Southern California Edison Company

P. O. BOX 128

SAN CLEMENTE, CALIFORNIA 92674-0128

R. W. KRIEGER
VICE PRESIDENT
NUCLEAR GENERATION

TELEPHONE
714-368-6255

September 22, 1995

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attention: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject: Docket No. 50-362
30 Day Report
Licensee Event Report No. 95-002
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 3

Pursuant to 10CFR50.73(d), this submittal provides a written Licensee Event Report (LER) for an occurrence involving containment integrity during refueling. Neither the health nor the safety of plant personnel or the public was affected by this occurrence.

Sincerely,

Enclosure: LER No. 95-002

cc: L. J. Callan, Regional Administrator, NRC Region IV
J. E. Dyer, Director, Division of Reactor Projects, NRC Region IV
K. E. Perkins, Jr., Director, Walnut Creek Field Office, NRC Region IV
J. A. Sloan, NRC Senior Resident Inspector, San Onofre Units 2 & 3
M. B. Fields, NRC Project Manager, San Onofre Units 2 and 3
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO)

bcc: (See attached sheet)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

Facility Name (1)	Docket Number (2)	Page (3)
SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT 3	0 5 0 0 0 3 6 2	1 of 0 2

Title (4)

Containment Integrity During Refueling

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
Month	Day	Year	Year	/// Sequential Number	/// Revision Number	Month	Day	Year	Facility Names	Docket Number(s)
0 8	2 7	9 5	9 5	--- 0 0 2	--- 0 0	0 9	2 7	9 5	NONE	

OPERATING MODE (9)	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10CFR (Check one or more of the following) (11)				
6	___ 20.402(b)	___ 20.40(c)	___ 50.73(a)(2)(iv)	___ 73.71(b)	
POWER LEVEL (10) 0 0 0	___ 20.405(a)(1)(i)	___ 50.36(c)(1)	___ 50.73(a)(2)(v)	___ 73.71(c)	
//////////////////////	___ 20.405(a)(1)(ii)	___ 50.36(c)(2)	___ 50.73(a)(2)(vii)	___ Other (Specify in Abstract below and in text)	
//////////////////////	___ 20.405(a)(1)(iii)	X 50.73(a)(2)(i)	___ 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)		
//////////////////////	___ 20.405(a)(1)(iv)	___ 50.73(a)(2)(ii)	___ 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)		
//////////////////////	___ 20.405(a)(1)(v)	___ 50.73(a)(2)(iii)	___ 50.73(a)(2)(x)		

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

Name	TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE
R. W. Krieger, Vice President, Nuclear Generation	7 1 4 3 6 8 - 6 2 5 5

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC.- TRUER	REPORTABLE TO NERDS	///////	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC.- TRUER	REPORTABLE TO NERDS	//////
					///////						//////
					///////						//////

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

	Expected Submission Date (15)	Month	Day	Year
___ Yes (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) X NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On 8/26/95, Unit 3 was in Mode 6 with core alterations in progress. Work was being initiated to drain steam generator (SG) E089 by venting through its atmospheric dump valve (ADV) and opening a SG drain line valve to a sump outside containment. To satisfy TS 3.9.4, Operations management (utility, licensed and non-licensed) directed a review of the Work Authorization (WAR) being used to control SG work, and a limited walkdown to ensure items not controlled by the WAR (manways and hand holes) were closed.

The ADV was opened at 1110 but a few minutes later, a worker (utility, non-licensed) noticed an open vent valve on the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) line for SG E089. This provided a path from inside containment to the outside atmosphere. Later, two other AFW vent and drain valves were also found open. Since core alterations occurred during this event, Edison is reporting it in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i).

This event was caused by incomplete communication. The WAR evaluator was not provided sufficient guidance, such that he misunderstood the scope and purpose of the WAR review (the vent and drain valves were listed as open on the WAR). When notified, operators immediately closed the ADV, and core alterations were promptly halted. Management has coached the individuals, and has reviewed this event with appropriate personnel. As a conservative measure, Edison will develop a checklist to assist cperators when verifying SG integrity inside containment prior to opening SG boundary valves.

Plant: San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 3
Reactor Vendor: Combustion Engineering
Event Date: August 26, 1995
Mode: Mode 6, Refueling

On 8/26/95, Unit 3 was in Mode 6 with core alterations in progress. During core alterations, Technical Specification (TS) 3.9.4 requires each penetration providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere to be closed by an isolation valve, blind flange, or manual valve, or be capable of being closed by an operable automatic containment purge valve.

Work was being initiated to drain steam generator (SG) E089 by venting through its atmospheric dump valve (ADV) and opening a SG drain line valve [WI,V] to a sump [WH] outside containment. To satisfy TS 3.9.4, Operations management (utility, licensed and non-licensed) directed a review of the Work Authorization (WAR) being used to control SG work, and a limited walkdown to ensure items not controlled by the WAR (manways and hand holes) were closed.

The ADV was opened at 1110 but a few minutes later, a worker (utility, non-licensed) noticed an open vent valve [BA,VTV] on the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) line for SG E089. This provided a path from inside containment to the outside atmosphere. Later, two other AFW vent [BA,VTV] and drain [BA,V] valves were also found open. Since core alterations occurred during this event, Edison is reporting it in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i).

CAUSE OF THE EVENT

This event was caused by incomplete communication between Operations management and the evaluator (utility, non-licensed) performing the WAR review. The evaluator was not provided sufficient guidance, such that he misunderstood the scope and purpose of the WAR review (the vent and drain valves were listed as open on the WAR).

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

When notified, operators immediately closed the ADV, and core alterations were promptly halted. Management has coached the individuals, and has reviewed this event with appropriate personnel. As a conservative measure, Edison will develop a checklist to assist operators when verifying SG integrity inside containment prior to opening SG boundary valves.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE

Due to the lack of containment pressurization potential during refueling, the small size of the openings (3/4 inch), and the limited duration (13 minutes), the safety significance of this event is minimal.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

In the past three years, there have been no other reportable occurrences where management provided incomplete communication and insufficient guidance, such that a worker misunderstood the scope and purpose of management's direction.