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MEETING WITH JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT COMPANY - OYSTER CREEK I
DOCKET NO. 50-219

1.0 General

A meeting was held with representatives of Jersey Central Power & Light Company (JCP&L) and General Electric (GE) on February 27, 1969 to discuss three problem areas which require resolution prior to licensing. A list of attendees is attached.

The items discussed were:

1. Deficiencies in number and quality of the startup personnel of JCP&L and GE.
2. Variances from written test procedures during the primary containment leak rate test which make the results questionable.
3. The inability of the secondary containment to meet Technical Specification requirements.

2.0 Discussion

2.1 Startup and Operating Organizations

The operating organization which the applicant and GE propose for plant startup differs from that described in the FSAR and is deficient in some areas when compared to the requirements of the Technical Specifications.

The changes in the Jersey Central Organization from that previously described are listed below in the order of their occurrence.

- 2.1.1 The original candidate for Technical Engineer has left Jersey Central's employ. It is not planned to fill this position, but to divide the responsibilities between his two assistants.

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- 2.1.2 The Technical Supervisor will leave the operating staff to join the General Public Utilities' Nuclear Support Group. His replacement is already understudying the position and the shift will not take place until the replacement is qualified.
- 2.1.3 The candidate for Operations Supervisor did not take the Senior Operator (SRO) licensing exam. The Technical Specifications require that position to be filled by a SRO. JCP&L depended on the GE counterpart to fill this position for initial plant operation, but he also failed to obtain his SRO license.
- 2.1.4 One of the five proposed candidates for Shift Supervisor (SS) failed both the SRO and Reactor Operator (RO) examinations. All the other candidates for SS passed the SRO exam.
- 2.1.5 The experienced Maintenance Supervisor is retiring soon after plant operation and no replacement has yet been found.
- 2.1.6 The number of candidates for RO licenses exactly matches the number required by the Technical Specifications, leaving no margin against failure on the exam.

Because it has been planned that JCP&L would only assume responsibility for plant operation after startup and power operation, these changes, except for the lack of an Operations Supervisor, do not pose an immediate problem.

The inadequacies in the GE startup personnel pose an immediate concern because of initial responsibility for plant operation. The sequence of events leading to our concern is as follows:

- a. GE's original candidate for Operations Superintendent, equivalent to the JCP&L Operations Supervisor, was transferred to another position.
- b. One of the candidates for the Operations Shift Supervisor and the candidate for Relief Shift Supervisor had no previous power reactor experience, and were therefore ineligible under the Commission's rule (10CFR § 55.35) to take the cold test for SRO.
- c. Of the original seven candidates proposed for SRO licenses, one was sick and failed to take the exam, two Operations Shift Supervisors and the Relief Shift Supervisor obtained SRO licenses, two Shift Supervisors obtained only RO licenses, and the candidate for Operations Superintendent only passed the RO license exam.

In addition, there were weaknesses in the startup technical support group. The Principal Engineer for Test Design and Analysis was not scheduled to be at the plant fulltime. The Technical Supervisor was the only one of the permanent shift technical people to have any operating or startup experience. GE planned to supplement these people, with specialists from San Jose for specific tests. During the course of the meeting, GE proposed to have a senior man with previous BWR startup experience present at all times.

2.2 Primary Containment Leak Rate Test


The results of the primary leak rate test were considered questionable because of the deviations from the written test procedures. An attempt was made before and during the test to introduce a water leg upstream of the main steam line valves in order to reduce leakage. It was not known whether the attempt was successful and whether it influenced the results. GE's position was that this environment was more like that of the actual accident environment. The staff disagreed and pointed out that this was not in the written test procedure and no other previous test at any facility used this technique. In addition, other valves were exercised in an attempt to reduce leakage. GE stated that the leak rate at 35 psig was 6 ft³/min which corresponds to a leak rate on the range from 0.95 to 1.1%/day which GE claimed marginally met the Technical Specification limit. If after consultation with the staff another test were necessary, GE proposed to run it after fuel loading, but before steaming because repairs to the main steam line valves would require approximately 4 weeks. JCP&L had not yet officially seen the results of the first test and had not signed off on it.

2.3 Secondary Leak Rate Test

GE stated that the 1200 cfm exhaust fans were not able to maintain a negative pressure of 0.25 inches of water in the secondary containment because of deficiencies in the design and construction of the metal panelled walls of the reactor building. GE has started procurement of additional fans to raise the capacity to 2500-3000 cfm, and plans to add additional filter capacity to each train. GE stated that offsite doses would not be increased by the reduced residence time in the building. The projected change would require 6 weeks for design and installation; therefore, GE requested a waiver of the requirement that this system be operational during fuel loading, reasoning that there were no substantial fission products present during this period.

3.0 Resolution

A tentative staff position was taken that some means of resolution of these items was necessary before issuance of the Provisional Operating License. Considerations included limited power operation. However, no action was taken at this time pending further response from Jersey Central on what it intends to do to resolve the matters.



Mark J. Wetterhahn
Reactor Project Branch 2
Division of Reactor Licensing

Attachment:
List of Attendees

Distribution:
Docket File ✓
DRL Reading
RPB-2 Reading
P. A. Morris
F. Schroeder
S. Levine
R. DeYoung
Branch Chiefs, DRL
CO (2)
H. Steele
V. Stello
M. Wetterhahn
Attendees, AEC

ATTACHMENT A

ATTENDANCE

JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

OYSTER CREEK

FEBRUARY 27, 1969

AEC - DRL

F. Schroeder

S. Ievine

D. Skovholt

R. Boyd

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J. Buzy

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REG

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