

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

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TO : Roger S. Boyd, Assistant Director
for Reactor Projects, DRL
THRU: Robert L. Tedesco, Chief *R*
Reactor Project Branch 2, DRL
FROM : V. Stello *VS*
Nuclear Systems Technology Branch, DRL
SUBJECT: MINUTES OF OYSTER CREEK MEETING - DOCKET NO. 50-219

DATE: May 29, 1967

Another meeting was held with representatives of Jersey Central and General Electric on May 17-18, 1967. The following were in attendance:

AEC

R. L. Tedesco, DRL
A. J. Rizzo, DRL
V. A. Moore, DRL
D. F. Sullivan, DRL
V. Stello, DRL
H. J. Richings, DRL
J. R. Sears, CO
R. L. Ferguson, DRS
H. Denton, CO

GE

M. R. Lane
A. J. McCrochlin
R. A. Huggins
R. V. Poe
T. E. Bloom
L. Stanley
M. A. Head
R. J. McWhorter

Jersey Central

T. J. McCluskey
D. R. Rees
J. V. Neely
D. E. Hetrick
G. H. Ritter

ORNL

P. Rubel

Burns & Roe

E. Nobile, Jr.
G. A. Lari

Pickard & Lowe

W. W. Lowe

The purpose of the meeting was to review the Oyster Creek instrumentation and control design. As has been our practice, an agenda was provided to the applicant prior to the meeting to identify our areas of interest.

Before reviewing the specifics of the meeting, it is appropriate to comment on the overall proceedings. In general we are having apparent communication problems with Jersey Central and General Electric. Although we prepared a topical agenda, discussions at the meeting, in many cases, indicated a lack of responsiveness to provide us with necessary information. There were many areas which we believed were of a basic design



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119

nature wherein a responsive answer would have been adequate. However, our discussions were usually terminated with little or nothing clarified or resolved; in fact, we find more questions being developed. The excuse was that the "right" people were not present to provide the answers. This trend has existed in past meetings and appears to be continuing. We have no explanation for this mode of operation but wonder about the final outcome. Meetings covering detailed areas of design have been held with GE on many occasions on other cases and this problem did not exist. We now believe that an alternate approach should be considered in dealing with the Oyster Creek review. Accordingly, we propose to minimize our meetings (frequency and length) and place more emphasis on developing detailed questions. Subsequent to receiving formal answers, we would meet with JC and GE. It appears that this alternate approach is warranted since we need additional information and recognize the approaching pressures of a "tight" schedule.

Detailed areas discussed included the following:

1. A presentation of the hardware for the rod worth minimizer (RWM) was made. GE restated the position that no "credit" has been taken for the RWM and JC indicated they would start up the plant if the RWM is inoperable. We find these positions difficult to accept. Clearly the intent of the RWM is to prevent rod patterns that could lead to unacceptable operating conditions. This device should provide assurance that a more favorable operating condition is achieved than would be attainable without it. We are requesting detailed information on the RWM via formal questions. After receiving the answers, it is our intent to propose a formal position.
2. Availability studies for the core spray and power system were discussed. Availability is calculated with an assumed time element of 100 hours. Since Oyster Creek's reactor can have a "bottom break," the core spray system may be required to function for as much as 5000 hours if the containment were not flooded. After we discussed this problem, JC made a statement that containment flooding would be proposed. Discussions on availability of power were not fruitful. However, both GE and JC maintain the position that the reliability of power is adequate and therefore a second diesel is not required. We expect to present a position on the second diesel prior to the June 1967 ACRS sub-committee meeting.

3. Qualification testing was discussed. It is not clear that behavior of instruments during blowdown will be acceptable. The only test specifically related to blowdown was performed on the level sensor. A blowdown from 1500 psia to 900 psia was conducted to establish the response of the "reference leg" of the sensor. No indication as to expected behavior was apparent from this test.
4. Discussions on basis for scram settings, instrument errors, and heat balance had to be postponed as the "right" people were not available to answer questions.
5. Incorporation of additional signals to initiate the actuation of the core spray system were discussed. GE admits that they are studying the problem but did not make any commitments.
6. I telephoned R. Huggins of GE on May 26, 1967, to clarify the criterion used for physical separation of channels. He indicated that except for three cases, listed below, the lead for each sensor is in a separate conduit. But no specific criterion is followed to physically separate the leads from either channel. This violates the criterion inferred in paragraph 7.2.1.4 on page VII-7-2 of the FD&SAR. R. Huggins indicated that they would clarify this point in response to our questions. The three exceptions where both subchannels are routed in the same conduit are:
 - (a) condenser vacuum
 - (b) scram dump tank level
 - (c) position switch on main steam isolation valves (used to scram when valves close).

A sensor, condenser vacuum, cannot be tested during normal operation.

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