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VICE PRESIDENT
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September 22, 1995

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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject: Docket No. 50-362
30-Day Report
Licensee Event Report No. 95-003
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 3

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(d), this submittal provides the required 30-day written Licensee Event Report (LER) for an event involving momentary inoperability of a diesel generator output breaker. Neither the health nor the safety of plant personnel or the public was affected by this occurrence or condition.

If you require any additional information, please so advise.

Sincerely,

Enclosure: LER No. 95-003

cc: L. J. Callan, Regional Administrator, NRC Region IV
J. E. Dyer, Director, Division of Reactor Projects, Region IV
K. E. Perkins, Jr., Director, Walnut Creek Field Office, NRC
Region IV
J. Sloan (USNRC Senior Resident Inspector, Units 1, 2 and 3)
M. B. Fields, NRC Project Manager, San Onofre Units 2 & 3
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO)

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

Facility Name (1) SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNIT 3
 Title (4) Failure To Install Jumpers
 Docket Number (2) 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 6 | 2
 Page (3) 1 of 0 3

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)																														
Month	Day	Year	Year	/// /// Sequential Number	/// /// Revision Number	Month	Day	Year	Facility Names	Docket Number(s)																														
0	8	2	6	9	5	9	5	0	0	3																														
OPERATING MODE (9) 6 THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10CFR (Check one or more of the following) (11) <table border="0"> <tr> <td>POWER LEVEL (10) 0 0 0</td> <td>20.402(b)</td> <td>20.405(c)</td> <td>50.73(a)(2)(iv)</td> <td>73.71(b)</td> </tr> <tr> <td>////</td> <td>20.405(a)(1)(i)</td> <td>50.36(c)(1)</td> <td>50.73(a)(2)(v)</td> <td>73.71(c)</td> </tr> <tr> <td>////</td> <td>20.405(a)(1)(ii)</td> <td>50.36(c)(2)</td> <td>50.73(a)(2)(vii)</td> <td>Other (Specify in</td> </tr> <tr> <td>////</td> <td>20.405(a)(1)(iii)</td> <td>X 50.73(a)(2)(i)</td> <td>50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)</td> <td>Abstract below and</td> </tr> <tr> <td>////</td> <td>20.405(a)(1)(iv)</td> <td>50.73(a)(2)(ii)</td> <td>50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)</td> <td>in text)</td> </tr> <tr> <td>////</td> <td>20.405(a)(1)(v)</td> <td>50.73(a)(2)(iii)</td> <td>50.73(a)(2)(x)</td> <td></td> </tr> </table>											POWER LEVEL (10) 0 0 0	20.402(b)	20.405(c)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)	////	20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)	////	20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	Other (Specify in	////	20.405(a)(1)(iii)	X 50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	Abstract below and	////	20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	in text)	////	20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)	
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LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

Name R. W. Krieger, Vice President, Nuclear Generation
 TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE 7 | 1 | 4 3 | 6 | 8 | - | 6 | 2 | 5 | 5
 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC- TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	////////	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC- TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	////////
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SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)										Expected Submission Date (15)	Month Day Year
<input type="checkbox"/> Yes (if yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO											

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On 8/27/95 with Unit 3 in Mode 6, at approximately 0000, electrical test technicians (test techs) (utility personnel) began tests on a protective relay on a supply breaker to the Train B class 1E bus. To ensure that the emergency diesel generator (EDG) output breaker to the bus would not be locked out during the testing, the test procedure includes a caution to block or jumper the auxiliary relay contacts, as necessary, to prevent operation or isolation of plant equipment. The test techs did not install the necessary jumpers for the EDG output breaker.

The protective relay was tripped four times between approximately 0000 and 0200 and, each time, was reset a few seconds later. The EDG output breaker was inoperable for the few seconds that the protective relay was tripped. The opposite train EDG was out of service for maintenance. Technical Specifications require that a minimum of one EDG be operable in Mode 6, and that with less than one EDG operable, core alterations be immediately suspended. Since core alterations continued during this event, Edison is reporting it in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i).

At approximately 0200, a test tech requested the Common Control Operator (CO) (utility, licensed) to close the breaker under test from the Control Room. The CO questioned this request and it was discovered that the Train B EDG had been momentarily inoperable.

This event was caused by cognitive personnel error when test techs failed to install jumpers. Testing was immediately suspended. The test techs involved were appropriately disciplined. All test techs were reminded of the need to adhere to written procedures.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATION STATION UNIT 3	DOCKET NUMBER 05000362	LER NUMBER 95-003-00	PAGE 2 of 3
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Plant: San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station
 Unit: 3
 Reactor Vendor: Combustion Engineering
 Event Date: August 26, 1995
 Mode: 6

DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENT

On 8/26/95 with Unit 3 in Mode 6, electrical test technicians (utility personnel) were preparing to conduct scheduled maintenance tests on a protective relay [86] on a supply breaker to the Train B class 1E engineered safety features bus [EB]. This relay protects the emergency diesel generator (EDG) [EK] by preventing its output breaker from closing either automatically or manually on a faulted bus. To ensure that the EDG output breaker would not be locked out during the testing, the test procedure includes a caution to block or jumper the auxiliary relay contacts, as necessary, to prevent operation or isolation of plant equipment.

Testing began at approximately 0000 on 8/27/95. The test technicians did not install the necessary jumpers for the EDG output breaker. They recognized that the test would not cause the EDG output breaker to close, and therefore incorrectly assumed that jumpers were not necessary. The protective relay was tripped four times between approximately 0000 and 0200 and, each time, was reset a few seconds later. The EDG output breaker, and hence the Train B EDG itself, was inoperable for the few seconds that the protective relay was tripped.

During the relay testing, the opposite train EDG was out of service for scheduled outage maintenance, and core reload was in progress. Technical Specification 3.8.1.2 requires that a minimum of one EDG be operable in Modes 5 and 6, and that with less than one EDG operable, core alterations be immediately suspended. Since core alterations continued during this event, Edison is reporting it in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i).

At approximately 0200 on 8/27/95, a test technician requested the Common Control Operator (CO) (utility, licensed) to close the breaker under test from the Control Room. The CO questioned this request and informed the Shift Superintendent (SS) (utility, licensed). The SS reviewed the testing that had been done and discovered that the Train B EDG had been momentarily inoperable.

CAUSE OF THE EVENT

This event was caused by cognitive personnel error when test technicians failed to install jumpers as required by the test procedure.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

Testing was immediately suspended. The test technicians involved were appropriately disciplined. All test technicians were reminded of the need to adhere to written procedures.

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF THE EVENT

The EDG output breaker was inoperable for only a few seconds at a time. Therefore, this event had minimal safety significance.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

SAW ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATION STATION
UNIT 3

DOCKET NUMBER
05000362

LER NUMBER
95-003-00

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ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

During the last three years, Edison has submitted two LERs for failure to follow approved procedures:

2-95-005, Loss of Pressurizer Level Due To a Valve Alignment Error

2-95-006, Reactor Coolant System Dissolved Oxygen Out of Specification

These events did not involve electrical test technicians.