed.

| Data Source: | Jaworski/Turner (Manager/Source) |
|-----------------|--------------------------------------|
| Accountability: | Jaworski/Gorence |
| Trend: | Needs Increased Management Attention |

SEP 62 & 71



OUTSTANDING MODIFICATIONS

This indicator shows the total number of outstanding modifications (excluding outstanding modifications which are proposed to be cancelled).

| | | | | | | | Reporting |
|---|-------|-------|---------|--------|------------|-------|-----------|
| Category | '93 | '94 | '95 | '96 | <u>'97</u> | '98 | Month |
| Form FC-1133 Backlog/In Progress | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Mod. Requests Being Reviewed | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 |
| Design Engr. Backlog/In Progress | 0 | 0 | 2 | 21 | 1 | 7 | 31 |
| Construction Backlog/In Progress | 5 | 3 | 18 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 29 |
| Design Engr. Update Backlog/In Progress | _1 | 4 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 13 |
| Totals | 6 | 7 | 31 | 24 | 1 | 7 | 76 |
| (Outage + OnLine) | (3+3) | (0+7) | (18+13) | (16+8) | (0+1) | (7+0) | (44+32) |

At the end of August 1995, 12 additional modification requests had been issued this year and 9 modification requests have been cancelled. The Nuclear Projects Review Committee (NPRC) had conducted 51 backlog modification request reviews this year. The Nuclear Projects Committee (NPC) had completed 4 backlog modification request reviews this year.

*A review of the reports used to determine the total number of outstanding modifications and their various stages of accomplishment was undertaken at the request of the Nuclear Planning Department. The results of the review determined that the reports were not providing complete/accurate data. The reports have been corrected. The revised totals beginning with the March 1995 data are reflected in the current graph.

The 1995 year-end Fort Calhoun goal for this indicator is a maximum of 63 outstanding modifications.

| Data Source: | Skiles/Ronne (Manager/Source) |
|-----------------|--------------------------------------|
| | Scofield/Lounsberry (Manager/Source) |
| Accountability: | Scofield/Phelps |
| Trend: | None* |



ENGINEERING ASSISTANCE REQUEST BREAKDOWN

This indicator shows a breakdown of the number of EARs assigned to Design Engineering and System Engineering. The 1995 year-end goal for this indicator is a maximum of 140 outstanding EARs.

Total EAR breakdown is as follows:

| EARs opened during the month | 15 |
|---|-----|
| EARs closed during the month | 61 |
| Total EARs open at the end of the month | 122 |

| Data Source: | Skiles/Parsons | (Manager/Source) | |
|-----------------|-----------------|------------------|--|
| Accountability: | Jaworski/Skiles | | |
| Trend: | None | | |
| 60 | | | |



Data Source: Accountability: Trend: Skiles/Parsons (Manager/Source) Skiles/Jaworski None

SEP 62



ENGINEERING CHANGE NOTICES OPEN

Data Source: Accountability: Trend:

Skiles/Parsons (Manager Source) Skiles/Jaworski None



LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) ROOT CAUSE BREAKDOWN

This indicator shows the LERs by event date broken down by Root Cause Code for each of the past twelve months from **August 1, 1994**, through **July 31, 1995**. To be consistent with the Preventable/Personnel Error LERs indicator, this indicator is reported by the LER event date, as opposed to the LER report date.

The cause codes are intended to identify possible programmatic deficiencies. For detailed descriptions of these codes, see the "Performance Indicator Definitions" section of this report.

There were no events in July 1995 that resulted in an LER.

Data Source: Trausch/Cavanaugh (Manager/Source) Accountability: Chase Trend: None



^{*}Note 1: The Simulator was out-of-service during Cycle 94-4. **Note 2: Includes 8 hours of General Employee Training.

LICENSED OPERATOR REQUALIFICATION TRAINING

This indicator provides information on the total number of hours of training given to each created during each cycle. The simulator training hours shown on the graph are a subset of the total training hours. Non-Requalification Training Hours are used for APO/EOP verification & validation, INPO commitments, GET, Fire Brigade, Safety Meetings, and Division Manager lunches.

Exam failures are defined as failures in the written, simulator, and Job Performance Measures (JPMs) segments of the Licensed Operator Requalification Training.

Due to the fact that Rotation 95-5 Requalification Training was not completed during August, no new statistics are being provided.

Data Source: Accountability: Trend: Gasper/Guliani (Manager/Source) Gasper/Guliani None

SEP 68



LICENSE CANDIDATE EXAMS

This indicator shows the number of Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) and Reactor Operator (R0) quizzes and exams taken and passed each month. These internally administered quizzes and exams are used to plot the SRO and RO candidates' monthly progress.

For the month of August 1995, there were no RO or SRO exams given. The Hot License class is currently in Simulator training.

Data Source:Gasper/Guliani (Manager/Source)Accountability:Gasper/GulianiTrend:None

SEP 68



OPEN INCIDENT REPORTS

This indicator shows the total number of Open IRs, IRs greater than 6 months old, and the number of open significant IRs.

Also, at the end of August 1995, there were 507 open IRs. 175 of these IRS were greater than 6 months old. There were 103 Open Significant IRs at the end of the month. These numbers have been restated to reflect the elimination of CARs from the system. As of April 21, 1995, CARS are no longer being issued. All future corrective actions will be documented on IRs.

1

| Data Source: | Conner/Plott (Manager/Source) |
|-----------------|-------------------------------|
| Accountability: | Andrews/Phelps/Patterson |
| Trend : | None |

Data for the 1996 Refueling Outage is not available.

MWO PLANNING STATUS (CYCLE 17 REFUELING OUTAGE)

This indicator shows the total number of Maintenance Work Requests (MWRs) and Maintenance Work Orders (MWOs) that have been approved for inclusion in the Cycle 16 Refueling Outage. This graph indicates:

- Parts Holds (Part hold removed when parts are staged and ready to use)
- Engineering Holds (Engineering hold removed when appropriate engineering paper work or support is received for the package)
- Planning Holds (Planning hold removed when planning is completed to the point when package is ready or other support is necessary to continue the planning process)
- Planning Complete (status given when only items keeping the job from being ready to work are parts or engineering support)
- Ready (status when all planning, supporting documentation, and parts are ready to go)

Data Source: Cl Accountability: Cl Trend: No

Chase/Schmitz Chase/Faulhaber None

SEP 31

1996 Outage Projects Status Report



This performance indicator shows the status of projects which are in the scope of Cycle 17 Refueling Outage. SSED's goal is to have all projects complete by August 23, 1996, 30 days prior to the Refueling Outage start date.

| Data Source: | Jaworski/Swearngin (Manager/Source) |
|-----------------|-------------------------------------|
| Accountability: | Jaworski/Boughter |
| Trend: | None |

SEP 31

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PROGRESS OF CYCLE 17 OUTAGE (1996 MODIFICATION PLANNING) (FROZEN SCOPE OF 9 OUTAGE MODIFICATIONS)

This indicator shows the status of Modifications approved for installation during the Cycle 17 Refueling Outage. Modifications added to the outage list after May 1, 1995, are not part of this indicator. The data is represented with respect to the baseline schedule (established June 16, 1995) and the current schedule. This information is taken from the modification variation report produced by Design Engineering Nuclear.

The goal for this indicator is to have all modification packages identified prior to May 1, 1995 PRC approved by March 22, 1995. 4 Modifications added after May 1, 1995, not included.

August 1995 Modifications added: 1 Deleted = 3

FC89-019 transferred from 1995 on-line FC92-017, FC93-013, and FC92-029 cancelled

Data Source:Skiles/Ronne (Manager/Source)Accountability:Phelps/SkilesTrend:None

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PROGRESS OF 1995 ON-LINE MODIFICATION PLANNING (FROZEN SCOPE OF 9 MODIFICATIONS)

This indicator shows the status of modifications approved for on-line installation during 1995. The data is represented with respect to the baseline schedule (established 1/13/ 95) and the current schedule. This information is taken from the Modification Variation Report produced by the Design Engineering Nuclear group.

The goal for this indicator is to have all modification packages identified prior to 1/13/95 PRC approved by October 30, 1995.

August 1995 Modifcations Added: 0 Deleted = 1

Mod FC89-017 moved to '96 outage.

| Data Source: | Skiles/Ronne (Manager/Source) |
|-----------------|-------------------------------|
| Accountability: | Phelps/Skiles |
| Trend: | None |

SEP 31



PROGRESS OF 1996 ON-LINE MODIFICATION PLANNING (FROZEN SCOPE OF 6 MODIFICATIONS)

This indicator shows the status of modifications approved for on-line installation during 1996. Modifications added to the on-line list after May 1, 1995, are not part of this indicator. The data is represented with respect to the baseline schedule (established June 16, 1995) and the current schedule. This information is taken from the modification variation report produced by Design Engineering Nuclear.

The goal for this indicator is to have all modification packages identified prior to May 1, 1995 PRC approved by March 25, 1996. 2 Modifications added after May 1, 1995, not included.

August 1995 Modifications Added: 0 Deleted = 0

Mod FC89-017 moved to '96 outage.

Data Source:Skiles/Ronne (Manager/Source)Accountability:Phelps/SkilesTrend:None

SEP 31

ACTION PLANS

ACTION PLANS

This section lists action plans that have been developed for the performance indicators cited as Adverse Trends during the month preceding this report. Also included are Action Plans for indicators that have been cited in the preceding month's report as Needing Increased Management Attention for three (3) consecutive months.

In accordance with Revision 3 of NOD-QP-37, the following performance indicators would require action plans based on three (3) consecutive months of performance cited as "Needing Increased Management Attention":

- Industrial Safety Accident Rate (page 2)
- Thermal Performance (page 33)
- Maintenance Workload Backlogs (page 46)

The action plan for Industrial Safety Accident Rate (page 2) is as follows:

REVERSING THE INDUSTRIAL SAFETY ADVERSE TREND

Even though the goal of zero lost-time accidents will not be met in 1995, the emphasis on safety and the reporting of potential safety hazards are still high priorities. The standards for safety will be raised by making the following items part of the station's daily operations:

- Promptly resolve safety problems.
- Promptly follow-up safety training to supervisors/crew leaders.
- Use the Near Miss forms to resolve potential safety concerns.

The action plan for Thermal Performance (page 33) is as follows:

Plant Heat Rate as measured by the INPO Performance Indicator has shown a decreasing performance trend. This is suspected to have resulted from degraded condenser performance with river water temperatures in excess of 65-70°F. This is based on decreases seen in total station electrical output, turbine first stage pressure, condenser inlet/output differential temperatures, and condenser vacuum compared to previous

Action plan for Thermal Performance (continued):

operating cycles. Another loss is suspected to be resultant from non-optimum operation of the condensate vacuum compared to previous operating cycles. Another loss is suspected to be resultant from non-optimum operation of the condensate cooler which controls cooling water to the generator hydrogen coolers, generator stator coolers, and generator field rectifier banks. Operation of this cooler with temperatures below optimum values rejects excessive amounts of thermal energy to the river and decreases overall plant efficiency.

GOALS:

- 1. Improve Plant Heat Rate as measured by the INPO Performance Indicator above the OPPD Goal of 99.6%.
- Improve Plant Heat Rate during periods when the river water temperature exceeds 65-70°F.
- Improve plant officiency to ensure maximum station electrical generation is achieved and maintained.

| | | | DUE | |
|----|--|----------------|----------|---|
| AC | TION(S) REQUIRED TO ACCOMPLISH GOALS | RESPONSIBILITY | DATE | COMMENTS |
| 1. | Review the calculations utilized to justify the power increase from 1420 MWT to 1500 MWT as it relates to secondary plant performance and the condenser evaluation completed during the 93/94 Power Uprate Study. | SYE | 10/30/95 | |
| 2 | Evaluate the temperature correction factor utilized to correct actual plant heat rate data to design conditions for INPO report- ing purposes. This mathematical correlation may not accurately reflect the plant derating experienced at elevated river water temperatures. | SYE | 10/30/95 | |
| 3. | R-view current operational procedures for condensate cooler operations. Implement changes required to ensure a minimum amount of heat is rejected to the river while providing sufficient protection for operating equipment. | SYE/OPS | 10/15/95 | |
| 4. | Continue to evaluate operating plant systems to determine components operating at less than optimum values of requiring maint. Set to ensure no impact on station efficiency. | SYE | Ongoing | Currently, SYE reviewing all plant parameters daily. |
| 5. | Continue to develop better tools to monitor plant performance, like development of better computer models to predict and quantify equipment performance impacts on station efficiency. | SYE | Ongoing | Currently, working toward another program that will provide computer analysis and troubleshooting assistance. |
| 6 | Complete EAR 95-077, Evaluation of Best Method of Measuring Circulating Water Flow. | DEN/SYE | 10/31/95 | Per EDITS on 9/14/95. |
| 7. | Implement corrective actions as outlined in EAR 95-077 using the ECN Process. | DEN/SYE/CM | Later | Date will be determined by NPRC after FCN is prepared |

ACTION PLANS (continued)

The action plan for Maintenance Workload Backlogs (page 46) is as follows:

- A detailed review is being conducted to determine which stage of the maintenance process has a higher than expected backlog. Areas being reviewed are:
 - Planning Scheduled Maintenance Bulk Work Package closeout

Corrective actions will be initiated based on the results of that review.

The action plan for Temporary Modifications (page 57) is as follows:

 The Temporary Modification program needs to have its program goals revised to reflect current NPRC scheduling practices. This will be completed by October 1, 1995.

AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM SAFETY SYSTEM PERFORMANCE

The sum of the known (planned and unplanned) unavailable hours and the estimated unavailable hours for the auxiliary feedwater system for the reporting period divided by the critical hours for the reporting period multiplied by the number of trains in the auxiliary feedwater system.

COLLECTIVE RADIATION EXPOSURE

Collective radiation exposure is the total external whole-body dose received by all on-site personnel (including contractors and visitors) during a time period, as measured by the thermoluminescent dosimeter (TLD). Collective radiation exposure is reported in units of person-rem. This indicator tracks radiological work performance for SEP #54.

COMPONENT FAILURE ANALYSIS REPORT (CFAR) SUMMARY

The summary of INPO categories for Fort Calhoun Station with significantly higher (1.645 standard deviations) failure rates than the rest of the industry for an eighteen-month time period. Failures are reported as component (i.e., pumps, motors, main steam stop valves, control element motors, etc.) categories.

Failure Cause Categories are:

Wear Out/Aging - a failure thought to be the consequence of expected wear or aging.

Manufacturing Defect - a failure attributable to inadequate assembly or initial quality of the responsible component or system.

Engineering/Design - a failure attributable to the inadequate design of the responsible component or system.

Other Devices - a failure attributable to a failure or misoperation of another component or system, including associated devices.

Maintenance/Testing - a failure that is a result of improper maintenance or testing, lack of maintenance, or personnel errors that occur during maintenance or testing activities performed on the responsible component or system, including failure to follow procedures.

Errors - failures attributable to incorrect procedures that were followed as written, improper installation of equipment, and personnel errors (including failure to follow procedures property). Also included in this category are failures for which cause is unknown or cannot be assigned to any of the preceding categories.

CENTS PER KILOWATT HOUR

The purpose of this indicator is to quantify the accomical operation of Fort Calhoun Station. The cents per kilowatt hour indicator represents the budget and actual cents per kilowatt hour on a twelve-month average for the current year. The basis for the budget curve is the approved yearly budget. The basis for the actual curve is the Financial and Operating Report.

CLEAN CONTROLLED AREA CONTAMINATIONS 2 1,000 DISINTEGRATIONS/MINUTE PER PROBE AREA

The personnel contamination events in the clean controlled area. This indicator tracks personnel performance for SEP #15 & 54.

CONTAMINATED RADIATION CONTROLLED AREA

The percentage of the Radiation Controlled Area, which includes the auxiliary building, the radwaste building, and areas of the C/RP building, that is contaminated based on the total square footage. This indicator tracks performance for SEP #54.

DAILY THERMAL OUTPUT

This indicator shows the daily core thermal output as measured from computer point XC105 (in thermal megawatts). The 1500 MW Tech Spec limit, and the unmet portion of the 1495 MW FCS daily goal for the reporting month are also shown.

DIESEL GENERATOR RELIABILITY (25 Demands)

This indicator shows the number of failures occurring for each emergency diesel generator during the last 25 start demands and the last 25 load-run demands.

DISABLING INJURY/ILLNE S FREQUENCY RATE (LOSS TIME ACCIDENT RATE)

This indicator is defined as the number of accidents for all utility personnel permanently assigned to the station, involving days away from work per 200,000 man-hours worked (100 man-years). This does not include contractor personnel. This indicator tracks personnel performance for SEP #25, 26 & 27.

DOCUMENT REVIEW (BIENNIAL)

The Document Review indicator shows the number G documents reviewed, the number of documents scheduled for review, and the number of document reviews that are overdue for the reporting

 .h. A document review is considered overdue if the review is not complete within six months of the assigned due date. This indicator tracks performance for SEP #46.

EMERGENCY AC POWER SYSTEM SAFETY SYSTEM PERFORMANCE

The sum of the known (planned and unplanned) unavailable and the estimated unavailable hours for the emergency AC power system for the reporting period divided by the number of hours in the reporting period multiplied by the number of trains in the emergency AC power system.

EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR UNIT RELIABILITY

This indicator shows the number of failures that were reported during the last 20, 50, and 100 emergency diesel generator demands at the Fort Calhoun Station. Also shown are trigger values which correlate to a high level of confidence that a unit's diesel generators have obtained a reliability of greater than or equal to 95% when the demand failures are less than the trigger values.

- Number of Start Demands: All valid and inadvertent start demands, including all start-only demands and all start demands that are followed by load-run demands, whether by automatic or manual initiation. A start-only demand is a demand in which the emergency generator is started, but no attempt is made to load the generator.
- 2) Number of Start Failures: Any failure within the emergency generator system that prevents the generator from achieving specified frequency and voltage is classified as a valid start failure. This includes any condition identified in the course of maintenance inspections (with the emergancy generator in standby mode) that definitely would have resulted in a start failure if a demand had occurred.
- Number of Load-Run Demands: For a valid load-run demand to be counted the load-run attempt must meet one or more of the following criteria:
 - A load-run of any duration that results from a real automatic or manual initiation.
 - B) A load-run test to satisfy the plant's load and duration as stated in each test's specifications.

1

- C) Other special tests in which the emergency generator is expected to be operated for at least one hour while loaded with at least 50% of its design load.
- 4) Number of Load-Run Failures: A load-run failure should be counted for any reason in which the emergency generator does not pick up load and run as predicted. Failures are counted during any valid load-run demands.
- Exceptions: Unsuccessful attempts to start or load-run should not be counted as valid demands or failures when they can be attributed to any of the following:
 - A) Spurious trips that would be bypassed in the event of an emergency.
 - B) Maifunction of equipment that is not required during an emergency.
 - C) Intentional termination of a test because of abnormal conditions that would not have resulted in major diesel generator damage or repair.
 - D) Malfunctions or operating errors which would not have prevented the emergency generator from being restarted and brought to load within a few minutes.

E) A failure to start because a portion of the starting system was disabled for test purpose, if followed by a successful start with the starting system in its normal alignment.

Each emergency generator failure that results in the generator being declared inoperable should be counted as one demand and one failure. Exploratory tests during corrective maintenance and the successful test that follows repair to verify operability should not be counted as demands or failures when the EDG has not been declared operable again.

EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR UNRELIABILITY

This indicator measures the total unreliability of emergency diesel generators. In general, unreliability is the ratio of unsuccessful operations (starts or load-runs) to the number of valid demands. Total unreliability is a combination of start unreliability and load-run unreliability.

ENGINEERING ASSISTANCE REQUEST (EAR) BREAKDOWN

This indicator shows a breakdown, by age and priority of the EAR, of the number of EARs assigned to Design Engineering Nuclear and System Engineering. This indicator tracks performance for SEP #62.

ENGINEENING CHANGE NOTICE (ECN) STATUS

The number of ECNs that were opened, ECNs that were completed, and open backlog ECNs awaiting completion by DEN for the reporting month. This indicator tracks performance for SEP #62.

ENGINEERING CHANGE NOTICES OPEN

This indicator breaks down the number of Engineering Change Notices (ECNs) that are assigned to Design Engineering Nuclear (DEN), System Engineering, and Maintenance. The graphs provide data on ECN Facility Changes open, ECN Substitute Replacement Items open, and ECN Document Changes open. This indicator tracks performance for SEP #62.

EQUIPMENT FORCED OUTAGES PER 1,000 CRITICAL HOURS

Equipment forced outages per 1,000 critical hours is the inverse of the mean time between forced outages caused by equipment failures. The mean time is equal to the number of hours the reactor is critical in a period (1,000 hours) divided by the number of forced outages caused by equipment failures in that period.

EQUIVALENT AVAILABILITY FACTOR

This indicator is defined as the ratio of gross available generation to gross maximum generation, expressed as a percentage. Available generation is the energy that can be produced if the unit is operated at the maximum power level permitted by equipment and regulatory limitations. Maximum generation is the energy that can be produced by a unit in a given period if operated continuously at maximum capacity.

FORCED OUTAGE RATE

This indicator is defined as the percentage of time that the unit was unavailable due to forced events compared to the time planned for electrical generation. Forced events are failures or other unplanned conditions that require removing the unit from service before the end of the next weekend. Forced events include start-up failures and events initiated while the unit is in reserve shutdown (i.e., the unit is available but not in service).

FUEL RELIABILITY INDICATOR

This indicator is defined as the steady-state primary coolant I-131 activity, corrected for the tramp uranium contribution and normalized to a common purification rate. Tramp uranium is fuel which has been deposited on reactor core internals from previous defective fuel or is present on the surface of fuel elements from the manufacturing process. Steady state is defined as continuous operation for at least three days at a power level that does not vary more than + or -5%. Plants should collect data for this indicator at a power level above 85%, when possible. Plants that did not operate at steady-state power above 85% should collect data for this indicator at the highest steady-state power level attained during the month.

The density correction factor is the ratio of the specific volume of coolant at the RCS operating temperature (540 degrees F., Vf = 0.02146) divided by the specific volume of coolant at normal letdown temperature (120° F at cutlet of the letdown cooling heat exchanger, Vf = 0.016204), which results in a density correction factor for FCS equal to 1.32.

GROSS HEAT RATE

Gross heat rate is defined as the ratio of total thermal energy in British Thermal Units (BTU) produced by the reactor to the total gross electrical energy produced by the generator in kilowatthours (KWH).

HAZARDOUS WASTE PRODUCED

The total amount (in Kilograms) of non-halogenated hazardous waste, halogenated hazardous waste, and other hazardous waste produced by FCS each month.

HIGH PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM SAFETY SYSTEM PERFORMANCE

The sum of the known (planned and unplanned) unavailable hours and the estimated unavailable hours for the high pressure safety injection system for the reporting period divided by the critical hours for the reporting period multiplied by the number of trains in the high pressure safety injection system.

INDUSTRIAL SAFETY ACCIDENT RATE - INPO

This indicator is defined as the number of accidents per 200,000 man-hours worked for all utility personnel permanently assigned to the station that result in any of the following:

- One or more days of restricted work (excluding the day of the accident);
- One or more days away from work (excluding the day of the accident); and
- 3) Fatalities.

Contractor personnel are not included for this indicator.

IN-LINE CHEMISTRY INSTRUMENTS OUT OF SERVICE

Total number of in-line chemistry instruments that are out-ofservice in the Secondary System and the Post Accident Sampling System (PASS).

LICENSE CANDIDATE EXAMS

This indicator shows the number of SRO and/or RO quizzes and exams that are administered and passed each month. This indicator tracks training performance for SEP#68.

Seco

LICENSED OPERATOR REQUALIFICATION TRAINING

The total number of hours of training given to each crew during each cycle. Also provided are the simulator training hours (which are a subset of the total training hours), the number of non-REQUALIFICATION training hours and the number of exam failures. This indicator tracks training performance for SEP #68.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) ROOT CAUSE BREAKDOWN

This indicator shows the number and root cause code for Licensee Event Reports. The root cause codes are as follows:

- Administrative Control Problem Management and supervisory deficiencies that affect plant programs or activities (i.e., poor planning, breakdown or lack of adequate management or supervisory control, incorrect procedures, etc).
- Licensed Operator Error This cause code captures errors of omission/commission by licensed reactor operators during plant activities.
- Other Personnel Error Errors of omission/commission committed by non-licensed personnel involved in plant activities.
- 4) Maintenance Problem The intent of this cause code is to capture the full range of problems which can be attributed in any way to programmatic deficiencies in the maintenance functional organization. Activities included in this category are maintenance, testing, surveillance, calibration and radiation protection.
- 5) Design/Construction/Installation/Fabrication Problem -This cause code covers a full range of programmatic deficiencies in the areas of design, construction, installation, and fabrication (i.e., loss of control power due to underrated fuse, equipment not qualified for the environment, etc.).
- 6) Equipment Failures (Electronic Piece-Parts or Environmental-Related Failures) - This code is used for spurious failures of electronic piece-parts and failures due to meteorological conditions such as lightning, ice, high winds, etc. Generally, it includes spurious or one-time failures. Electric components included in this category are circuit cards, rectifiers, bistables, fuses, capacitors, diodes, resistors, etc.

LOGGABLE/REPORTABLE INCIDENTS (SECURITY)

The total number of security incidents for the reporting month depicted in two graphs. This indicator tracks security verformance for SEP #58.

MAINTENANCE OVERTIME

The percent of overtime hours compared to normal hours for maintenance. This includes OPPD personnel as well as contract personnel.

MAINTENANCE WORKLOAD BACKLOGS

This indicator shows the backlog of non-outage Maintenance Work Orders remaining open at the end of the reporting month. Maintenance classifications are defined as follows:

Corrective - Repair and restoration of equipment or components that have failed or are malfunctioning and are not performing their intended function. Preventive - Actions taken to maintain a piece of equipment within design operating conditions, prevent equipment failure, and extend its life and are performed prior to equipment failure.

Non-Corrective/Plant Improvements - Maintenance activities performed to implement station improvements or to repair non-plant equipment.

Maintenance Work Priorities are defined as:

Emergency - Conditions which significantly degrade station safety or availability.

Immediate Action - Equipment deficiencies which significantly degrade station reliability. Potential for unit shutdown or power reduction.

Operations Concern - Equipment deficiencies which hinder station operation.

Essential - Routine corrective maintenance on essential station systems and equipment.

Non-Essential - Routine corrective maintenance on nonessential station systems and equipment.

Plant improvement - Non-corrective maintenance and plant improvements.

This indicator tracks maintenance performance for SEP #36.

MAXIMUM INDIVIDUAL RADIATION EXPOSURE

The total maximum amount of radiation received by an individual person working at FCS on a monthly, quarterly, and annual basis.

MWO PLANNING STATUS (CYCLE 17 REFUELING OUTAGE)

The total number of Maintenance Work Orders that have been approved for inclusion in the Cycle 16 Refueling Outage and the number that are ready to work (parts staged, planning complete, and all other paperwork ready for field use). Also included is the number of MWOs that have been engineering holds (ECNs, procedures and other miscellaneous engineering holds), parts hold, (parts staged, not yet inspected, parts not yet arrived) and planning hold (job scope not yet completed). Maintenance Work Requests (MWRs) are also shown that have been identified for the Cycle 16 Refueling Outage and have not yet been converted to MWOs.

NUMBER OF CONTROL ROOM EQUIPMENT DEFICIENCIES

A control room equipment deficiency (CRD) is defined as any component which is operated or controlled from the Control Room, provides indication or alarm to the Control Room, provides testing capabilities from the Control Room, provides automatic actions from or to the Control Room, or provides a passive function for the Control Room and has been identified as deficient, i.e., does not perform under all conditions as designed. This definition also applies to the Alternate Shutdown Panels Al-179, Al-185, and Al-212.

A plant component which is deficient or inoperable is considered an "Operator Work Around (OWA) Item" if some other action is required by an operator to compensate for the condition of the component. Some examples of OWAs are:

- The control room level indicator does not work but a local sight glass can be read by an Operator out in the plant;
- A deficient pump cannot be repaired because replacement parts require a long lead time for purchase/delivery, thus requiring the redundant pump to be operated continuously;
- Special actions are required by an Operator because of equipment design problems. These actions may be described in Operations Memorandums, Operator Notes, or may require changes to Operating Procedures;
- Deficient plant equipment that is required to be used during Emergency Operating Procedures or Abnormal Operating Procedures;
- System indication that provides critical information during normal or abnormal operations.

NUMBER OF MISSED SURVEILLANCE TESTS RESULTING IN LICENSEE EVENT REPORTS

The number of Surveillance Tests (STs) that result in Licensee Event Reports (LERs) during the reporting month. This indicator tracks missed STs for SEP #60 & 61.

OPEN INCIDENT REPORTS

This indicator displays the total number of open incident Reports (IRs), the number of IRs that are greater than six months old and the number of open significant IRs.

OUTSTANDING MODIFICATIONS

The number of Modification Requests (MRs) in any state between the issuance of a Modification Number and the completion of the drawing update.

- Form FC-1133 Backlog/in Progress. This number represents modification requests that have not been plant approved during the reporting month.
- Modification Requests Being Reviewed. This category includes:
 - A) Modification Requests that are not yet reviewed

- Modification Requests being reviewed by the Nuclear Projects Review Committee (NPRC).
- Modification Requests being reviewed by the Nuclear Projects Committee (NPC).

These Modification Requests may be reviewed several times before they are approved for accomplishment or canceled. Some of these Modification Requests are returned to Engineering for more information, some approved for evaluation, some approved for study, and some approved for planning. Once planning is completed and the scope of the work is clearly defined, these Modification Requests may be approved for accomplishment with a year assigned for construction or they may be canceled. All of these different phases require review.

- Design Engineering Backlog/In Progress. Nuclear Planning has assigned a year in which construction will be completed and design work may be in progress.
- 4) Construction Backlog/In Progress. The Construction Package has been issued or construction has begun but the modification has not been accepted by the System Acceptance Committee (SAC).
- Design Engineering Update Backlog/In Progress. PED has received the Modification Completion Report but the drawings have not been updated.

The above mentioned outstanding modifications do not include modifications which are proposed for cancellation.

OVERALL PROJECT STATUS (REFUELING OUTAGE)

This indicator shows the status of the projects which are in the scope of the Refueling Outage.

PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL MWOs COMPLETED PER MONTH IDENTIFIED AS REWORK

The percentage of total MWOs completed per month identified as rework. Rework activities are identified by maintenance planning and craft. Rework is: Any additional work required to correct deficiencies discovered during a failed Post Maintenance Test to ensure the component/system passes subsequent Post Maintenance Test.

PERCENT OF COMPLETED SCHEDULED MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES

The percent of the number of completed maintenance activities as compared to the number of scheduled maintenance activities each month. This percentage is shown for all maintenance crafts. Also shown are the number of emergent MWOs. Maintenance activities include MWRs, MWOs, STs, PMOs, calibrations, and other miscellaneous activities. This indicator tracks Maintenance performance for SEP #33.

PREVENTABLE/PERSONNEL ERROR LERS

This indicator is a breakdown of LERs. For purposes of LER event classification, a "Preventable LER" is defined as:

An event for which the root cause is personnel error (i.e., inappropriate action by one or more individuals), inadequate administrative controls, a design construction, installation, installation, fabrication problem (involving work completed by or supervised by OPPD personnel) or a maintenance problem (attributed to inadequate or improper upkeep/repair of plant equipment). Also, the cause of the event must have occurred within approximately two years of the "Event Date" specified in the LER (e.g., an event for which the cause is attributed to a problem with the original design of the plant would not be considered preventable).

For purposes of LER event classification, a "Personnel Error" LER is defined as follows:

An event for which the root cause is inappropriate action on the part of one or more individuals (as opposed to being attributed to a department or a general group). Also, the inappropriate action must have occurred within approximately two years of the "Event Date" specified in the LER.

Additionally, each event classified as a "Personnel Error" should also be classified as "Preventable." This indicator trends personnel performance for SEP Item #15.

PRIMARY SYSTEM CHEMISTRY % OF HOURS OUT OF LIMIT

The percent of hours out of limit are for six primary chemistry parameters divided by the total number of hours possible for the month. The key parameters used are: Lithium, Chloride, Hydrogen, Dissolved Oxygen, Fluoride and Suspended Solids. EPRI limits are used.

PROCEDURAL NONCOMPLIANCE INCIDENTS (MAINTENANCE)

The number of identified incidents concerning maintenance procedural problems, the number of closed IRs related to the use of procedures (includes the number of closed IRs caused by procedural noncompliance), and the number of closed procedural noncompliance IRs. This indicator trends personnel performance for SEP #15, 41 and 44.

PROGRESS OF CYCLE 17 OUTAGE MODIFICATION PLANNING

This indicator shows the status of modifications approved for completion during the Refueling Outage.

PROGRESS OF 1995 ON-LINE MODIFICATION PLANNING

This indicator shows the status of modifications approved for completion during 1995.

RADIOLOGICAL WORK PRACTICES PROGRAM

The number of identified poor radiological work practices (PRWPs) for the reporting month. This indicator tracks radiological work performance for SEP #52.

RADIO OF PREVENTIVE TO TOTAL MAINTENANCE & PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE ITEMS OVERDUE

The ratio of preventive maintenance (including surveillance testing and calibration procedures) to the sum of non-outage corrective maintenance and preventive maintenance completed over the reporting period. The ratio, expressed as a percentage, is calculated based on man-hours. Also displayed are the percent of preventive maintenance items in the month that were not completed or administratively closed by the scheduled date plus a grace period equal to 25% of the scheduled interval. This indicator tracks preventive maintenance activities for SEP #41.

RECORDABLE INJURY/ILLNESS CASES FREQUENCY RATE

The number of injuries requiring more than normal first aid per 200,000 man-hours worked. This indicator trends personnel performance for SEP #15, 25 and 26.

REPEAT FAILURES

The number of Nuclear Plant Reliability Data System (NPRDS) components with more than one failure and the number of NPRDS components with more than two failures for the eighteenmonth CFAR period.

SAFETY SYSTEM FAILURES

Safety system failures are any events or conditions that could prevent the fulfillment of the safety functions of structures or systems. If a system consists of multiple redundant subsystems or trains, failure of all trains constitutes a safety system failure. Failure of one of two or more trains is not counted as a safety system failure. The definition for the indicator parallels NRC reporting requirements in 10 CFR 50.72 and 10 CFR 50.73. The following is a list of the major safety systems, sub-systems, and components monitored for this indicator:

Accident Monitoring Instrumentation, Auxiliary (and Emergency) Feedwater System, Combustible Gas Control, Component Cooling Water System, Containment and Containment Isolation, Containment Coolant Systems, Control Room Emergency Ventilation System, Emergency Core Cooling Systems, Engineered Safety Features Instrumentation, Essential Compressed Air Systems, Essential or Emergency Service Water, Fire Detection or Suppression Systems, Isolation Condenser, Low Temperature Overpressure Protection, Main Steam Line Isolation Valves, Onsite Emergency AC & DC Power w/Distribution, Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation, Reactor Coolant System, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System, Reactor Trip System and Instrumentation, Recirculation Pump Trip Actuation Instrumentation, Residual Heat Removal Systems, Safety Valves, Spent Fuel Systems, Standby Liquid Control System and Ultimate Heat Sink

SECONDARY SYSTEM CHEMISTRY PERFORMANCE

The Chemistry Performance Indra (CPI) is a calculation based on the concentration of key impurities in the secondary side of the plant. These key impurities are the most likely cause of deterioration of the steam generators. Criteria for calculating the CPI are:

1) The plant is at greater than 30 percent power; and

2) the power is changing less than 5% per day.

The CPI is calculated using the following equation:

CPI = (sodium/0.90) + (Chloride/1.70) + (Sulfate/1.90) + (Iron/4.40) + (Copper/0.30)/5.

Where: Sodium, sulfate and chloride are the monthly average blowdown concentrations in ppb, iron and copper are monthly time weighted average feedwater concentrations in ppb. The denominator for each of the five factors is the INPO median value. If the monthly average for a specific parameter is less than the INPO median value, the median value is used in the calculation.

SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

Significant events are the events identified by NRC staff through detailed screening and evaluation of operating experience. The screening process includes the daily review and discussion of all reported operating reactor events, as well as other operational data such as special tests or construction activities. An event identified from the screening process as a significant event candidate is further evaluated to determine if any actual or potential threat to the health and safety of the public was involved. Specific examples of the type of criteria are summarized as follows:

- 1) Degradation of important safety equipment;
- 2) Unexpected plant response to a transient;
- Degradation of fuel integrity, primary coolant pressure boundary, important associated features;
- 4) Scram with complication;
- 5) Unpianned release of radioactivity,
- 6) Operation outside the limits of the Technical Specifications;
- 7) Other.

INPO significant events reported in this indicator are SERs (Significant Even; Reports) which inform utilities of significant events and lessons learned identified through the SEE-IN screening process.

SPARE PARTS INVENTORY VALUE

The dollar value of the spare parts inventory for FCS during the reporting period.

STAFFING LEVEL

The actual staffing level and the authorized staffing level for the Nuclear Operations Division, The Production Engineering Division, and the Nuclear Services Division. This indicator tracks performance for SEP #24.

STATION NET GENERATION

The net generation (sum) produced by the FCS during the reporting month.

TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS

The number of temporary mechanical and electrical configurations to the plant's systems.

- Temporary configurations are defined as electrical jumpers, electrical blocks, mechanical jumpers, or mechanical blocks which are installed in the plant operating systems and are not shown on the latest revision of the P&ID, schematic, connection, wiring, or flow diagrams.
- 2) Jumpers and blocks which are installed for Surveillance Tests, Maintenance Procedures, Calibration Procedures, Special Procedures or Operating Procedures are not considered as temporary modifications unless the jumper or block remains in place after the test or procedure is complete. Jumpers and blocks installed in test or lab instruments are not considered as temporary modifications.
- 3) Scaffold is not considered a temporary modification. Jumpers and blocks which are installed and for which MRs have been submitted will be considered as temporary modifications until final resolution of the MR and the jumper or block is removed or is permanently recorded on the drawings. This indicator tracks temporary modifications for SEP #62 and 71.

THERMAL PERFORMANCE

The ratio of the design gross heat rate (corrected) to the adjusted actual gross heat rate, expressed as a percentage.

UNIT CAPABILITY FACTOR

The ratio of the available energy generation over a given time period to the reference energy generation (the energy that could be produced if the unit were operated continuously at full power under reference ambient conditions) over the same time period, expressed as a percentage.

UNIT CAPACITY FACTOR

The net electrical energy generated (MWH) divided by the product of maximum dependable capacity (net MWe) times the gross hours in the reporting period expressed as a percent. Net electrical energy generated is the gross electrical output of the unit measured at the output terminals of the turbine generator minus the normal station service loads during the gross hours of the reporting period, expressed in megawatt hours.

UNPLANNED AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAMS PER 7,000 CRITICAL HOURS

This indicator is defined as the number of unplanned automatic scrams (reactor protection system logic actuations) that occur per 7,000 hours of critical operation.

The value for this indicator is calculated by multiplying the total number of unplanned automatic reactor scrame in a specific time period by 7,000 hours, then dividing that number by the total number of hours critical in the same time period. The indicator is further defined as follows:

- Unplanned means that the scram was not an anticipated part of a planned test.
- 2) Scram means the automatic shutdown of the reactor by a rapid insertion of negative reactivity (e.g., by control rods, liquid injection system, etc.) that is caused by actuation of the reactor protection system. The scram signal may have resulted from exceeding a set point or may have been spurious.
- 3) Automatic means that the initial signal that caused actuation of the reactor protection system logic was provided from one of the sensor's monitoring plant parameters and conditions, rather than the manual scram switches or, manual turbine trip switches (or push-buttons) provided in the main control room.
- Critical means that during the steady-state condition of the reactor prior to the scram, the effective multiplication (k er) was essentially equal to one.

UNPLANNED CAPABILITY LOSS FACTOR

The ratio of the unplanned energy losses during a given period of time, to the reference energy generation (the energy that could be produced if the unit were operated continuously at full power under reference ambient conditions) over the same time period, expressed as a percentage.

UNPLANNED SAFETY SYSTEM ACTUATIONS - (INPO DEFINITION)

This indicator is defined as the sum of the following safety system actuations:

- The number of unplanned Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) actuations that result from reaching an ECCS actuation set point or from a spurious/inadvertent ECCS signal.
- 2) The number of unplanned emergency AC power system actuations that result from a loss of power to a safeguards bus. An unplanned safety system actuation occurs when an actuation set point for a safety system is reached or when a spurious or inadvertent signal is generated (ECCS only), and major equipment in the system is actuated. Unplanned means that the system actuation was not part of a planned test or evolution. The ECCS actuations to be counted are actuations of the high pressure injection system, the low pressure injection system, or the safety injection tanks.

UNPLANNED SAFETY SYSTEM ACTIONS - (NRC DEFINITION)

The number of safety system actuations which include (<u>only</u>) the High Pressure Safety Injection System, the Low Pressure Safety Injection System, the Safety Injection Tanks, and the Emergency Diesel Generators. The NRC classification of safety system actuations includes actuations when major equipment is operated <u>and</u> when the logic systems for the above safety systems are challenged.

VIOLATION TREND

This indicator is defined as Fort Calhoun Station Cited Violations and Non-Cited Violations trended over 12 months. Additionally, Cited Violations for the top quartile Region IV plant is trended over 12 months (lagging the Fort Calhoun Station trend by 2-3 months). It is the Fort Calhoun Station goal to be at or below the cited violation trend for the top quartile Region IV plant.

VOLUME OF LOW-LEVEL SOLID RADIOACTIVE WASTE

This indicator is defined as the volume of low-level solid radioactive waste actually shipped for burial. This indicator also shows the volume of low-level radioactive waste which is in temporary storage, the amount of radioactive oil that has been shipped off-site for processing, and the volume of solid dry radioactive waste which has been shipped off-site for processing. Low-level solid radioactive waste consists of dry active waste, sludges, resins, and evaporator bottoms generated as a result of nuclear power plant operation and maintenance. Dry radioactive waste includes contaminated rags, cleaning materials, disposable protective clothing, plastic containers, and any other material to be disposed of at a low-level radioactive waste disposal site, except resin, sludge, or evaporator bottoms. Low-level refers to all radioactive waste that is not spent fuel or a by-product of spent fuel processing. This indicator tracks radiological work performance for SEP #54

SAFETY ENHANCEMENT PROGRAM INDEX

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FORT CALHOUN STATION OPERATING CYCLES AND REFUELING OUTAGE DATES

| EVENT | DATE RANGE | PRODUCTION (MWH) | CUMULATIVE (MWH) |
|----------------------------|--|----------------------|------------------|
| Cycle 1 1st Refueling | 09/26/73 - 02/08/75 02/08/75 - 05/11/75 | 3,299,639 | 3,299,639 |
| Cycle 2 2nd Refueling | 05/11/75 - 10/01/76 10/01/76 - 12/13/76 | 3,853,322 | 7,152,961 |
| Cycle 3 3rd Refueling | 12/13/76 - 09/30/77 09/30/77 - 12/09/77 | 2,805,927 | 9,958,888 |
| Cycle 4 4th Refueling | 12/09/77 - 10/13/78 10/13/78 - 12/24/78 | 3,026,832 | 12,985,720 |
| Cycle 5 5th Refueling | 12/24/78 - 01/18/80 01/18/80 - 06/11/80 | 3,882,734 | 16,868,454 |
| Cycle 6 6th Refueling | 06/11/80 - 09/18/81 09/18/81 - 12/21/81 | 3,899,714 | 20,768,168 |
| Cycle 7 7th Refueling | 12/21/81 - 12/03/82 12/03/82 - 04/06/83 | 3,561,866 | 24,330,034 |
| Cycle 8 8th Refueling | 06/06/83 - 03/03/84 03/03/84 - 07/12/84 | 3,406,371 | 27,736,405 |
| Cycle 9 9th Refueling | 07/12/84 - 09/28/85 09/28/85 - 01/16/86 | 4,741,488 | 32,477,893 |
| Cycle 10 10th Refueling | 01/16/86 - 03/07/87 03/07/87 - 06/08/87 | 4,356,753 | 36,834,646 |
| Cycle 11 11th Refueling | 06/08/87 - 09/27/88 09/27/88 - 01/31/89 | 4,936,859 | 41,771,505 |
| Cycle 12 12th Refueling | 01/31/89 - 02/17/90 02/17/90 - 05/29/90 | 3,817,954 | 45,589,459 |
| Cycle 13 13th Refueling | 05/29/90 - 02/01/92 02/01/92 - 05/03/92 | 5,451,069 | 51,040,528 |
| Cycle 14 14th Refueling | 05/03/92 - 09/25/93 09/25/93 - 11/26/93 | 4,981,485 | 56,022,013 |
| Cycle 15 15th Refueling | 11/26/93 - 02/20/95 02/20/95 - 04/14/95 | 5,043,887 | 61,065,900 |
| Cycle 16 16th Refueling | 04/14/95 - 09/21/96 09/21/96 - 11/02/96 | • (Planned Dates) | |

FORT CALHOUN STATION CURRENT PRODUCTION AND OPERATIONS "RECORDS"

First Sustained Reaction First Electricity Supplied to the System Commercial Operation (180,000 KWH) Achieved Full Power (100%) Longest Run (477 Days) Highest Monthly Net Generation (364,468,800 KWH) Most Productive Fuel Cycle (5,451,069 MWH - Cycle 13) Shortest Refueling Outage (52 days) Highest Calenda: Year Generation (4,118,368.7 MWH) August 5, 1973 (5 47 p.m.) August 25, 1973 September 26, 1973 May 4, 1974 June 8, 1987-Sept. 27, 1988 October 1987 May 29, 1990-Feb. 1, 1992 Feb. 20, 1995-April 14, 1995 1994